

ALLENBY IN EGYPT

BEING VOLUME II OF
ALLENBY: A STUDY IN GREATNESS

By
FIELD-MARSHAL
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OF CYRENAICA AND WINCHESTER
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VICEROY OF INDIA

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TO
MY FRIENDS IN EGYPT

WHO SHOWED SO STOUT A HEART
WHEN THE TEST OF THEIR FRIENDSHIP CAME

PREFACE

I UNDERTOOK the writing of Allenby's biography nearly seven years ago—shortly after his death. I was then commanding a division at Aldershot; busy, but not so busy that I could not hope to complete the work in reasonable time. It took me many months to collect material, since Allenby had left no record of his life and no papers. Just as I had got fairly started on the writing I was sent to command in Palestine, and soon had to deal with a rebellion there. I returned to England in 1938 to take over the Southern Command, the largest and busiest in England, and again could spare little time for writing. When I was ordered to the Middle East, two months before the outbreak of the present war, I had almost finished the account of Allenby's military career, but had not begun the equally, or more, interesting history of his work as High Commissioner in Egypt. As I saw little prospect of writing this while the war lasted I arranged to publish what had already been done, leaving the Egyptian story till after the war. The result was *Allenby: A Study in Greatness*, which was published in 1940. It told of Allenby's life up to the end of the war against the Turks in 1918.

During the first two years of the present war, when my headquarters were in Egypt, it seemed a pity not to take advantage of being on the spot and at least to collect material from those who had known and worked with Allenby, British or Egyptian. Gradually the present volume was compiled. It was written in spare hours or half-hours, often separated by days, weeks, or even months, during two years of intense military work. Some

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of it was written in my frequent aeroplane journeys. On being transferred to India nearly two years ago I laid the manuscript aside. I felt, however, that the record of Allenby's courage and leadership could not fail to be an inspiration in these troubled times. So I have lately made a special effort to revise and complete it.

The story of Allenby's work in Egypt has not before been told in any detail or with fairness to Allenby; Lord Lloyd's *Egypt since Cromer* was obviously written without full knowledge of the facts. Allenby cared for results only, and never chose to justify or explain them. It is hoped that the present story, of which the facts can be guaranteed, will enable a better judgment of his career and character to be made. I believe it will be held fully to justify the sub-title of the previous volume—"A Study in Greatness". I believe also that the stout support Egyptians have given us in this war, especially at times when our victory must have seemed doubtful to them, can be attributed in some measure to the impression that Allenby left of British resolution and fair dealing.

Since this second volume has appeared after so long an interval, I have caused to be reprinted here—as "Allenby the Man" and "Allenby the General"—the prologue and epilogue of the previous volume, which summarize Allenby's character and military qualities. They will help the reader to appraise Allenby's career and character as a whole.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to two men who have most generously helped me with information—Sir Walford Selby and Gerald Delany. They lived through the events described, had intimate knowledge of the personalities concerned, and possessed a keen sense of history. Selby, as a member of the Residency staff in Cairo and later of the Foreign Office, has given me the inside, official viewpoint. Delany, as Reuter's representative in Egypt for many years, has been in close touch with both official and

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unofficial circles, British and Egyptian; his knowledge and judgment of events in Egypt are unrivalled. He was better qualified than I to write this book, but has generously given me instead his knowledge and help. I hope that he will soon write his own book on Egypt. Among others who have given me valuable help and advice are the late Sir Maurice Amos, Sir Alexander Keown-Boyd, and R. A. Furness, who were all three on the staff at the Residency during Allenby's term of office, and Colonel R. H. Andrew, Lord Allenby's nephew. I thank the Foreign Office for allowing me to see the official documents of the period. Finally, I thank my cousin, Raymond Wavell-Paxton, for all the work he has done in dealing with my publishers at home in my absence abroad.

I deeply regret that Lady Allenby, who asked me to undertake this Memoir of her husband, did not live to see the task completed. She leaves with all who know her the memory of a gracious and noble woman, a fitting companion to her great husband.

A. P. W.

*New Delhi,
April 1943.*

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
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LORD ALLENBY WITH HIS PET STORK IN THE RESIDENCY
GARDEN, CAIRO



ALLENBY BRIDGES

These two bridges named after Lord Allenby may be used to contrast the two sides of his career and character. The Allenby Bridge over the Jordan—the one in the background—erected during the war, was a severe, uncompromising structure of steel girders, invaluable but austere. The fishing bridge, over a stretch of the Avon near Salisbury where Allenby often fished, was put up by Colonel Bailey, of Lake, and other friends, in memory of a fellow-fisherman, and may typify the inner, deeper side of his nature, which loved the country and birds and flowers and peace.

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ALLENBY THE MAN¹

ALLENBY was the last man who would have cared what his biographer wrote of him, or, indeed, that his biography should be written at all. He never troubled to explain his successes or to justify any action he had taken; he bore no grudge against his critics or detractors; he left behind no account of his life and no material to compile one; he had, in truth, a certain impatience with those who recalled past events, saying that it was only the future that mattered. Yet it is well that an attempt should be made to tell his story and to paint his portrait. Not only is there interest in the record of one who was a successful soldier in the most testing of all wars and a wise, sympathetic administrator in perplexed countries at difficult times; but also Allenby's character was of such rare truth and strength that it can serve as a model, and yet of such humanity—rough, violent humanity at times—that it can escape the aversion that most people feel towards anyone held up as a model.

His fame as a soldier rests secure on two brilliant campaigns in Palestine and Syria. The Great War of 1914-18 was mostly hard, pitiless, clumsy pounding, and the manoeuvres of those five years that will be remembered and discussed as examples of the strategist's art are few. Tannenberg, the Marne, the campaigns on the Russian front in 1914 and 1915, the overrunning of Serbia and of Rumania, the operations that began at Gaza-Beersheba and ended with the fall of Jerusalem, the final annihilation of the Turkish armies in Palestine

¹ This formed the Prologue to Vol. I.

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and Syria—these will form the main material for textbook analysis and discussion. In two of them, the master-hand was Allenby's; and while it is true that the odds in numbers and equipment were on his side in his victories, the manner of their accomplishment showed a bigness of conception and a firmness of execution that must give him a high place among great captains of war. The opening of the Arras battle in April 1917 showed that even in the close-locked conditions of trench warfare he could plan on original lines: had he remained in France and been given the opportunity he might well have developed a technique in position warfare that would have brought an earlier end to the long conflict; it is notable that two prominent officers of the Tank Corps have recorded that he was the most understanding of the high commanders on the Western Front. Indeed, Allenby had qualities of courage, loyalty, directness of thought and purpose, knowledge of his profession and common sense in the application of his knowledge, that would have made him a great soldier in any age and under any conditions.¹

He brought these same qualities, together with a patience and a tolerance that were innate in him, though his appearance and manner did not always suggest them, to his task of administering first the occupied enemy territories that his troops had overrun in Palestine, Syria, and beyond, and later the ancient, baffling land of Egypt at a difficult and dangerous period. His success as diplomat and administrator has been more questioned than his ability as a soldier; and his handling of the Egyptian problem has been bitterly criticized in some quarters. Allenby never replied or defended himself: it was not his way. It will be possible one day to provide a basis on which his actions in Egypt can be better under-

¹ Had he lived in the Middle Ages he might have inspired a statue in Whitehall like Verrocchio's statue of Colleoni in Venice.

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stood and judged, but the later course of events has been the best justification of his foresight and good sense.

The official records and documents of his victories as a soldier and of his success or failure as an administrator will remain available for future strategists and historians to dissect and discuss; but history, and more especially military history, is dry, misleading stuff without a clear understanding of the character and motives of the chief actors. It is like tinned food: it lacks the vitamins necessary for health. The aim of this biography is to leave on record, while memory is fresh and many of those who knew him well are still alive, a portrait of Allenby as a man, rather than to describe in detail his achievements in war and peace. He is perhaps too near yet for a final estimate as general and administrator, but he will soon be too far for a contemporary portrait as a man.

Allenby came from the English countryside, of old-rooted English stock. He was the embodiment of those virtues which the Englishman likes to think most typical of his race—tolerance and kindness, love of peace and order and fair dealing. Allenby had no family tradition of military service, and glory was the last idea that would ever have entered his head. His attitude to soldiering was not that of the professional man-at-arms seeking a bubble reputation, but rather that of the good citizen who bears arms in the defence of peace and trade, but longs always to return from the distasteful necessity of fighting to his beloved countryside or town, to his home and his business. While still a young officer Allenby once confided to a friend that to have a garden and to grow roses was the thing in life that made most appeal to him. But, having once adopted a military career, the deep sense of duty and loyalty which was the guiding motive of his whole life caused him to give of his best unsparingly, and made him sometimes a hard taskmaster to those

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under him. He had little personal ambition, and never sought advancement; but his character and abilities made it certain that advancement would come to him. Nor did Allenby ever pretend not to enjoy the exercise of power and the privileges and position that it gave him.

His mind had breadth and poise rather than any great depth. He had not a creative and imaginative brain, like Marlborough: his military genius was colder and stiffer, like that of Wellington, the very embodiment of character and common sense. He had the gift of a wonderfully retentive memory, and he stored it wisely, adding a sound knowledge of his profession and much of the learning of a scholar to the lore of the countryside that he had acquired in youth. In all three departments he kept his stock fresh and up to date. Indeed, Allenby's range of information was remarkable, and it was not wise in his presence to lay down the law on any subject, unless very sure of the facts: he was disconcertingly likely to have read more, thought more, and remembered more on the same subject. He made no parade of his knowledge, and never talked for effect; but he would not pass uncorrected any inaccurate or ignorant statement made in his presence. He was studious, and read much; he enjoyed foreign travel, and missed no opportunity to visit fresh countries and see new sights; but most he loved the quiet and peaceful things of life—gardens and birds and old buildings. Fishing was his favourite recreation.

All this does not seem to accord well with his nickname and traditional reputation in the Army as "the Bull". Yet the name was appropriate enough at first sight and knowledge of the man and to some of his moods. His size, bearing, and obvious physical strength were of themselves impressive: the frank, open countenance, with its firm jaw and steady eyes, gave assurance of power and courage; the voice was of a part with the form and face—strong, clear, and confident almost to

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arrogance. The conscious strength of form, face, and voice could affect very powerfully those who came in contact with him. To those who knew him well, and to those who faced him fairly and without fear, his dominant personality was an inspiration and support; to those who met him for the first time or were at all nervous in his presence he was without doubt alarming and disconcerting, especially in his official capacity. His manner was often gruff and abrupt; his questions were straight and sharp; and he demanded an immediate, direct reply. Any attempt at prevarication, any indefiniteness, even hesitation, might provoke a sudden explosion of anger that could shake the hardiest.

But it needed no long acquaintance with Allenby to realize that his nickname was appropriate to externals only, that the man was big mentally and morally as well as physically, and that, in spite of his volcanic outbursts of temper, his attitude to men was at bottom kindly and tolerant. The outstanding spiritual characteristic of Allenby was a greatness of mind that matched his bigness of body; he was incapable of the least meanness or pettiness of spirit in his dealings with persons or with questions of conduct. However violently his anger might rage, he never cherished a grudge or bore any ill-will. Though intensely self-reliant, he was not obstinate, and would always listen to the views of those who had special knowledge, accepting their advice if he judged it sound. Once his mind was made up he asked no one to share his responsibility. If things went well, he was generous in his acknowledgement of the services of his subordinates; if things went ill, he was sparing of blame and never stooped to shirk his own responsibility or to defend himself.

He was always grave and courteous to women, and all women liked him; to children he was kind and humorous, and children adored him. With men he was

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reserved, even with those who knew him best, and remained, except on rare occasions, somewhat aloof and Olympian—as little likely to ask for confidences as to give them, so sure of himself as hardly to recognize the existence of doubts in lesser men. His path through life was simple, straight, and direct; neither fear nor favour could ever make him swerve from it, and the end he sought was peace and quiet, the peace of the English countryside from which he sprang.

Such is the outline that the following pages will attempt to develop into a portrait, the portrait of a great soldier and a very gallant and honourable gentleman, whose family motto, *Fide et labore* (“By loyalty and service”), records the faith by which he lived and died.

ALLENBY THE GENERAL¹

ALTHOUGH Allenby was to give another eight strenuous years to the service of his country, and, as Field-Marshal, to remain on the active list to the end of his life, his career as a commander of troops in the field virtually ended when the armistice with Turkey was concluded. Therefore this seems the appropriate place to attempt some estimate of his generalship and of his place on the roll of great British soldiers. He would have claimed no such place for himself, not because of any conscious modesty, but simply because he would not have thought it worth while for anyone to spend time in discussing his merits or demerits. What he had been given to do he had done to the best of his ability; the results, good and bad, were there for the world to see and judge.

Allenby had been successful. Whether his successes were due to fortune, to the work of his staff, to the fighting qualities of his troops, to the weakness of the enemy, or to his own skill, let anyone decide for himself. He would do nothing, by speech or writing, to influence the verdict, except to give most generous tribute to all those who had helped him. What mattered now was the next job of work, not discussion of the last. If Allenby had been a bridge-player he would have permitted no post-mortems; he would simply have recorded the score with a word of praise or condolence to his partner and would have concentrated on the next deal.² And when all work was

¹ This formed the Epilogue to Vol. I.

² On drafts of the Official History submitted to him, for instance, he made few comments, unless to emphasize the skill or coolness of one of his subordinates.

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done it was surely better to spend one's last years in the study of living birds and beasts and flowers and in visiting new corners of the earth than in discussing old, dead events that had passed beyond recall, for good or for evil. "Once you have taken a decision, never look back on it," was one of Allenby's favourite maxims. Few have had the strength of mind to act on it as wholly as he did.

Not many generals, certainly few modern generals, can have had Allenby's experience as a commander in the field and on the training ground. On active service he had commanded a troop in Zululand and Bechuanaland; a squadron, a regiment, a column (the equivalent of a brigade), in the South African War; a division, a Corps, an Army, and finally an independent Expeditionary Force in the Great War. In peace he had led and trained a troop, a squadron, a regiment, a brigade, a division—not for a season or so, in the intervals of staff employment, but each for several years. In addition to all this practical experience, he had studied the theory of his profession seriously; he had passed the course of the Staff College, and had held a staff appointment most efficiently. It would be difficult for any critic to find fault with his professional equipment for command.

He was, however, no narrow-minded specialist; he had an unusual range of interests and knowledge outside his profession. And what he knew, military or secular, he knew thoroughly; there was nothing superficial about Allenby's store of information, as many a shallow conversationalist or plausible commanding officer found to his cost. Also he had travelled widely, and had used eyes, ears, and tongue with understanding.

In all professions, and especially in the military, character is of greater importance than brains or experience. Allenby's character can surely be judged adequate to the most searching calls that the testing

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profession of arms could make. He had absolute courage, physical and moral—a courage so complete that he seemed almost unaware that such a quality existed; he acted quickly and coolly in danger, not because danger excited him to action, but because there was work to be done at once. His loyalty to his superiors went beyond deeds; he would brook no word of criticism of their orders or decisions. He had an even rarer quality, possibly—that of trusting his own subordinates. Courage, loyalty, trust, straightforwardness—all these were Allenby's; and these are surely the prime qualities required of one in whose keeping the welfare, the honour, and the lives of many men are placed.

What, then, was wanting in Allenby that his greatness was so reluctantly admitted by some, that he was so unpopular a figure for a great part of his military career? He lacked a measure of self-control, a little humanity, the power to communicate enthusiasm and to inspire disciples. His sudden explosions of temper, his occasional almost childish petulance, did his reputation the more harm since he never troubled to correct the impression they created. Only those who stood near to him and saw him daily knew how little they represented the true nature of the man. Allenby never quite realized that men are governed through the emotions rather than through the intelligence. There was an aloofness about him, a suggestion of mental superiority, that kept him from the hearts of his officers and men—perhaps designedly, for any show of affection would have embarrassed him greatly. He lacked the spur of ambition; duty was the mainspring that drove him, and duty is a less powerful motive of action than ambition for a career or zeal for a cause.

As a general in high command he used surprise and mobility as his main weapons for the discomfiture of his adversaries; these, and relentless vigour in pursuit, are

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the principal lessons that students of his campaigns will note. They may mark also his willingness to take chances, though doing all in his power to minimize them. Allenby was no reckless gambler; he calculated the odds carefully, but when they were in his favour and the gain was great he accepted risks cheerfully. The soft modern doctrine of 'Safety first', which so often marks the decline of businesses, of governments, of armies, and of nations, found no place in Allenby's creed. His skill in planning and in deceiving his enemy was not the result of sudden flashes of inspiration, but of much reading and study of past campaigns and of present conditions. His mind did not work very swiftly, except in action, but surely.

A less obvious quality, but one that was the real foundation of his successes, was the care for administration, which has been emphasized in the course of the narrative. Administration is not a showy quality, and is apt to receive scant attention in the writing of military histories. "Where do you read that Sir Tristram weighed out hay and corn, that Sir Lancelot distributed billets, or that any knight of the Round Table condescended to higgie about a truss of straw?" scornfully cries a character in one of Scott's novels. But if these knights had indeed not troubled to supervise such details of interior economy, be sure that their enterprises would have miscarried. Allenby made no such mistake; he never interfered in details, but he insisted on being satisfied at all times that every possible preparation had been made for the supply of food and munitions and stores, for the health of his troops, and for the care of the sick and wounded. The exception was in pursuit; then he was prepared to disregard the warnings of his supply officers and to call on his troops to live hard and fight hard, so that the enemy should be given no opportunity to live and fight again.

His method of command was a more personal one than that of most commanders of great armies—modern

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armies, that is. Once he knew and trusted his staff he spent as little time as possible in the office and as much time as possible with his army—by no means always with the forward troops, but also in visiting bases, hospitals, workshops, training camps, and all establishments by which the army lived, moved, and had its being. His physique and appearance stood him in good stead. He could endure continual long journeys over dusty, bumpy tracks, often in great heat, without the least apparent fatigue; and his bearing left an ineffaceable impression on the minds of his troops. No soldier who had seen Allenby—and practically all his soldiers did see Allenby—could have any doubt that he was being commanded, or that operations would not fail from lack of vigour and decision in high places.

His ideas on discipline were simple: an order was an order, a regulation was a regulation, to be obeyed without question, at all times, and in all circumstances. His strict enforcement of certain orders, such as the keeping of chin-straps down and the wearing of steel helmets, and of certain prohibitions—for example, against riding in cut-shorts or tying horses to trees—has been the cause of many of the stories told of him, and has left in the minds of some an impression of a senseless martinet who delighted in petty details of dress and discipline. This is not the truth: the orders he insisted on had all a reason of good common sense; he relaxed or cancelled many restrictions that seemed to him unnecessary, and never troubled about small idiosyncracies of dress or routine. What Allenby would never consent to do was to turn a blind eye to infringement of orders, or to make any allowance for circumstances. Hence his rating of half-dazed men who had been fighting for hours because their chin-straps were not down, his ban on cut-shorts even in the tropical heat of the Jordan valley, his explosion of anger

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because he found a corpse in the trenches wearing a cap instead of a steel helmet.

His critics overlook, or do not realize, how seldom Allenby punished, except with his tongue. When he commanded a regiment some of his officers thought him unduly lenient; as a higher commander, when he reviewed the sentences of courts-martial or other matters of discipline, he always took the greatest pains to understand any case brought before him, and was on the side of mercy whenever possible.¹ With officers, even senior officers, he was often harsh in words and manner, sometimes in the presence of their juniors; this was resented by many. But with Allenby duty came first and personal feelings (his own or anyone else's) much later. "I do not care if I am fair or unfair to anyone, if I think they do not do their work," he once said to one of his staff. At the same time he gave every one a chance; and if he was doing his best he seldom removed him from his post, even though his best was not very good. Allenby preferred to be served by an honest mediocrity whom he could trust than by one of better capacity of whose honesty and loyalty he was not sure.

Allenby was a purist, sometimes almost a pedant, in the use of the English language. His style, both official and colloquial, was simple and severe; good, plain, homespun English, purged of all superfluous adjectives or adverbs, all neologisms, colloquialisms, or idiosyncracies. Once his standard was known it was easy enough to draft a document for him; but officers new to his ways sometimes met rude rebuffs when they first produced work for him. Such a modernism as 'dump' would be removed

¹ A senior staff officer said of him, "He was the most just man I have ever served. In the matter of courts-martial, courts of inquiry, reports on inefficient officers, and so forth he took the greatest pains to ensure that justice was done, and that no question of bias or prejudice was allowed to intrude."

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with a caustic reproof from any official document submitted to him; if he met it verbally he might affect to be ignorant of its meaning. A split infinitive would be duly castigated, even though it were in a telegram which had to be enciphered, deciphered, and paraphrased before it reached its destination, in the course of which process the infinitive might be unsplit and resplit without the sender having any control over the matter.

After the Battle of Beersheba and the capture of Gaza the War Office, feeling that the brief record of these successes sent by Allenby would not satisfy the thirst of the public for news, cabled for a fuller account of Allenby's victories. An officer of the Intelligence Staff, realizing what was wanted, wrote a long telegram, rather in the style of an imaginative war correspondent presented with a 'scoop'. When it was placed before Allenby he exploded in wrath at the idea that such florid journalese might be sent in his name. His criticism having reduced the unfortunate author to a state of collapse, Allenby himself dictated a stately account of the operations, in which there was hardly an adjective, and certainly nothing to satisfy any public demand for picturesque detail.

If the foregoing is a fair summary of Allenby's military qualities and manners, what of the results they produced in the Great War? Some have gained the impression that he was a failure in France who surprisingly became a success in Palestine, either because the conditions were easier or because he was better suited by independent command. It was as though a forward taken out of the scrum and put at wing three-quarter had showed an unexpected turn of speed and scored several brilliant tries. But the player must have had pace and cunning all the time; and a crossing of the Mediterranean cannot have turned Allenby from a bad general into a good one. His alleged failure in the

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close-locked, muddy scrum in France needs further examination. In truth his record there was at least as good as that of any other British commander. In the hurly-burly of the Retreat from Mons and in the sudden rebound to the Aisne he kept his head as well as any, and better than some; the Cavalry Division may have done nothing very spectacular, but it covered the flanks of the army and kept a far more numerous force of enemy horsemen at a safe distance. In the First Battle of Ypres the Cavalry Corps under Allenby, in holding at bay so greatly superior a mass of enemy infantry, performed a feat of defence unrivalled in history by any other cavalry; and the chief credit was undoubtedly due to the composure, personal example, and iron resolution of its leader.

His handling of his next command, the Fifth Corps, has been much criticized. He is said to have been wasteful of life in making attacks or counter-attacks in conditions where there was little or no chance of success. Allenby, it should be noted, took over the Corps at the crisis of the Second Battle of Ypres, when fighting had been in progress for some time, much ground had already been lost, and it seemed doubtful whether Ypres itself could be held. He had no opportunity of getting to know the ground or the troops before his Corps had to withstand renewed heavy attacks. And he had orders to maintain his position at all costs. In this he was successful, and the Corps lost little ground in the closing stages of the battle. In the circumstances Allenby was bound to act as he did, and his firmness may have saved Ypres. But his harsh manner gave the unfortunate impression of a rough, obstinate commander who could only charge blindly forward.

His command of the Third Army showed that he was not careless of men's lives. In the ordinary day-to-day holding of the line its proportion of casualties

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was much lower than in the other Armies—this may have been partly due to better trenches—and Allenby ordered far fewer of the trench raids that were often the cause of needless losses and of costly retaliation. But again his roughness and outbursts of temper were the criterion by which the Army judged him. For the Arras battle, his one great opportunity in France, he has had less credit than he deserved. April 9, 1917, was the most successful day's fighting the British forces in France had yet had in two and a half years' warfare. Its success has been obscured by the subsequent slow progress and heavy losses. So far as Allenby himself is concerned, these later attacks were made on the plans of G.H.Q.; and the tired troops of the Third Army were never relieved by fresh divisions, as was done in the great battles of the Somme or Passchendaele. The last big attack of the Arras battle, an almost complete failure, was ordered to begin in the dark to suit the ideas of another Army commander and in spite of Allenby's protests.

While Allenby's reputation with the regimental officer and soldier was too much coloured by the sight and sound of a loud and angry man, the opinion of the higher staffs was influenced by his comparative silence and ineffectiveness at the periodical conferences of Army commanders. At these Allenby did not make the impression that his abilities warranted. He was not a ready debater; his mind, like a battleship, was powerful and weighty, but required space and time to turn or manoeuvre.¹ Haig and he were never congenial and always inclined to be tongue-tied in each other's presence.

Thus Allenby, unlike a prophet, had little honour in France save in his own circle, the circle of those who worked closely with him. These all recognized both his

¹ T. E. Lawrence once said of Allenby, "His mind is like the prow of the *Mauretania*. There is so much weight behind it that it does not need to be sharp like a razor."

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abilities and his true character, but their testimony had no more weight to leaven the general opinion of the Army as a whole than an article in a staid monthly magazine is likely to change the views formed by the general public from the popular daily papers. Allenby had a 'bad Press' when he was in France, and his reputation suffered accordingly. If his actual record of achievement is studied it will challenge comparison with that of any of his contemporaries.

There is no need to recapitulate his triumphs in Palestine. The manner in which they were accomplished surely gives reason for him to be regarded as the best British general of the Great War. He had more of the divine spark than the single-minded Haig, with equal resolution and courage; a greater driving-power, though less humanity, than Plumer; more force than Rawlinson and an equal shrewdness; a broader outlook than Maude; more experience of command than Robertson; a greater stability than the volatile Henry Wilson. He was of the same type as Wellington, with whom he had many points of resemblance, in his common-sense realism, in his flair for concealing his intentions and surprising his enemy, in his appreciation of the value of good administration, in his lack of the human touch.

Should Allenby be placed in the first rank of British commanders—that small, select band headed by Marlborough, whose genius for war challenges comparison with that of Napoleon or any of the world's great captains? Certainly he has not many superiors. He may have lacked something of the passion and creative energy of Cromwell, of the cold application of Wellington, of the fiery energy of Wolfe, of the warm humanity of Moore, of the organizing ability of Kitchener. But the British Army has had few leaders with better mental or physical equipment for the rough test of war, less likely to lose heart in the darkest hour, or more remorse-



Photo Central News

LORD ALLENBY WITH HIS MOTHER AND LADY ALLENBY

This photograph was taken at Felixstowe in 1919, on the occasion of Lord Allenby's receiving the freedom of the city.



Photo Central News

LORD ALLENBY, MR. LLOYD GEORGE, AND THE EMIR FEISAL LEAVING THE GUILDHALL

This photograph was taken during the Emir's visit to London after the Great War.

On the right is Lady Allenby.

ALLENBY THE GENERAL

less in pressing home an advantage and completing a victory; certainly none with a greater sense of loyalty and duty or more of the truth and straightforwardness that mark a great and generous nature.

BOOK III
PLOUGHSHARE

PROLOGUE
AFTERMATH OF WAR

(Syria and Palestine, November 1918-June 1920)

THE armistice with Turkey, signed on October 31, 1918, left Allenby master of all Palestine and Syria. His lightning campaign, which had carried his troops from near Jaffa to north of Aleppo, a distance of some 350 miles, in less than six weeks, had destroyed the enemy forces opposed to him with a completeness which seemed to dispose of all military difficulties in the Middle East.

But war creates as many fresh problems as it solves old ones. Allenby, at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919, found that the very thoroughness of his victory had stimulated the growth in the Near East of a whole crop of controversies that the overshadowing needs of war had hitherto kept from showing themselves above ground. They were political problems rather than military; but Allenby, as Commander-in-Chief, had to find at least a temporary settlement of them until the Peace Conference could make its decisions. There was the administration of the whole of Syria to be arranged, with French and Arabs urging their claims with passion and bitterness. In the area to the north of Aleppo, Turkish generals with large armed forces still under their control were disregarding the terms of the armistice; and the Armenian population was calling for protection. The

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methods and date of demobilization were causing some restlessness in the minds of the war-weary troops, and would be a source of trouble unless carefully handled. There was the disposal of great numbers of Turkish prisoners and Armenian refugees to be settled as well as of quantities of animals and masses of stores of every kind. All this was in addition to the daily administration of a large body of troops scattered over an area of poor communications, some five hundred miles long and varying between fifty and one hundred in breadth.

At first the troubles were only in front, in the newly conquered areas. Behind the forward area the Military Administration in Palestine was doing admirable work; there was little foreboding yet of the effects of the Balfour Declaration or of the conflict between Arab and Jew that was to cause such suffering and perplexity in the Holy Land. Farther back still, at the base in Egypt, all seemed well; the Egyptians had remained quiet and apparently contented throughout the war, which had brought their land much profit in money; there was no one who realized the strength of the hostility, caused by real grievances, that was smouldering in the minds of educated Egyptians and fellahin alike, and was to break out so suddenly and so fiercely.

The organization of conquered Syria and Palestine was Allenby's first care. He had laid down the outlines shortly before the armistice with Turkey. The whole of Palestine became O.E.T.A.¹ South, under Major-General Sir Arthur Money, who already administered the portion of Palestine occupied before the final offensive. The coastal portion of Syria from Alexandretta to Acre, including Beirut and the Lebanon, was placed under French administration, and was called at first O.E.T.A. North (later West). O.E.T.A. East, under Arab administration, was a large, somewhat indeterminate area

¹ Occupied Enemy Territory Administration.

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stretching from Aleppo to Damascus to the east of the French zone and thence southward to include the Hauran and the country now known as Trans-Jordan. Later, when Cilicia was occupied in December 1918, a new area was formed known as O.E.T.A. North, under a French administrator, the name of the original O.E.T.A. North being changed to O.E.T.A. West. All four administrations were under the direct authority of Allenby as Commander-in-Chief; and complex problems of currency, finance, public works, police, justice, refugees, poor relief, and so forth were referred, in three languages, to his headquarters for decision. The Quartermaster-General, a wary Scot, refused to let his Staff or Financial Adviser have anything to do with the administration of Occupied Enemy Territory; so the General Staff, rushing in where Adjutant-Generals feared to tread, became involved in complicated financial, legal and administrative problems.¹ Beyond the area of the O.E.T.A.'s there was a purely military control, under the G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps, General Sir Harry Chauvel, using the Turkish officials, of an area to the north of the Baghdad Railway including the towns of Marash, Aintab, and Urfa, which had been occupied at the end of 1918 to prevent the threatened massacre of Armenians by the withdrawing Turkish troops.

Allenby, following his usual practice, travelled the huge area he controlled, and settled problems on the spot as far as possible. His responsibilities stretched from his base in Egypt, still under martial law, across Sinai, where was his line of communication by the military railway; over all Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Syria; to places more than one hundred miles north and east of Aleppo;

¹ A basis of agreement on many of the problems common to all the areas of occupation was laid down at a conference of their administrators and staffs held at Mount Carmel in June 1919, under Sir Arthur Money.

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and in Cilicia up to the Taurus Mountains in the northwest. His headquarters were now at Haifa, on Mount Carmel.

There soon arose anxious problems to be solved. The first came to a head from the refusal of certain Turkish Generals, of whom the most prominent was Ali Ihsan Pasha, commander of the forces withdrawn from the Mesopotamian front, to disband their armies in compliance with the armistice terms. They were beyond easy reach by direct action, and Allenby had no wish to become committed any deeper into Turkish territory; so he decided to bring pressure on the Turkish Government. At the beginning of February 1919 he went, in the battleship *Téméraire*, from Haifa to Constantinople, then in Allied occupation; and interviewed the Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of War. The meeting showed Allenby's personality at its most dominant. The Ministers came prepared to discuss and argue; Allenby merely read out his demands, which included the removal of Ali Ihsan, handed them a copy, and insisted on immediate acceptance without discussion or argument. The Turkish Ministers, taken completely aback, hastily promised to comply with the requirements, and were so impressed with Allenby's firmness that they did so with all haste. Ali Ihsan was soon afterwards removed from his command, and the obstruction ceased. Allenby had remained only thirty-six hours in Constantinople, and had accomplished his purpose in five minutes, merely by a display of his inflexible determination.

Syria was the next problem. During the early part of 1919 friction between French and Arabs was increasing; and the French were becoming exasperated at what they considered British encouragement of the Arab cause. The French claim to predominance in Syria was based on sentiment and tradition rather than on any rights or

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even special interests; but it was none the less real and had been recognized by the British Government in the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. The French now complained that British officers were openly supporting the Arab claim to control the whole of Syria, and they accused Allenby himself of partiality. As Allenby wrote to a friend at this time:

There is plenty to do and plenty to think about. All nations and would-be nations and all shades of religions and politics are up against each other and trying to get me to commit myself on their side. I am keeping my end up, so far; but there is need to walk warily.¹

Feisal had gone to Europe to plead the Arab cause, and presently Allenby was summoned, early in March 1919, to appear at the Peace Conference and to give his views on the Syrian question. At a meeting in Paris on March 20 he stated that if the French were imposed on an unwilling Syria "there would be trouble and even war" between French and Arabs. On the next day, when he had been in Paris barely thirty-six hours, Allenby received instructions from the Cabinet to return to Egypt as Special High Commissioner and to restore order there.

Before dealing with the causes of this sudden appointment, it will be as well to outline the subsequent course of events in Syria. Although Allenby continued to be responsible for the military administration in Syria for another seven or eight months, his main preoccupation was henceforth to be with Egypt. The Peace Conference, from which he had been called so abruptly, decided to postpone the difficult solution by appointing a Commission of American, British, and French representatives to visit Syria and ascertain the wishes of the population at first hand. This would have been, if carried out, in accordance with a pledge given by Allenby on behalf of

¹ From a letter to Major-General J. Vaughan (March 2, 1919).

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the British and French Governments on November 7, 1918, a few days after the armistice with Turkey, to the effect that the aim of the Allies was to set up National Governments deriving from the free choice of the inhabitants. The British representatives on the Commission were Sir Henry McMahon and D. G. Hogarth, both men of well-known integrity, standing, and knowledge, as were also the Americans, Charles Crane and Dr. H. C. King. The French, however, aware of their unpopularity in Syria, negatived the proposed inquiry simply by appointing no representatives at all. They preferred to seek their ends by diplomatic pressure in Paris. The British knew well that the French would refuse to accept the findings of a Commission on which they had not been represented; but could find no means to make them appoint representatives. Eventually the Americans proceeded to Syria alone. Their report showed that an American mandate would be welcomed, a British tolerated, and a French rejected; also that Syria and Palestine must be treated as a whole, as under the Turks, and not separated. But before they returned—indeed, almost before their departure—French diplomacy, working among the devious bargainings of the Conference, had gained its ends over Syria. To retain Iraq and Palestine the British Prime Minister had agreed that Syria should be placed under French mandate. The American report was not even made public.

Though no mandate had yet been issued and the decision of the Peace Conference was in theory still open, the French obtained from the British Government, which was becoming alarmed at the cost of the many Armies of Occupation, an undertaking that French troops should relieve British in Syria in the autumn of 1919. This withdrawal of British troops and the substitution of French units took place in November. It very nearly led to an armed conflict of Arabs and French between

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Damascus and Beirut; only Allenby's authority prevented it. He was at Beirut at the time with the French commander, General Gouraud, and sent a staff officer to interpose himself between the two forces and to dissuade the Arabs from their intention of attacking. It was the last act of his command in Syria, and postponed the conflict between French and Arabs till July 1920. In that month, as a result of the announcement in May of the terms of the French mandate for Syria, hostilities broke out; after a short struggle the French occupied Damascus, and Feisal left the country. As is known, the British Government later made to their Arab allies of the war such reparation as lay in their power by placing Feisal on the throne of Iraq, and his brother Abdullah on the throne of Trans-Jordan.

The story of Palestine under Allenby may also be shortly outlined here. His policy was to administer it, so far as possible, strictly under the international rules for enemy territory occupied in war, which laid down the principle that the administrator is merely a tenant who can make no avoidable change in the existing laws and arrangements until the country is disposed of by treaty of peace. This, Allenby considered, precluded any special privileges being accorded for Jewish settlement until the Peace Conference had given their decision. The Foreign Office, however, in contravention of these accepted principles, sent a Zionist Commission to Palestine in the spring of 1918. Allenby continued to adhere, so far as possible, to the orthodox interpretation of the duties of a military administration; and thereby became the target of some of the criticism of the impatient Zionists. Allenby's Political Officer, Colonel Meinertzhagen (who was an Intelligence officer in 1917 and had been responsible for the famous 'haversack ruse' at the Third Battle of Gaza), considering that Allenby was not carrying out in Palestine the policy of the Foreign Office

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in furtherance of the Balfour Declaration, sent a dispatch to this effect to the Foreign Office. A friend, to whom he showed the letter, warned him that Allenby would not allow such criticism by one of his staff. Meinertzhagen agreed that this was likely, but persisted in what he held to be his duty. His dismissal was even swifter than the friend had prophesied, and followed immediately on Allenby seeing a copy of the letter. But Meinertzhagen had no fear of Allenby and always met him on equal terms. "I suppose you realize that you would have had to give your housemaid longer notice," was his only comment. Allenby laughed, and they parted friends. They had always had a common interest in the study of birds.

Major-General Sir Arthur Money was succeeded as Military Administrator by Major-General Sir Harry Watson in the middle of 1919, and the latter not long afterwards by Major-General Sir Louis Bols, Allenby's Chief of General Staff. The Military Administration itself came to an end in June 1920, when Sir Herbert Samuel became the first Civil Administrator. The further progress of the Zionist experiment, its successes and its failures, the prosperity it brought and the resentment it caused, and all the rights and wrongs of that unhappy conflict, are, fortunately, outside the scope of this biography.

In both these political controversies, in Syria and in Palestine, Allenby had maintained, so far as lay in his power, a strict impartiality. His sympathies, no doubt, lay with Feisal and the Arabs; but he used his authority and influence to keep the Arabs strictly within the bounds laid down by the Allied Governments, so long as he controlled Syria. He regarded as premature the Foreign Office encouragement of Zionism while Palestine was still subject to military administration and should therefore by international law have had no major change

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introduced; but he was not by any means unsympathetic to the aspirations of the Jews for increased immigration, and it cannot be claimed for him that he foresaw all the dangers that the Zionist experiment was to cause.



PART I

EGYPT: THE PROTECTORATE

(*March 1919-February 1922*)

Your good and my good, perhaps they are different; and either forced good or forced evil will make a people cry out with pain.

KING FEISAL, quoted in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*
(Chapter XIV), by T. E. Lawrence

CHAPTER I

A NATION'S ANGER

(*March-April 1919*)

Double, double, toil and trouble;
Fire burn, and cauldron bubble.

SHAKESPEARE, *Macbeth*

IT is likely that few Englishmen, even of those who knew Egypt well, would, at the beginning of 1919, have regarded the Egyptians as a nation in the full sense of the word; or would have admitted that they had reasonable cause for anger. Preoccupied with the war, we had almost completely lost contact with Egyptian feeling during the war years. The proclamation of a Protectorate¹ in December 1914, made hurriedly as a war measure, and certainly so regarded by responsible Egyptian opinion, had come to be looked on by British eyes as a settlement of Egypt's political future that needed no immediate revision. Actually, the Protectorate

¹ The literal translation of the word 'Protectorate' in Arabic is *Himaya*. But that word unfortunately had another meaning for the Egyptians. By general usage it had come to be associated with the protected position of foreigners under the Capitulations, and as such had an objectionable significance.

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made little change in the Egyptian system of government. The only Ministry which ceased to have an Egyptian Minister was that of Foreign Affairs, which came directly under the High Commissioner. The capitulatory privileges of foreigners, which conferred wide exemptions from Egyptian judicial, legislative, and fiscal authority, remained unaffected. One of the principal uses made of martial law, which had been declared in November 1914, was to render decrees of Egyptian Ministers applicable, despite the Capitulations, to foreigners.

The fact that Egypt, under martial law, had remained passive during the war had been interpreted as satisfaction with, or at least indifference to, the existing state of affairs. And from a material point of view Egypt was obviously prospering. The price of cotton, her staple product, had soared to heights undreamt-of; the Army had bought forage, animals, and other produce of the country at good prices, and had paid well and fed well the fellahin who had enlisted into those two invaluable bodies, the Egyptian Camel Corps and the Egyptian Labour Corps; the troops themselves had spent their money lavishly in Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere. Egypt had apparently had all the benefits and none of the losses of the long weary war: why should she be dissatisfied or so ungrateful as to bite the hand that had fed her plentifully during these years when fear, poverty, and death had been the lot of many peoples?

Such a view was natural enough in the soldiers who formed the bulk of the British population in Egypt at the end of the war; all their thoughts and energies had been involved in military operations, and they had little time to consider the Egyptian problem or Egyptian feelings. The instructed few—the Foreign Office and Civil Service officials, the military staff officers who had dealt with questions of martial law and internal security,

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the British residents who had made Egypt their home—were aware of the problems and of the dangers, but all had completely failed to gauge the growth of national spirit and the intensity with which both the educated classes and the illiterate fellahin felt their grievances. Nor did they realize that the nation had found a leader to express its spirit and its resentment.

The growth of the Egyptian national consciousness had begun long before the war as a result of the freedom of speech and of thought and the material prosperity brought by the British occupation; it had been stimulated by Lord Kitchener's creation of the Legislative Assembly in 1913; its quick flowering at the end of the war was due largely to its watering by the doctrines of self-determination and of the rights of small nations expressed by the leading politicians of the Allies during the war, especially by that class-room idealist, President Woodrow Wilson.

Even those who were most likely to be well disposed to the British—the Sultan, who owed his throne to them;¹ Rushdi, the Prime Minister, who had administered Egypt during the war years; the other Ministers; the great land-owners who had made large fortunes out of cotton (the Pasha class)—were disappointed at the lack of recognition of the assistance Egypt had provided to Britain's war effort. The Arabs of the desert were to be allowed to appear at the Peace Conference and state their case; so were Cypriots and Syrians; while the more civilized Egyptians were to be treated as a British Colony and refused admittance. They probably felt like a man whose house had been used as an hotel for a long period by uninvited, though paying, guests without a word of gratitude to their host.

¹ Soon after the outbreak of war with Turkey Great Britain had declared the Khedive deposed, and had placed his uncle, Prince Hussein, on the throne. On his death in 1917 he was succeeded by his brother, the late King Fuad.

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The grievances of the Effendi class were mainly the usual result of a European system of education on the Oriental mind, which is apt to absorb learning quickly but superficially without the stability of character that learning should bring. The system produced a growing class of would-be Government officials or lawyers; and as the supply of both considerably outran demand, the disappointed ones turned to politics, journalism, and agitation. Their simple creed was that the British administration, which had caused the education to be provided, should have provided also safe and easy occupation for the educated. Consequently every post in the Government held by a British official appeared an infringement of their rights; and it has to be admitted that during the war the quality of the British officials had deteriorated (many of the best having gone to fight), while the quantity had been growing for some years before the war, to the exasperation of the Egyptians. From their point of view British help had declined, while British interference had increased.

The grievances of the fellahin were simpler and more material. The demands of the Army, during the progress of its campaigns, for labour, animals, and feeding-stuffs had grown beyond the point at which they could be supplied by voluntary effort. The military had brought pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government to fulfil its demands, which in the end had been met by the crudest form of impressment in the villages. Men had been conscripted against their will for the Labour Corps; their animals and crops seized; and even sometimes money extracted from them under the guise of subscriptions to the Red Cross. As usual in such oppressions, the burden fell heaviest on the poorest and least protected. Neither the Army nor the British officials realized the injustices which were being practised in their name; but in the eyes of the fellahin they were naturally held

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guilty. The villagers had tolerated the rule of the British for the protection given them against injustice; but if the British had become oppressive also, then down with the accursed foreigners. There was plenty of inflammable material in the Delta in 1919.

The man who set light to it, Saad Zaghlul, who was to become the national hero and the chief opponent of British policy for the next eight years, was a not unworthy representative of the qualities and defects of his race. He was a man of the people (like Arabi Pasha, whose revolt was the cause of the British occupation) and had been the first pure-born Egyptian—*i.e.*, not of the old Turkish ruling class—to hold Ministerial office. He was honest, patriotic, with a gift of vivid emotional oratory and a shrewd sense of humour. In appearance he was tall and gaunt, with high cheek-bones and narrow eyes. At times he was courageous and outspoken, and at times hesitant and apprehensive. He could be charming, but was occasionally overbearing and rude. Childless himself, he found unlimited pleasure in the companionship of children. With women he was invariably chivalrous and courteous. His own married life represented an ideal companionship. His wife was a daughter of a famous Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustapha Fahmy Pasha, who had collaborated very cordially with Lord Cromer over a long number of years. He could not suffer cruelty to animals. It is related that when he was in exile at Gibraltar in 1923 he was invited to visit a town in Spain where a bullfight was in progress. He was so shocked by the sight that he left at once, and in his own inimitable manner roundly told his host what he thought of him and of Spanish taste and culture. One of his sayings was, "Animals cannot talk, but they understand; humans can talk but often do not understand." Zaghlul was not naturally a leader, as those who originally selected him for the position soon discovered,


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and was often alarmed at the dangerous prominence in which he found himself. He was, however, inordinately vain, jealous of his leadership, and to that extent ambitious. Ambition, as Mark Antony pointed out, "should be made of sterner stuff". Discomfort and danger make little appeal to the average educated Egyptian; Zaghlul was apt to trade on the fact that he had suffered a little of both in his efforts for the nation and to exaggerate the amount he had suffered. Revolutionaries in tougher communities would have scorned to class Zaghlul's trials as sufferings at all. He had less courage, less political wisdom, and even less ability to compromise than another contemporary opponent of England, De Valera.

Zaghlul had been chosen as the first Minister of Education in Egypt by Lord Cromer, who said in a speech shortly before he left Egypt, "Unless I am mistaken, a career of great public usefulness lies before the present Minister of Education, Zaghlul Bey. He possesses all the qualities which are necessary to serve this country. He is honest and capable and has the courage of his convictions." His talents were, however, destructive rather than constructive, and he soon went into opposition. He had now for some years been preaching the gospel of complete independence for Egypt. He had not, however, been the originator of the Wafd (or Delegation), as his party came to be known. It was the creation of others, notably men like Mohammed Mahmoud;¹ and Zaghlul only consented to join after his nomination to a Ministerial appointment had been rejected by the Foreign Office.


The sequence of events which led up to the outbreak was briefly as follows. Shortly after the armistice Zaghlul called on the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald

¹ Prime Minister of Egypt June 1928 to October 1929 and December 1937 to August 1939; died January 1941.



SAAD ZAGHLUL PASHA

reat Britain's principal opponent from 1919 to 1925, he was deported to Malta in arch 1919; returned to Egypt in April 1921; was deported to Aden in December 1921; d returned to Egypt in September 1923. He was Prime Minister of Egypt from January 26, 1924, to November 24, 1924.



HOUSES IN OPPOSITION

(1) THE RESIDENCY, CAIRO (now the British Embassy).

(2) THE "BEIT-EL-OMMA" (HOUSE OF THE NATION).

This was the Cairo residence of the late Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the centre for many years of opposition to Great Britain's policy in Egypt.

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Wingate, at the head of a delegation; and, claiming to speak in the name of the Egyptian people, demanded independence for Egypt. The High Commissioner, somewhat taken aback, gave a non-committal reply, and Zaghlul then required permission for himself and his delegation to go to London and lay Egypt's case before the British Government. On this request being referred to it, the Foreign Office sent an uncompromising refusal; and Zaghlul embarked on a campaign to rally the nation to his view of their cause. Meanwhile Egypt's official representatives, the Prime Minister Rushdi and his colleague Adly, also asked for permission to visit England and discuss the future of Egypt. This request was strongly backed by the High Commissioner. The Foreign Office reply, to the effect that "no useful purpose would be served" by the visit, was undoubtedly a grave blunder. It was a mistake of bad manners rather than of bad intentions; but in the East manners have a greater and intentions perhaps a lesser importance than in Europe, a difference seldom realized by the average Englishman. The Egyptian sets a higher value on politeness and a lower value on mere justice than the Englishman. At the end of the war we must have seemed to the Egyptians neither polite nor just, for in war standards of politeness and justice both deteriorate.

The Foreign Office also committed the mistakes of disregarding the advice of the responsible man on the spot, and of refusing to allow grievances to be aired, two proceedings which are always of doubtful wisdom. Their excuse was that the forthcoming Peace Conference was occupying all their attention. This excuse, however, was the very root of Egyptian discontent; Arabs and other less civilized people were to be allowed to state their case in Paris, but not the Egyptians. The British attitude gave fresh fuel to Zaghlul's fiery campaign, while Rushdi and Adly tendered the resignation of their offices as a

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consequence of their rebuff. Sir Reginald Wingate was now summoned home to represent the situation personally. He urged, without success, that both the Ministers and Zaghlul should be received. At the end of February 1919 the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, invited Rushdi and Adly to London, but it was now too late. Zaghlul's campaign had made such headway that it was obvious to the two Ministers that any agreement reached by them in London would be repudiated in Egypt unless it met Zaghlul's ideas. They refused to go unless Zaghlul's deputation was also received, and to this the Foreign Office would not agree.

The explosion could not now be long delayed. Zaghlul's agitation reached a pitch that threatened to cause disorders and dangers to the British and other foreigners in Egypt. He was warned by the military authorities to cease his activities forthwith; and on his disregard of the warning was arrested on March 8 with three colleagues, and deported to Malta. Within a few days all Egypt had flared up in revolt. Its principal feature was an organized attack on the communications of the country; railway-lines were torn up and stations burned; telegraph and telephone wires were cut; and Cairo was soon isolated from the rest of the country. The number of casualties to Europeans was not heavy; but eight Englishmen were murdered in circumstances of extreme brutality while travelling by train from Luxor to Cairo. The grim story of this tragedy was related at the time, but the story of Hanem Aaref, a public woman of Mellawi, received little publicity. It may not be out of place, therefore, to record it here. On the arrival of the train at Mellawi with the bodies of the murdered Englishmen piled up in the brake-van, it was met by a frenzied crowd. The body of one man still breathing was pulled out of the van and submitted to further indignities. Among the two thousand persons of all classes who

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composed the crowd this poor woman, Hanem Aaref, alone showed any humanity. She wept at the sight and tried to protect the body. She was beaten and driven away.

Members of the British community, deeply touched by this act of pity, opened a subscription list for her. They thought of giving her a gift of land, but in keeping with the characteristics of her class she preferred jewellery. She chose two heavy gold bracelets and a gold signet ring. A third bracelet was ordered with a suitable inscription, and what remained of the fund was handed to her in cash. The inscription on the third bracelet ran as follows:

TO HANEM AAREF

A GIFT IN RECOGNITION OF HER COMPASSION

TOWARDS A DYING BRITISH SOLDIER ON

18TH MARCH 1919

God will reward the doer of good deeds.

General Bulfin was in command of the Army in Allenby's absence. He was an exceptionally stout-hearted, level-headed soldier, the right man for such a crisis. He promptly formed mobile columns to patrol the country and restore order, and in little more than a week had the situation well in hand. Meanwhile Allenby had, as already related, been appointed by the British Government as Special High Commissioner, with instructions "to exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil, to take all measures necessary and expedient to restore law and order, and to administrate in all matters as required by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis".

Allenby was the fourth successive soldier to be appointed as chief British representative in Egypt. Sir Henry McMahon (who had been with Allenby at Hailey-

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bury, at a crammer's, and at the Royal Military College) had served in a regiment only for a few years before joining the Political Service; but the other three, Kitchener, Sir Reginald Wingate, and Allenby himself, had been active soldiers at the date of their appointment.

Allenby arrived in Cairo on March 25 and found matters fast improving under Bulfin's firm hand. He took stock of the situation and consulted his Advisers, British and Egyptian. On the evening of the day after his arrival he addressed an assembly of notables who had been invited to the Residency as follows:

I have been appointed High Commissioner for Egypt by His Majesty the King, and it is my desire and duty to assist in bringing to the country peace, quiet, and contentment. My intentions are:

First, to bring the present disturbances to an end.

Secondly, to make careful inquiry into all matters which have caused discontent in the country.

Thirdly, to redress such grievances as appear justifiable.

It is you who can lead the people of Egypt. It is your duty to work with me in the interest of your country.

I cannot believe that any one of you will not assist me in every way, and I am prepared to rely on you to set to work at once with a view to calming the passions now let loose.

After quiet has been restored I feel confident that you will trust me to inquire impartially into all grievances, and to make such recommendations as may seem to be desirable for the content and well-being of the people of Egypt.

Lord Allenby never deviated from this programme. Almost at the same moment as he was thus seeking to pour oil on the troubled waters a speech delivered by Lord Curzon on March 24 was published in Cairo and caused great resentment. He described the disturbances as "predatory rather than political", and said that one gratifying feature had been the behaviour of many Egyptian officials. The immediate result was a strike of

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these officials to show that they were not as amenable as Curzon thought.

On March 31, a bare week after his arrival, Allenby telegraphed home recommending the release of Zaghlul and of his colleagues and permission for them to proceed to Europe. This recommendation came as a shock to the British Government; they had sent a strong man to reduce a recalcitrant people to control, and his first proposal was to make a concession they had already twice refused. The Foreign Office consulted Wingate, who, though he had originally recommended this permission, now advised very forcibly that concession in the present circumstances would be an inadmissible weakness.

But the Government could hardly disregard the advice of the man to whom they had just given full powers to deal with the situation; they agreed, somewhat reluctantly, to his proposals. On April 7 Allenby announced the release, with permission to proceed where they would, of Zaghlul and his three colleagues. Of these four men, three—Ismail Sidky, Mohammed Mahmoud, and Zaghlul himself—were destined to become Prime Ministers of Egypt; the fourth, Hamed-el-Bassel, was a makeweight—a Bedouin chief of little education.

The wisdom of Allenby's action was fiercely challenged, both at the time and later. A Foreign Office spokesman concluded a contemporary résumé of the events with the words, "Thus a fortnight of violence has achieved what four months of persuasion failed to accomplish. The object lesson will not be lost in Egypt and throughout the East." A British resident with long knowledge of Egypt¹ wrote:

The proclamation of April 7th came as a bombshell to us. As affecting British prestige and security in Egypt, General Allenby's action is regarded as nothing short of

¹ He afterwards became one of Allenby's staunchest supporters.

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calamitous. Men who were previously prepared to stand by us simply had to go over to the other side for protection.

Lord Lloyd, in his *Egypt since Cromer*, published nearly fourteen years later, says:

It is difficult to justify this surrender to the forces of disorder. However unwise and unjust might have been the decision to deport the four leaders, or the decision to refuse them passports, the reversal of those two decisions at such a moment was certain to be given one interpretation and one only; that violence had succeeded where constitutional methods had failed.

Yet, surely, few who have studied the history of Egypt before and since this crisis will argue that Allenby was wrong, or that it would have been possible by stronger action at this stage to have changed Egyptian opinion and to have altered the subsequent course of events. Lord Lloyd implies that if General Bulfin had been allowed a free hand to complete his measures things would have been different. But General Bulfin himself was one of those who counselled some concession to Egyptian opinion, both before and after Allenby's arrival. So did Clayton,¹ who knew Egypt well and can be no more accused of weakness of purpose than can Bulfin. That Allenby himself acted through lack of firmness is denied by his whole career and character.

The key to his action at this stage may be found in a comment he made later on to one of his staff, who brought him a report in which a subordinate constantly referred to "the difficulties of my position". "What does he mean," said Allenby, "by the difficulties of his position? I have never been in a *difficult* position in my life. I have sometimes been in an *impossible* one, and then I have got out of it as quickly as I could." This remark throws a revealing light on Allenby's whole

¹ Sir Gilbert Clayton, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior. He died playing polo while High Commissioner of Iraq in September 1929.

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character: it shows the strength of the man who is prepared to face any situation and to admit no difficulty in a course of action he considers appropriate, and yet has the common sense that recognizes when a task is impossible and the courage and honesty that admits it. He was quick to realize that though the Egyptian outbreak had been stirred to boiling-point by agitators, the seething mass that overflowed was the spontaneous expression of a nation's indignation that was not without causes. It would have been easy enough with the force at his disposal to take stern measures of repression and retaliation; but these could only make it more difficult to arrive at the friendly understanding with the Egyptian people without which our position in Egypt would have been impossible. He knew that his action would be criticized in most quarters as weakness; yet he was strong enough and wise enough to take it. As with all other decisions of his life, great or small, he never looked back to justify or defend it.

The immediate effect was auspicious; rioting turned to demonstrations of joy; and Rushdi again took office as Prime Minister. But the evil elements which the revolt had let loose had yet to be subdued; and there were still many ugly incidents and murders of British soldiers and of Greek and Armenian civilians, both in the cities and in the provinces; much disorder had still to be suppressed with a firm hand. The extremists made another effort to gain control by a campaign of intimidation against Government officials; and succeeded in bringing about the re-resignation of Rushdi on April 21. Allenby, by a stern proclamation on April 22, stopped the intimidation; and a month later Mohammed Said Pasha—a Turk of the old school, forceful but unscrupulous—formed a Ministry to carry on the government of Egypt. A comparatively calm period followed.

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This account of the Egyptian troubles of the spring of 1919 may be ended on a lighter note in the report of a dialogue between Lord Allenby and one of his Generals at a conference in April, when the relaxation of certain measures of punishment and control were being discussed:

ALLENBY: I hear you are fining the villages in your area somewhat heavily, General X.

GENERAL X: Well, sir, when a village misbehaves itself I fine it ten per cent. of its ghaffir tax.

ALLENBY: That's not what I've heard, X. I'm told you fine them ten times their ghaffir tax.

GENERAL X: Yes, that's right, sir—ten per cent.

ALLENBY: But that's not ten per cent.; that's a thousand per cent.

GENERAL X: Oh, is it, sir? (*Pause.*) Well, anyway it's what I call ten per cent., and when I say ten per cent. they know what they've got to pay, and they pay it all right, sir.

CHAPTER II

THE SPHINX AND THE RIDDLE

(May 1919-December 1921)

His personality alone did much to restore the name and word of an Englishman to the high pinnacle on which they stood in the East before the war.

The Times article on Lord Allenby
(July 1925)

WHETHER by wise conciliation, as his supporters thought, or by ill-advised surrender, as his critics alleged, Allenby had accomplished the immediate task of his commission, the restoration of law and order to Egypt, as quickly as might be and without further embittering a resentful people. There were to be outbreaks of disorder at intervals during the whole six years of his High Commissionership; and he was to be accused again of weakness and irresolution in dealing with them. But in May 1919 he had established a period of comparative stability and calm in which the second mandate of his commission—"to maintain the King's Protectorate on a secure and equitable basis"—could be usefully examined. It did not take Allenby himself very long to realize that the King's Protectorate was an impossible relationship between Great Britain and Egypt; but it took three years for His Majesty's Government to come to the same conclusion; and it was to take yet another fourteen years to establish by treaty what it is hoped will prove a secure and equitable basis of understanding between the two countries, even under the test of a new war. The first decisive step on this

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path of understanding was that taken by Allenby at the beginning of 1922.

In order to appreciate Allenby's stewardship of Egypt and to follow the complexities of the problem which baffled British diplomacy and statesmanship for so many years, it is essential to have a clear background of conditions and personalities. In the first place, few British observers, not even all of those who were charged with directing our relations with Egypt, had a proper understanding of its past history or of the constitution under which it was governed. The average Englishman knew that we had taken over a bankrupt, disorganized, and oppressed country; that by skilful administration we had restored its finances, had established justice, had substituted order for chaos; and that we had guided and governed it ever since. He seldom realized that Egypt, under Turkish overlordship, had enjoyed, since the days of Mohammed Aly, almost complete autonomy (except in the matter of the Capitulations¹); so that in demanding their independence the Egyptians were not seeking something they had never had, but the return of rights they had won when the Turks were their masters. It was, however, true that these rights had been won and exercised by a foreign despot and not by the Egyptian people who now claimed them.

Nor did most people understand how the British control was exercised; they did not always grasp that the British Advisers had no executive power of their own, only through the Egyptian Ministers whom they advised. In 1884 Lord Granville, the Secretary of State concerned, had laid down the principle that the advice tendered to a Minister or a Governor by a British Adviser must be accepted, and this had made the British *de facto* rulers of Egypt; but it is important to grasp that it was

¹ The Capitulations were certain rights, judicial and economic, which had been granted by old treaties to the nationals of many foreign Powers.

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only the Ministers who could issue orders or make laws, and that without a Ministry it was therefore impossible to govern Egypt by civil process. The Protectorate had made no alteration to this state of affairs; the British Advisers were still powerless without a Ministry to advise; in its absence the country could only be governed under martial law,¹ obviously a vicious and clumsy method in time of peace, quite contrary to British traditions. Hence the first care of Allenby, as of any High Commissioner, must always be to secure a Ministry which would carry on the business of the country. He might be spoken of as an administrator; but in actual fact he was more often concerned with 'minister-ing' Egypt than with administering it. He had sometimes to persuade, encourage, or convince the doubtful, timid, or unwilling politician that it was his duty to take office, in spite of an unwelcome pronouncement from Downing Street or of popular clamour from El Azhar. It was work for which Allenby had no taste and no training; yet his natural qualities of sincerity and common sense, with a patience and forbearance that only those who knew him well realized, gave him a success that would have eluded many a practised diplomat. In the troubled politics of Egypt he stood as the one constant solid figure, always straight, always true to his word; whose yea was yea, and whose nay was nay; who would listen and advise with sympathy; who interfered as little as possible in Egypt's internal affairs, but when he did, left no doubt that he meant to be obeyed.

Besides the Ministers of the moment, there were two personalities in Egypt whose influence had always to be taken into account. The first was Zaghlul, the champion of independence, the popular idol, whose vanity, obstinacy, and jealousy were growing with the crowd's acclamation and making him less and less open to reason.

¹ Allenby had actually to declare the 1919 Budget passed by martial law.

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The second was the Sultan (afterwards King) of Egypt, Fuad, a very different character. He was shrewd rather than forcible, politic rather than vehement; he could play the autocrat but had not the vigour to be a dictator. But his abilities and his influence were very far from negligible, though he was never popular with the majority of his subjects. His relations with Allenby were usually good, and their liking was mutual; but when it came to a difference of opinion there was never any doubt as to whose was the stronger will.

There was a third, and more baffling, personality which demanded attention—that of the Egyptian crowd. Egypt is a country where no man, be he King or Minister or demagogue, can rely for long on public opinion, so sudden and so changeable are its enthusiasms or its angers. In a land with a large proportion of illiterates the Press exercises a comparatively small, but seldom moderating, influence. The preachings in the mosques, the whispers in the cafés, the rumours of the bazaars, are the means by which popular beliefs are spread and passions roused. The Egyptian mob was dangerous from the suddenness of its uprising, from the extravagance of its violence; but it usually required little force to suppress it, if quickly and firmly applied.

Egyptian popular leaders, and especially Zaghlul, used the student classes as a political weapon. They could easily be excited by a little heady oratory, and naturally found street demonstrations more amusing than the dull routine of education. School strikes became a regular game and were proclaimed on the slightest occasion; should a British Cabinet Minister in London make a speech which displeased the students they left their desks and paraded the streets in noisy demonstrations; anniversaries of certain events since 1918 also provided excuses to neglect work in favour of noise. Over a period of years both learning and discipline were

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almost unknown to a large proportion of Egypt's school-boys.

There was another current of opinion in Egypt which, though it exercised little influence on Allenby, might have disturbed one less careless of criticism. It was that of a large section of the British community, official and unofficial, resident or migratory. Such opinion in general accused Allenby of lack of resolution in dealing with the Egyptians. Things had gone all right in the old days, they claimed, when there was none of this talk of independence and Egyptians had just done what they were told to do; it needed only a little firmness, and perhaps a sharp lesson, and the Egyptians would again come to heel. "This didn't happen in Cromer's time" was the watchword of such people. Allenby took no notice of these imperialistic murmurings of the idle tourist or of the discontents of the disgruntled official; though he listened attentively to those who had real knowledge and understanding of the country.

Such were the conditions with which Allenby had to deal at the Cairo end of the London-Cairo cable route. At the other were the personalities of Downing Street; and the influences which were shaping the policy of the British Empire at home and abroad.

The Foreign Secretary was Lord Curzon. If experience, knowledge, diligence, aptitude had been the only qualities required, the direction of foreign affairs could not have been in better hands. Nor was his judgment often at fault; yet since he lacked the force of character and the resolution to maintain his point of view in the face of opposition, much of his work was wasted, and British policy in the years after the war was usually inconstant, irresolute, and ineffectual. Lord Curzon realized the mistakes that were being made, but, though disapproving, gave way. Affairs at home occupied so much of the Cabinet's time that foreign policy had often

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too little attention. The rebellion in Ireland seemed to drag on interminably and with ever greater bitterness; and industrial troubles were frequent. There were many awkward foreign engagements besides Egypt, and the temper of the British people made difficult any strong policy abroad; they were utterly weary of foreign adventures and expensive foreign commitments, and wished to get back to normal as soon as possible. For the first time in its history the nation had fought as a nation. It had not liked it and wished to return to its traditional occupation of trading as soon as possible. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, when asked his recommendation on the disposition of the numerous British forces still abroad, never tired of repeating his advice to "get out of the places that don't belong to you and hold on to those that do". In this latter category, it may be remarked, he included both Ireland and Egypt.

The above sketch of the conditions in which the Egyptian problem was treated during the years following the war is necessarily imperfect; it omits much, and some of its estimates may be disputed. The essential figures in the picture were these. In Egypt a people, largely ignorant and illiterate, led by an obstinate demagogue, clamoured for independence, with no sense of the responsibilities it would bring; more moderate Egyptians, fearing responsibility, followed the dictates of the mob rather than directed it. In England a Coalition Government of discordant members, led by a Prime Minister who had little understanding of foreign affairs, was distracted by a whole series of difficult problems, internal and external, among which Egypt seemed relatively unimportant, and had certainly little interest for the nation at large. Between them stood Allenby, the soldier trained to receive definite orders and to execute them precisely. He now found that in place of definite orders he was

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given only a vague policy, not always easy to interpret and sometimes impossible to execute.

Instead of being able to command and to receive instant obedience, he had to persuade and conciliate. He had force at his disposal as a last resort, and temptation enough to use it; but he knew that force could never solve the problem of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Many spoke of "Allenby's policy" at this time or later. He had and could have no policy of his own; he was charged with executing the policy of the Cabinet, and so far as he could interpret it, did so with his usual loyalty. But he gradually established out of his fund of natural common sense certain principles that guided him in his day-to-day conduct of affairs in Egypt. Firstly, if our avowed policy of training the Egyptians to govern themselves was sincere and meant anything it was useless to interfere and take the direction into one's own hands as soon as any difficulty arose. If the Ministers and officials were to learn to govern, if the Police were to be efficient in keeping order, if the Egyptian Army was to be able to support their authority at need, then they must learn to face their difficulties and dangers by themselves, and must not rely on the British when anything disconcerting or alarming took place. Two extracts from Allenby's letters to his mother (to whom he wrote regularly from Egypt, once every week or ten days up to the time of her death in 1922) show his observance of this principle.

April 6, 1921:

Saad Zaghlul arrived in Cairo yesterday. I kept all officers and soldiers out of the streets and left the whole management to the Egyptians. There was a gigantic and enthusiastic but quite orderly crowd, and not a single mishap occurred.

May 20, 1921 (after some disturbances had taken place):

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I bide my time, as I want the Egyptians to settle their politics for themselves, and I don't want to interfere with my troops unless the life, limb, or interests of Europeans are in danger.

The principle had obvious risks, especially with the explosiveness of Egyptian crowds; and Allenby was criticized on several occasions, especially after the Alexandria riots in May 1921, which caused considerable loss of life, for not taking charge early enough. But his principle was sound, though it took a bold man to face the risks involved.

His second principle, never to bargain in matters of policy, was also wise. Bargains are for the weaker, a generous firmness for the stronger. When it had been decided that it was necessary, or desirable, to make a concession he held that it should be made freely and at once without trying to extract advantages in return. This belief was at the root of his action in obtaining the 1922 Declaration.

Thirdly, it was his firm conviction that our position in Egypt depended ultimately on our sea-power in the Mediterranean. So long as that was maintained we could afford to make all reasonable concessions to the Egyptians, since we could control Egypt just so long and so firmly as we controlled the Mediterranean. If we lost control any rights granted by the Egyptians would be valueless.

One of the most striking tributes to Allenby's work was paid by an Englishman who had a very great knowledge of Egypt and the Egyptians. Harry Boyle, who had been one of Cromer's most trusted assistants, came out to Egypt in the spring of 1921. It was nominally a holiday visit, but there is no doubt that Boyle was commissioned by the Foreign Office to make an unofficial report, in view of the many criticisms of Allenby which were reaching England. If he was sent

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to curse he remained to bless, as the following extracts from his diary show:

I had the privilege of seeing a good deal of Allenby, for whom I conceived a high admiration. His position in Egypt was a most difficult one, involving as it did dozens of matters with which, as a soldier, he was wholly unfamiliar. His period of office coincided also with the most active period of the Zaghul movement. Nevertheless he did extraordinarily well, and I have no hesitation in thinking that a great part of his success with the native element was due to his extraordinary resemblance to Lord Cromer, both in physique and manner.

Allenby is the one and only good point I can find in the whole horizon.

I like Lord Allenby more and more. He is a fine fellow and the best possible for the present circumstances. Intrigues against him, either here or in London, make me furious.

Allenby's staff also, of the Diplomatic Service,¹ found him to their liking as a chief. They soon came, in fact, to regard him with affection and admiration. If they expected a rough, blunt soldier, with little literary or classical knowledge, and no skill of the tongue or pen, they were soon undeceived. "He wrote the best short minute of any whom I have served", one of them has recorded. Another, having introduced into the draft of a dispatch a translation of a passage from one of the Greek dramatists, was surprised to hear Allenby say, on reading it, "If we are going to quote Æschylus let us do it in the original Greek", which he gave.

All, at one time or another, came under the lash of his temper and the severity of his tongue; but all learned how quickly it passed, leaving no grudge or remembrance; and all appreciated his quickness to grasp the essentials

¹ He also had with him for a time one of his former military staff in Palestine, Lord Dalmeny; and Sir Gilbert Clayton, who had been his Political Officer in Palestine, was Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.

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of a problem, his strength of decision, and his complete loyalty to those who served him. As an instance of this last, he caused to be placed on record in the official file the privately expressed advice of one of his subordinates which he had not taken, but which had afterwards proved to be right. Allenby, on his part, soon learned to appreciate the qualities of his staff and to cease to regard them, or to address them, as "weak-kneed blackcoats". The Residency staff never worked more loyally or more harmoniously as a team than under the direction of Allenby.

The Residency at Cairo—house and office in one—where Allenby spent more than six years, is a pleasant building on the banks of the Nile. A spacious garden runs down to the great river, the water and silt of which enable almost anything to be grown. Allenby spent much time in his garden and liked showing it to visitors; their pleasure was sometimes mixed with justified apprehension of a formidable marabou stork which followed Allenby everywhere, almost like a dog, and had a jealous dislike of any children or ladies with him. The stork himself, however, had a severe fright one day when two young lions, which had been brought to visit Allenby on their way to the Zoo, broke loose and chased the stork round the garden. Not far off, on the other side of the river, was the Cairo Zoo, to which Allenby was a frequent visitor, improving and indulging his already intimate knowledge of beasts and birds. His interest in and love of animals did not, however, extend to dogs; he never owned one and was not fond of them. He made no parade of his position, and walked in Cairo without ceremony and without escort other than an A.D.C. till near the end of his time, when he was officially ordered not to go abroad unguarded.

Allenby still rode, but less frequently as his official duties claimed more of his time. In the winter, when he

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could spare the time, he shot duck, which visit the Egyptian Delta in large numbers. In the summer, when official Egypt moves to Alexandria, he bathed regularly; and on one occasion, in July 1920, nearly lost his life in the sea. It was a rough day, and Allenby, who was a strong swimmer, went out too far; he had great difficulty in getting back to shore and broke a blood-vessel and strained his heart and lungs. He was in bed for a fortnight afterwards. A less determined man would have been drowned.

There was much entertaining at the Residency, official and private, and it was seldom that there was not a large party both at luncheon and dinner. Allenby and Lady Allenby were admirable hosts in every way; even the most official parties were friendly as well as dignified. Allenby's kindness and humour as a host are illustrated by the following story. A senior officer from Palestine, who was going on a visit to Egypt, told one of his subordinates to telegraph to the General Commanding in Cairo, an intimate friend, that he was coming to stay the night with him. "Tell him I shall be late," he said, "and that he is not to bother about dinner for me; just to put a pint of champagne and some *foie gras* sandwiches in my room." The telegram was by some mistake delivered at the Residency instead of to the G.O.C.; and when the officer arrived at Cairo he found to his surprise the High Commissioner's A.D.C. awaiting him at the station with the announcement that his telegram had been received, that the High Commissioner regretted he was dining out, but that his room was prepared. The officer in question was not easily disconcerted; but when he found champagne and a large plate of *foie gras* sandwiches in his room he felt that some explanation was needed. On meeting his host at breakfast next morning he began at once to apologize for the "awful mistake last night". "What mistake?" said Allenby. "Weren't the

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sandwiches the right kind?" And would hear no word of apology or explanation, merely saying he was delighted to see his guest, and to be able to provide the supper to which he was accustomed.

Lady Allenby's influence and personality were, in their sphere, as marked as Allenby's in his. Under a gentle manner and great personal charm she hid a character as strong as his; she was less swayed by sentiment and had more realism and common sense than most women; she was always punctual, never in a hurry; quite above intrigue or gossip; serene, dignified, and unaffected. A great woman and a fitting complement to Allenby's greatness.

CHAPTER III
THE MILNER MISSION
(*May 1919-December 1921*)

Government is such an imperfect business at the best that it is more important that people should have the system which they like than a better system which they like less.

LORD MILNER

AT the beginning of April, shortly after the appointment of Allenby as High Commissioner, the Government had proposed to send to Egypt a Commission of inquiry headed by Lord Milner; and had suggested to Allenby the announcement of this as an alternative to his proposed release of Zaghlul and his associates. Allenby declined to be diverted from his purpose even by so illustrious a red herring as Lord Milner, but agreed that the visit would be useful later.

A Commission (or mission) of inquiry is the favourite device of British Governments for dealing with awkward problems, internal or external. It has many obvious advantages. It postpones the necessity for making a difficult decision for at least a time—the Milner Mission and the negotiations arising out of it provided a breathing-space of more than two years; it gives interesting employment to a number of distinguished public servants or ex-servants; it produces a volume, often very readable, full of valuable information and orderly statistics; and finally, there is always the possibility that the Commission may light on an acceptable and workable solution of the problem.¹

¹ This is unusual. Four Commissions have visited Palestine since 1921, but none of them arrived at the right answer: the Sankey Coal Commission had no better fate at home.

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To be most effective, the Milner Mission should have reached Egypt in May, during the quiet period following the restoration of order. But Milner himself, who was a member of the Cabinet, was deeply engaged in other activities; it was not easy to find suitable members at short notice (there is a recognized principle of such Commissions that the more difficult the problem the greater the number of members required); and the hot season in Egypt is not the best time for good work. The arrival of the Mission was postponed till the autumn, and eventually till the winter. By then opposition to it had been organized and consolidated.

Meanwhile Allenby went on leave to England, which he had not visited for more than two years. He had left it in June 1917, comparatively unknown, somewhat disappointed; removed to a secondary theatre as a result of his failure at Arras, many believed. Now he was famous. Honours had come thickly to him. He had received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament, had been made a Viscount, had been given a grant of £50,000. Sadly enough, he had received the official announcement of his elevation to the peerage on what would have been his son Michael's twenty-first birthday. In the summer of 1919 he had been promoted Field-Marshal. In 1920 he was made Colonel of the Life Guards, which carries with it the Court appointment of Gold Stick in Waiting. Most of the Allied countries at war with Germany had sent him decorations: the United States, France, Italy, Belgium, Rumania, Greece, Egypt, China, Japan, the Hejaz. A Cockney soldier of his Army was heard to remark, on reading of his many rewards, "They 'aven't 'arf put it across old Allenby".

A new peer has to choose a place or places from which to derive his title. Allenby took Megiddo¹, the scene of his

¹ Certain of the lighter-minded members of his staff were convinced that Bashan, where the bulls come from, was the most suitable place in the Holy Land to be connected with his title.

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greatest victory, and Felixstowe, where his mother still lived. As supporters to his coat of arms he chose a horse, to symbolize the cavalry arm to which he belonged and owed so much for his victories, and a camel, to record the part that useful but unlovely animal played in the Palestine Campaigns. A British General of the future may have difficulty in finding comparable supporters to his arms, for a tank or lorry would hardly gain admission to the College of Arms as "heraldic beasts".

Many institutions, guilds, or societies, whose aim and setting were peace, offered him honours for his success in war. Several universities—Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and Yale—offered him degrees; the ancient City Companies of London, such as the Goldsmiths, Fishmongers, and Grocers, invited him to become a freeman; a racehorse (which ran unsuccessfully in the Derby) was named after him, and several race-clubs made him a life member. Perhaps the most curious distinction he received was honorary membership of the most exclusive cricket club, the I Zingari. Its three chief rules are "Keep your promise; keep your temper; keep your wicket up." To the first and last of these precepts Allenby could faithfully subscribe; he had observed them all his life.

The crowning civic honour of the freedom of the City of London—the equivalent of a Roman 'triumph'—was bestowed on five commanders of the war: Jellicoe, Beatty, French, Haig, and Allenby. For Allenby the ceremony took place on October 7, 1919, when he was received at the Guildhall and was presented with the freedom and with a sword of honour. He was afterwards entertained at a luncheon at the Mansion House. A week or two earlier he had had a more homely reception at Felixstowe when he had gone to visit his mother, now aged eighty-eight.

Allenby returned to Egypt in November to find that the political situation had deteriorated in his absence,

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and that the period of calm was over. Zaghlul, still in Paris, had, through his followers in Egypt, organized opposition to the Mission, of which they intended to order a boycott. The Prime Minister, Mohammed Said, resigned on the plea that the arrival of the Mission should be postponed till the peace treaty with Turkey had been concluded;¹ and a successor had to be found. The Mission arrived early in December. Its composition was distinguished and was intended to be sympathetic to Egypt. The other members besides Milner were Sir Rennell Rodd,² who had served Egypt under Cromer; General Sir John Maxwell, who had many years' service with the Egyptian Army and was a popular figure in Egypt; Mr. C. Hurst,³ Principal Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office; Mr. J. A. Spender, a prominent Liberal, formerly Editor of the *Westminster Gazette*; and General Sir Owen Thomas, to represent the Labour Party. But the Mission had two fatal defects in Egyptian eyes. Its terms of reference included the maintenance of the Protectorate; and although an exclusively British body, it proposed to recommend a Constitution for Egypt, a task for which Egyptians considered themselves fully as capable and more concerned. The boycott by Egyptians was successful; and the Mission left Egypt three months later without having had any open contact with Egyptian opinion other than by the vociferous and uncompimentary clamours of the mob. It had had, however, certain important contacts behind the scenes.

Allenby, largely with the idea of leaving a free field for the Mission, spent the first six weeks of 1920 touring the Sudan with Lady Allenby. He first paid a visit at

¹ Actually it was not signed till three and a half years later, in July 1923.

² Raised to the peerage as Lord Rennell in 1933, Ambassador to Italy, 1908-19, M.P., 1928-31. Died 1941.

³ Sir Cecil Hurst, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., President of International Court of Justice at The Hague, 1934-36.

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Jeddah to King Hussein of the Hejaz, who had long expressed a wish "to kiss him on his intelligent forehead". Hussein as a ruler was difficult and unreasonable; as a host, he was courteous and charming. He presented Allenby with a sword of honour and entertained him at the traditional Arab banquet called 'Sumat', held only on special occasions and usually to celebrate the visit of a conqueror. Slaves walked along the middle of the table to feed the guests, over two hundred of whom were present, including tribal chiefs from all parts of the Hejaz.

From Jeddah Allenby went by Port Sudan, Suakin, and Atbara to Khartoum; and then on up the river as far south as Lake No in the Bahr el Ghazal Province. On the return journey he visited the Kassala and Dongola provinces. At Korosko, just north of Wadi Halfa, he found a crashed aeroplane; it was one of the earliest of those ventures by which the long-distance air routes of the world were laid out in the years following the war. The pilots were South Africans, Pierre Van Ryneveld and Quintin Brand.¹ They had reached Korosko from London in seven days, a record at that time. Allenby took the two pilots aboard his steamer. On return to Cairo they renewed in another plane their attempt to reach South Africa by air and eventually did so after a mishap in Rhodesia. They were the first men to complete the journey from England to the Cape by air.

Milner and his Mission returned to England in March 1920. Although moderate and responsible Egyptians had not dared to break the boycott imposed by students and agitators in Egypt, some now bethought themselves that it would be well to get into touch with

¹ Now Lieutenant-General Sir Pierre Van Ryneveld, K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., Chief of the General Staff, Union Defence Forces in South Africa, and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Quintin Brand, K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C., Director-General of Civil Aviation in Egypt 1932-36.

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the Mission before it reported. After some face-saving negotiation they induced Zaghlul to accompany them to England and to open discussion with the Mission at the end of May. Early in August, after protracted and difficult negotiation, Milner produced a scheme which went a long way towards meeting Egyptian claims. The Protectorate was to be replaced by a Treaty which granted Egypt independence, subject to certain reservations for special British interests. Allenby, who came home on leave in August,¹ strongly advised that the scheme should be put at once before the Cabinet, and, if approved by them, announced as the solution of His Majesty's Government; and that its terms should on no account be made public before Cabinet consideration.² His advice was not taken, or came too late. Milner, with a rashness curious in so experienced a diplomat, had given Zaghlul a note of his proposals without obtaining from him any acceptance of them or even undertaking to recommend them. Zaghlul, fearing to lose the favour of the fickle mob if he made the least concession, had declared that the proposals must be accepted by the Egyptian nation, of which he had so often claimed to be the sole accredited representative. He was allowed to

¹ There were strong rumours at the time that he would not return to Egypt; and the War Office intended to recommend him for the Aldershot Command if the Foreign Office did not require him for Egypt.

² The following is an extract of a letter to a friend, dated August 27, 1920:

"Milner gave me the outline of his projected settlement. Apparently Egypt is to have control of all but Finance and Justice. She will conduct her own affairs. The Sudan question has not been seriously discussed; and it seems that the present dual control is to endure on Egypt receiving a guarantee that she gets her Nile water. Here is, I fear, likely to be trouble. I told the King, Curzon, and Milner that I hoped the Milner proposals would not be published; but submitted to H.M.G., who would take what action they deemed requisite. However, it appears that the whole thing is public and a cockshy for criticism by every one—before the Cabinet has ever had a chance of considering it. Zaghlul, I hear, is not content; and will not return to Egypt."

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send some of his colleagues to Egypt to sound national opinion; the terms of the proposal, of course, became public at once, and were thenceforward regarded, as Allenby had foreseen, as the minimum offer to which the British Government was committed. It was useless for Curzon to announce that the agreement was merely the recommendation of the Milner Mission and not necessarily acceptable to the Government. Milner, a member of the Cabinet, had always been regarded by the Egyptians as a plenipotentiary in the negotiations, and any assertion to the contrary was taken as evidence of British bad faith. Allenby's dislike of the bargaining process of a Treaty was justified.

The agreement might, even so, have had a good chance of acceptance if Zaghlul had shown any leadership. But by refusing to commit himself either to recommendation or condemnation, he left his supporters puzzled and gave his enemies their opportunity. After some further fruitless discussion the Mission submitted its report, and it was decided to open negotiations on its proposals with an official delegation from Egypt.

It was now 1921, nearly two years since the troubles into which the Commission was appointed to inquire, and one year since its visit to Egypt. But there was to be still more delay. The negotiations on the composition of the delegation were long and tortuous. The Sultan, Fuad; the Prime Minister, Adly; and the popular favourite, Zaghlul, all wished to have the predominant voice in its formation.

Zaghlul, getting anxious about his position, and jealous of Adly's growing influence for moderation, telegraphed from Paris on March 20 saying that he would support the Adly Ministry on condition that martial law and the censorship were abolished and that he should lead the official delegation, which should contain a majority of members from his following. He then made

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hurried plans for his return to Cairo, where he arrived on April 5. Adly showed every friendliness towards him; he went to the station to greet him, and no action was taken to prevent the nation from giving the warmest welcome to the nationalist leader.

The journey by rail from Alexandria to Cairo was one of triumphal progress, and extraordinary scenes marked his arrival in the capital. The day automatically became a national holiday. Women left the seclusion of the harems, an unprecedented thing, to participate in one of the most remarkable receptions ever accorded to a citizen of any country. At least 400,000 people must have thronged the relatively short distance from the railway station to Zaghlul's house. Tram-cars bedecked with flags and palms, vehicles of all descriptions covered in flowers, dancing-girls, native musicians, camels and donkeys, all combined to make a striking picture.

It was not long before Adly and Zaghlul came into open conflict. Three weeks after his return Zaghlul in a speech made it clear that collaboration between himself and Adly depended on the entire acceptance of his conditions. Meanwhile Adly announced that Zaghlul had found himself in agreement with the Ministry, except as regards the presidency of the delegation. The Ministry maintained, said Adly, that according to precedent the Premier must preside over an official delegation. Zaghlul was beginning to lose ground, and five members of his delegation declared their confidence in Adly. As he found his influence waning, so Zaghlul became more violent in his campaign against Adly. As a direct result there were serious riots with much loss of life at Alexandria in May. The casualties were thirty Egyptians and fourteen Europeans killed and a hundred and thirty Egyptians and sixty-nine Europeans wounded.

Allenby has been much criticized both for allowing Zaghlul to return and for failing to take strong enough

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action to prevent the Alexandria riots or to check them in time. The return of Zaghlul was obviously a dangerous measure likely to disturb the peace, but it would have been difficult to refuse admission to Egypt to one who had been admitted to negotiation in England and with whom Adly himself was in correspondence over the formation of a joint delegation. The Alexandria riots were a direct sequel to an incident at Tanta at the end of April, when the police fired on an unruly and dangerous mob, killing a few and wounding others. Allenby strongly advised a firm attitude to the popular outcry against the police, but Adly, always weak in a difficulty, agreed to an inquiry, which passed some criticism on the police and shook their morale. As a result they would not fire in similar circumstances at Alexandria, and the mob got completely out of hand. If Allenby's advice had been followed about the Tanta incident the Alexandria riots would never have assumed such proportions. His reluctance to intervene at once with British troops was in accordance with his policy that the Egyptians, if they were to be fit for independence, must learn to check their own disorders.

At last the official delegation, led by Adly, departed for London on July 1. As Allenby had repeatedly warned the Foreign Office during these months, the negotiations between Curzon and Adly had no greater prospect of success than those between Milner and Zaghlul. With Zaghlul still commanding the voice of the crowd, Adly dared make no withdrawal from the position the former had taken up with Milner. The discussions, with an interval of some five or six weeks, lasted from July to November, but the question of the location of British troops in Egypt proved an insuperable obstacle that no council-table formula could surmount.

During Adly's absence the political atmosphere had been reasonably calm in spite of Zaghlul's agitation and

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of a singularly ill-timed visit, at Zaghlul's invitation, of four Labour M.P.'s, which was permitted by the Cabinet in spite of the protests of the Residency. The Ministry, under Sarwat Pasha, acting as Prime Minister during Adly's absence, had made considerable headway; the majority of Egyptians were genuinely anxious for a settlement and calm. Zaghlul had made many blunders and had lost much ground. But disappointment at the failure of the negotiations was accentuated by a peevish admonitory note from the British Government, which Allenby was ordered to present to the Sultan early in December.¹ Adly resigned shortly afterwards. The tone of this note caused great resentment in Egypt, and undoubtedly very much increased the difficulty of forming a new Ministry. The strong political position which Adly had gained in Egypt for himself and the moderate elements crumbled to pieces, and Zaghlul rose again like a phoenix from the ashes of his own folly. His relief at the breakdown of the Adly negotiations was obvious. He welcomed it not on national but on personal grounds.

There was a moment when Sarwat was prepared to take office on a programme accepted by the Foreign Office; but renewed agitation by Zaghlul destroyed the opportunity. The situation by the middle of December was that no Minister could be persuaded to form a Government to carry on the affairs of Egypt. The attempt to bargain a Treaty had brought a complete deadlock from which Allenby was left to find an exit.

In the meantime disorders had broken out in Cairo. On the advice of the officials responsible, who feared widespread and dangerous disturbances, Allenby decided to prohibit a meeting summoned for December 22 by

¹ It came to be known as the "Allenby Note", though Allenby had no hand in its composition and had never seen it till he was ordered to hand it to the Sultan.

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Zaghlul, the prime mischief-maker. Zaghlul challenged the decision by an appeal to the nation.

Allenby now made up his mind that there was no way of removing the deadlock in Anglo-Egyptian relations while Zaghlul and his immediate *entourage* remained in the country. So he took the bold step of ordering the arrest of Zaghlul and five of his colleagues on December 23, and they were removed under military escort to Suez for deportation.¹ There was some apprehension that Allenby's drastic action would plunge Egypt once again into a state of widespread disorder. There were many portents to support this view, but Allenby did not share it, and was determined vigorously to suppress all attempts at disturbance. He had strong forces on the streets of Cairo, where the outbreaks were promptly suppressed, and sent warships to Suez, Ismailia, Port Said, and Alexandria, while naval parties went up the Nile. The natives of Alexandria, doubtless mindful of the lessons of the preceding May, showed little disposition to stir up trouble, and mischief-makers in general soon realized that they were to be given little chance of organizing outbreaks on any large scale. Thanks to Allenby's firm measures, calm had been practically restored before the end of December. Disorders had ceased; all Government officials, after a short face-saving strike, were again at work; the schoolboys were still out, but were soon to return to their studies under the threat of an indefinite lock-out; and the native Bar had decided to call off their strike, and, instead, to go into mourning for two months. The public services were again working normally.

But all this did not mean to say that Egypt had settled down to any political stability. Order had been

¹ Zaghlul was entertained on Christmas Day by the officers of the British regiment at Suez. On December 30 he left for Aden, where he remained till March 1, 1922, when he was removed to the Seychelles Islands.

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re-established by strong military action, but for Allenby the same fundamental political problems remained to be solved. There was still no Ministry and no chance of getting one until some way could be found out of the political impasse. On December 28 Allenby had been compelled to issue a proclamation authorizing the Under-Secretaries of State—who, with one exception, were all British—to exercise the powers and functions of Ministers in administrative matters until a new Ministry was formed. But it was an impossible task for a group of British Under-Secretaries to carry on the government of the country for any length of time with a hostile Egyptian personnel. Allenby had to find some solution of the deadlock.


PUNCH ON THE LONDON CHAMPION -- SEPTEMBER 17, 1904



THE RETURN FROM THE CRUSADE.

FROM-MUSKETS ANSWER, "GREETING FROM PALESTINE; EITHER I COME, LADY-LOVE, LADY-LOVE, WELCOME ME HOME."
 BARON. "I DO ENDEAVOR--WITH ALL MY HEART!"

PUNCH ON THE LONDON CHAMPION -- JANUARY 15, 1902



ANOTHER "SERPENT OF OLD NILE."

LET'S ATTEMPT TO FEEL IT DOWN. "PERHAPS IT'D BETTER KEEP DOWN MY TAIL DOWN TILL YOU'VE THOUGHT OF THE RIGHT STEPS TO CHASE HIM WITH."


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TWO "PUNCH" CARTOONS



EGYPTIAN INTERNEES AT MALTA, APRIL 1919

In the middle of the seated row are Hamed El Bassel Pasha (in Bedouin dress), Ismail Sidky Pasha, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, and Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, all of whom—except the first—subsequently became Prime Ministers of Egypt.



EGYPTIAN DEPORTEES IN THE SEYCHELLES ISLANDS

Seated: Saad Zaghlul Pasha. *Standing (left to right):* Fathallah Barakat Pasha, Makram Ebeid Bey, Atef Baraket Bey, Mustafa Nahas Bey, Sinnot Hanna Bey. There are two survivors of the group: Mustafa Nahas Bey (now Pasha and Prime Minister.), and Makram Ebeid Bey (now Pasha).

CHAPTER IV

THE 1922 DECLARATION

(January-February, 1922)

Content you, gentlemen, I'll compound this strife.

SHAKESPEARE, *The Taming of the Shrew*

THE announcement made by His Majesty's Government on February 28, 1922, by which the Protectorate was abolished and Egypt declared an independent Sovereign State, is a notable landmark in the relations between Britain and Egypt, and is Allenby's principal contribution to political history. His action has been much criticized, misunderstood, and misrepresented, so that a somewhat full account of his doings and his motives during December 1921 and the first two months of 1922 is an essential part of his biography.

Allenby had during 1921 repeatedly warned the Government to be prepared for a failure of the negotiations with Adly and to have a policy ready to announce if the plan for a treaty broke down. He had made no secret of his own view that the policy should include the abolition of the Protectorate. Now, however, he was left, after two years of bargaining, with an impracticable policy, no Ministry, and a complete stoppage of the administrative machinery of Egypt. Co-operation with the Egyptians, on which basis British rule had rested during and since the days of Lord Cromer, had come to an end. Allenby determined that the time had come to compel the Government to recognize the true facts of the position.

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During the last week of December 1921 and the first week of January 1922 he ascertained, mainly through one of his staff as intermediary, the conditions in which the moderate party, the leaders of which were Adly and Sarwat, could undertake to form a Ministry. On January 12 a formula had been agreed on, Sarwat had produced a satisfactory list of Ministers who were prepared to take office under it, and Allenby was in a position to telegraph his solution to the Foreign Office for approval.

Put as briefly and simply as possible, the difference between Allenby's standpoint and that taken up hitherto by His Majesty's Government was as follows: the Government was prepared, subject to the approval of Parliament, to abolish the Protectorate and to recognize the independence of Egypt, provided the Egyptians would first bind themselves to conditions regarding certain British interests and rights, of which the chief were the safeguarding of our Imperial communications, the protection of foreigners in Egypt, and our position in the Sudan. This the Egyptians had refused to do. Allenby proposed that the Government should abolish the Protectorate and grant independence forthwith, but should announce at the same time that Great Britain retained liberty of action, if her interests demanded it, in certain matters, afterwards known as "the reserved subjects", until such time as an amicable agreement on those matters could be reached. The Government contended that it was impossible thus to give away our position in Egypt by the abolition of the Protectorate, until we had satisfactory pledges from the Egyptians as to our special interests. Allenby retorted that our position in Egypt in fact depended¹ not on the existence

¹ "Whatsoever may be the final solution of the problem, our effective guarantees are our military and naval position in Egypt, and the variously penetrating influences of our forty years' moral predominance in the country."—Allenby's dispatch to the Foreign Office (February 2, 1922).

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of a shadowy, undefined Protectorate, but on our sea-power in the Mediterranean and the presence of our garrison in the Delta, and that these constituted our real pledges. As long as we announced that, as the stronger party, we intended to reserve our rights in the essential matters, there was no danger in granting independence to Egypt, and much profit, since it would enable Egyptian co-operation again to be secured.

In his cable to the Foreign Office Allenby demanded an immediate reply. This led to accusations of "aggression"; of presenting a pistol at the head of the Government; of delivering an ultimatum; of being, in fact, rough and soldier-like. The real explanation was that Allenby knew he had no time to lose. He was aware of the changeable mood of Egyptian politicians; and the solution he was now urging was no new thing but one that he had presented to the Government many times in the last year. He was now determined on forcing an issue without further delay. He sent at the same time as his official cables a private telegram to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, urging his support. Curzon answered that he would do his best to obtain an early decision from the Cabinet, and that he hoped for a favourable reply. He did in fact recommend Allenby's proposals most strongly in the Cabinet, but, on meeting opposition, wilted before it as he had done on other occasions. On January 18 a telegram was sent to Allenby saying that the Cabinet were unable to accede to his proposals as they stood, and suggesting that he should send home two of his Advisers, Sir Gilbert Clayton and Mr. Amos,¹ to explain them further. It was not a suggestion that had the least chance of appealing to Allenby. He replied at once that his Advisers were in entire agreement with the solution he had proposed, and that it would be a useless waste of

¹ The late Sir Maurice Amos, K.B.E., Judicial Adviser to the Government of Egypt, 1919-25.

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time to send them home; that one of his staff, Mr. Selby¹, would very shortly be in England, and could give any detailed explanation necessary. In a personal telegram to Curzon he again repeated his main arguments; urged the dangers of delay; and ended by tendering his resignation if his advice was not accepted. Since Allenby was subsequently criticized for the manner and hastiness of this resignation, it should be made clear that this was a personal telegram to Curzon and not, therefore, a formal resignation. Allenby's intention was to strengthen the Foreign Secretary's hand in his discussions with the Cabinet. Curzon had telegraphed to Allenby that he was supporting him in the Cabinet "up to the point of resignation";² and Allenby hoped by placing his own resignation in Curzon's hands to give him an additional weapon to use in the Cabinet. Such personal telegrams are not usually circulated to other members of the Cabinet, as are official ones; but this one of Allenby's was, without reference to Curzon's personal telegram to Allenby; and his resignation was held by some Ministers, who were unaware of the circumstances, to be a 'footpad' attempt to hold up the Cabinet coach.

On January 24 the Foreign Office cabled to Allenby an alternative formula, which Curzon afterwards described as a "bridge" which he had at great pains constructed for Allenby. In essentials it was, however, the same proposal—that the Egyptians should accept our terms first, and that the Protectorate should be abolished afterwards. Allenby replied, on the 25th, that he would endeavour to carry out the Government's suggested policy, but that he had not the least hope that any

¹ Sir Walford Selby, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O., Ambassador in Lisbon 1937-40. He had been First Secretary at the Residency and was now on his way home to take up an appointment at the Foreign Office.

² "Up to" but not "including", he explained subsequently.

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Egyptian Ministers would take office on it. He now formally and officially tendered his resignation. The four principal British Advisers to the Egyptian Government, in consultation with whom Allenby's proposals had been drawn up, also informed the Foreign Office that Allenby's resignation must involve theirs.

After another Cabinet meeting a long denunciatory telegram was sent to Allenby on January 28. It accused him of suddenly and without warning reversing a policy on which he had been consulted by the Cabinet, and which was largely the result of his own advice; of misleading them as to the prospects of obtaining a Ministry to carry out that policy; and of now presenting an ultimatum to the Government and demanding an instant reply without discussion. It concluded by ordering Allenby, together with Amos and Clayton, two of his principal Advisers, to return home for consultation. The majority in the Cabinet had in fact decided to replace Allenby and his Advisers; and the telegram was intended to provide the Government's subsequent justification. Actually it was such a complete misstatement of the position, and its accusations could so easily be disproved, that it gave Allenby a very strong position for counter-reply. He did not, however, make any immediate answer, but told an extremely able member of his staff to draw up a dispatch to refute Foreign Office allegations; this dispatch, a masterpiece of argument and phrasing, which completely upset the Foreign Office case, he carried home with him. The last paragraph may be quoted as typical of Allenby.

The Commission which I hold from His Majesty is to maintain His Majesty's Protectorate over Egypt. I have done so, but I do not think it has the elements of durability, and I have now advised its being brought to an end, as it was established, by a unilateral declaration. I have laid open to His Majesty's Government a course which, in my

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judgment, accords with the general traditions of British policy and British institutions, and is in the truest interest of the Empire, while it is consistent with that political development of Egypt which His Majesty's Government have always desired to encourage, and which has been the goal of the labours of my predecessors, men who in serving their own country have sought the welfare of the Egyptian people.

Allenby left Cairo on February 3. The report of the enthusiastic send-off given him by Egyptians, British, and foreigners—not only at Cairo but at other stations on the line and again at Alexandria—gave his opponents at home their first cause to doubt whether it was going to be quite as easy as it had seemed to dismiss so popular a figure. Their doubts were increased by articles in the Press, particularly in *The Times*, supporting Allenby, though without full knowledge of his proposals. The attitude of *The Times* is of some interest. Its very able foreign correspondent, Sir Valentine Chirol, had lately been in Egypt. He had been treated with scant courtesy by Allenby, who had been annoyed by some comments in a *Times* article, not on himself but on the Sultan. Chirol had therefore no reason to favour Allenby. But he understood the Egyptian problem; and when he learned in London of the gist of Allenby's proposals he supported them warmly, and cabled to Lord Northcliffe, proprietor of *The Times*, who then happened to be passing through Egypt on his way home, recommending him to stop in Egypt and to study the question on the spot. Northcliffe sent a telegram to Allenby to ask if he could stay at the Residency. Allenby was embarrassed; he was the last person to canvass for Press support, and mistrusted newspaper-men. He was, however, persuaded by his staff to receive Northcliffe, who spent several days gathering all shades of opinion in Egypt, and was a witness of Allenby's impressive send-off. The support of

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The Times in the succeeding weeks was a considerable factor in Allenby's success.

Lord Northcliffe pointed out that Egyptian hopes of a general settlement had been allowed to grow up unchecked over a period of two years, and then with the breakdown of the Adly-Curzon negotiations came such universal feelings of bitterness and mistrust as to paralyse government in Egypt. He found a very curious situation in Egypt. The government of the country since December had been carried on by Under-Secretaries of State, and that was a position which could not last indefinitely, but in the absence of any solution of the present deadlock there seemed no immediate prospect of remedying that very unsatisfactory situation. Meanwhile the position of British functionaries, to whom apparently the British Cabinet looked to carry on the machinery of government, was becoming more and more intolerable. It appeared to Lord Northcliffe that the men on the spot had taken the true measure of the situation, and had acted wisely and with courage. He had come to the conclusion that the High Commissioner had prepared the way for the best and most practical means of getting ahead with the Egyptian problem, and that it would be expedient to take advantage of his counsels, since they constituted at once a pledge of Britain's good faith, which was so urgently needed in Egypt; they would set the Egyptians well on the path they desired to tread, and they in no way imperilled the essential interests of Britain.

In conclusion, Lord Northcliffe pointed out the fact that there was much solidarity of opinion in Egypt behind the efforts of the High Commissioner to arrive at a *modus vivendi*. This had been unmistakably evidenced by the large and representative gathering present at the station on the occasion of Viscount Allenby's departure for London.

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Allenby arrived home early on February 10. He was met at the station by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, by Sir Philip Chetwode, and by Mr. Selby. He was in high spirits, and at once announced to his friends that he was "not going to budge an inch and was not going to argue", forestalling advice which they had come to offer him. Though warned that it was too early for Foreign Office hours, he insisted on going at once to Downing Street to leave his dispatch refuting what he called the "wicked accusations" against him of the Foreign Office telegram of January 28.

The history of the subsequent fate of this dispatch is somewhat amusing. It was marked, in accordance with the usual custom for important State documents, "To be circulated to H.M. the King and to the Cabinet". No sooner, however, had Lord Curzon had time to read the first pages of the dispatch than he telephoned urgently to the branch of the Foreign Office concerned and had all circulation suspended. When he saw Allenby that evening his opening remarks were on the subject of the dispatch.¹ "This is an extremely able document, Lord Allenby," he began; "it must have been written by a very clever man. You did not write it yourself. Who wrote it for you?" To this not very tactful beginning Allenby replied, "No, I did not write it, but I have been through every word of it, and am prepared to initial every line if your Lordship is not satisfied. It was written by a *very* clever man." Curzon then said that it was not a document which could be fittingly circulated to the King and to the Cabinet, since it was not the kind of document which he, as Secretary of State, or the Cabinet were in the habit of having addressed to them by their representatives abroad. Allenby replied that he regretted that fact, but that as Lord Curzon had seen fit to bring

¹ The account of this interview was given by Allenby to a friend immediately afterwards, and at once recorded by him.

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certain charges against him, which had doubtless been circulated to the Cabinet, and as his dispatch was the reply to those charges, he must insist on its circulation.

Curzon then spent some time trying to induce Allenby to withdraw his resignation, instancing his own experience as Viceroy of India, when his suggestions were frequently vetoed by the Government, but he did not resign. The same, he added, was true of Lord Reading, the present Viceroy. Allenby replied that he did not wish to draw comparisons between Lord Curzon's and Lord Reading's action and his own, but that his course was clear. At present his word was current coin from Cairo to Khartoum. Were he to consent to return to Egypt, if his proposals were turned down, it would not be worth the paper on which it was written. He could not at any price sacrifice the confidence he commanded in Egypt. Curzon then asked plaintively how they were to find a successor; it would be most difficult and inconvenient. "If you ask my advice," said Allenby, "send as good a man as me, and a better if you can find him."

Having made no impression, Curzon now said that Allenby must see the Prime Minister. Allenby again urged the need for an immediate decision. The interview ended with a bitter diatribe by Curzon about the conduct of the Advisers in supporting Allenby by their resignation. Allenby replied that he considered they had served him and His Majesty's Government loyally and that he could not discuss the point. As he was leaving the room Curzon inquired where Lady Allenby was. Allenby could not refrain from a parting shot: "I have left her behind in Egypt, as I feared there might be trouble if I brought her away."

The interview, which had lasted an hour and a half, left Allenby's determination unshaken. Next day was a Saturday. The only action taken by Allenby was to go personally to the Foreign Office to make certain that his

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dispatch had been "circulated". His Majesty the King afterwards told him that he had read and enjoyed every word of it.

The fateful interview with the Prime Minister was fixed for Monday, February 13, but was then postponed till the morning of the 15th. The Cabinet was now in an awkward position. Allenby had much support in the Press; his dispatch was a very damaging answer to the charges by which it had been proposed to justify his dismissal; and Allenby, as a peer, would have the opportunity and right to state his case in the House of Lords if his resignation was accepted. It was left to the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, to try to turn Allenby out of his entrenched position, on which the arguments of the Foreign Secretary had had so little result.

Sir Gilbert Clayton and Amos accompanied Allenby to the meeting. Mr. Lloyd George was supported by Lord Curzon. Allenby was subjected to a sharp cross-fire of questions and objections on his proposals; he began to show impatience, complaining of the number of occasions on which his advice had been rejected. "But," said the Prime Minister, "you are now asking me to abandon our entire position in Egypt without guarantee." Here Amos broke in: "That, sir, is not a fair description of Lord Allenby's proposals." Mr. Lloyd George then turned on Amos and again went over the Cabinet's objections, to which Amos replied. The argument was proceeding, when Allenby broke in with: "Well, it is no good disputing any longer. I have told you what I think is necessary. You won't have it, and it is none of my business to force you to. I have waited five weeks for a decision, and I can't wait any longer. I shall tell Lady Allenby to come home." On this the Prime Minister rose and put his hand on Allenby's arm. "You have waited five weeks, Lord Allenby," he said; "wait five more minutes." He then announced that he would agree to

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Allenby's scheme if a few minor amendments could be made. Allenby said he would examine the amendments and give a final answer that afternoon. His Advisers, to whom he put the amendments after the meeting, soon assured him that they were quite unimportant changes in drafting, and that he had got the entire substance of what he wanted.

There was still one more effort to thwart the agreed solution. It came not from those members of the Cabinet who had always opposed it, of whom the most determined had been Winston Churchill, but from Curzon, who had originally supported it so warmly. He made a futile attempt to go back to the old proposal of no abolition of the Protectorate till after agreement on the reserved subjects. When the documents agreed to by the Prime Minister and Lord Allenby had finally been approved by the Cabinet he spoke petulantly of "the stupidity of these soldiers". His failure to move Allenby at their interview had undoubtedly rankled.¹

The Government, too, covered its defeat with a cloud of misrepresentation. In the debate in the House of Commons on March 14, for approval of the abolition of the Protectorate, the spokesman for the Government, Mr. Austen Chamberlain,² spoke as if it had been Allenby who had given way and not the Government. "I am happy to think," he said, "that the moment we got face to face with Lord Allenby our differences disappeared, because he saw at once that we could not alter the *status quo* in respect of those matters until we had definite security that we should be able to protect our interests and fulfil our obligations." He repeated the same travesty of facts twice more in his speech. In justice to an

¹ In *Curzon: the Last Phase*, by Harold Nicolson, the 1922 Declaration is said to be Curzon's own policy. This claim and the whole account of the episode in this book are incorrect.

² The late Sir Austen Chamberlain, K.G.

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honourable man it should be said that he had taken no part in the discussions and was probably unaware that the brief he had been given was incorrect. Allenby made no protest. He had got his way, and cared not what was said of him. But when Austen Chamberlain later became Foreign Secretary the remembrance of that speech was present with Allenby and may have contributed to the unfortunate misunderstanding between them.

Such is the inner story of the part played by Allenby in obtaining the 1922 Declaration of the Independence of Egypt. He is still spoken of bitterly by some unrepentant imperialists as the man who "sold the pass" and gave away our position in Egypt. If anyone could have been so accused it was Milner, but actually there was no pass to sell, since there was none that could have been held. There was a last ditch that some foolish people might have died in, from which Allenby's common sense preserved us. Can there be any doubt now that his solution was the right one? The only alternative amounted to virtual annexation and military rule, which, quite apart from questions of morality and justice, was unthinkable in view of the temper of the British nation at the time and the inconstancy of their rulers. How long would British opinion have tolerated military rule in Egypt, and how long would the Government have supported their representative in such rule? Allenby had already had experience of the vacillation of the Cabinet in 1920.

Allenby's service to his country and to Egypt at this crisis lay not so much in recognizing the correct solution—that was easy to anyone who knew the real facts and conditions—as in the courage and firmness he showed in putting it forward and in carrying it through against such a weight of opposition and misrepresentation. His Advisers, who risked their careers to support him, also deserved well of the State. A contrast may be drawn

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between the action of Mr. Lloyd George, who had been one of the chief opponent's of Allenby's proposals,¹ but who, with considerable political courage, supported him in the end when the facts were brought home to him; and that of Lord Curzon, who realized from the first the wisdom of Allenby's solution, but had not the strength of character to support it against opposition.² This gives a measure of the worth of the two men in a crisis. In the council-room as in the field of action, character and courage count for much more than mere knowledge and ability. Allenby had no further respect for Lord Curzon after this experience, but he had always a liking and admiration for Lloyd George. Years later Allenby had made a speech at a Service dinner shortly after one of Lloyd George's attacks on Lord Haig and the soldiers. A friend said to him afterwards, "You disappointed the Press. They came expecting to hear you attack Lloyd George." Allenby replied immediately, "Attack Lloyd George? I like the little man. He won the war, but for heaven's sake don't tell him so."

¹ He had exclaimed at one time to the King: "I know now why he is called the Bull; he has got into our Eastern china-shop and is breaking everything up."

² "Here was a man possessed of great intelligence, of flaming energy, of clear ideals, of unequalled knowledge, of wide experience: to this man was granted an opportunity such as falls seldom to any modern statesman; and yet, although in almost every event his judgment was correct and his vision enlightened, British policy under his guidance declined from the very summit of authority to a level of impotence such as, since the Restoration, it has seldom reached."—HAROLD NICOLSON, *Curzon: the Last Phase*.

PART II

EGYPT: INDEPENDENCE (March 1922-June 1925)

The first of early blessings, independence.

GIBBON, *Autobiography*

Whether the People be led by the Lord,
Or lured by the loudest throat:
If it be quicker to die by the sword
Or cheaper to die by vote—

Holy State or Holy King
Or Holy People's Will—
Have no truck with the senseless thing.
Order the guns and kill.

RUDYARD KIPLING

CHAPTER V

1922: THE BIRTH OF THE NEW ORDER IN EGYPT

Always remember it is better to make a bracelet that fits the
wrist than a necklace so long that the wearer stumbles over it.

JOAN GRANT, *Winged Pharaoh*

OF Allenby's six years as High Commissioner, he had spent the first three in obtaining a workable policy on which to base our post-war relations with Egypt. He passed the last three years in superintending the beginnings of the new regime which resulted from that policy. It was a period of vexation and disappointment; it culminated in a senseless crime, for which some held Allenby's forbearance largely responsible; it ended with his resignation in circumstances of misunderstanding and irritation.

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The mistakes and misfortunes of the period were there for all to see, and have obscured the successes won and the real progress made. The foundations of modern Egypt's political life were laid in these years; Allenby played a great part in shaping and securing those foundations; and subsequent events have shown that the foundations were, on the whole, well, truly, and wisely laid—given the material and labour available.

In the eyes of many of his own countrymen in Egypt Allenby appeared during this period as a half-hearted defender of their rights and privileges; while certain members of the Labour Party at home represented him as a high-handed militarist who was crushing Egyptian liberties. The Egyptians themselves were in no mood to be grateful to any Englishman, and clamoured at his sternness rather than recognized his forbearance. Only those who stood close to Allenby, Egyptians as well as British, realized how much his steadfastness of purpose accomplished in most trying circumstances, and how wise his advice and judgments usually were. Fortunately, Allenby cared nothing whether he was praised or blamed, and devoted himself to the problems of the new order in Egypt without thought of personal reputation or advantage.


The immediate problems after the Declaration of 1922 were the framing of a Constitution, the abolition of martial law, which had been in force already for nearly eight years, and the compensation of the foreign officials, mainly British, who would lose their employment and prospects under the new regime. All these problems were successfully solved within the next eighteen months. The ultimate objective was the conclusion of an agreement with Egypt on the question of the 'reserved subjects'—the security of British Imperial communications, the defence of Egypt, the protection of foreign communities, and the Sudan. Had Allenby stayed in Egypt a little

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longer a solution of these difficult problems might have been reached earlier, for the Egyptians trusted and respected him and had confidence in his fairness. As it was, it was more than ten years after his departure before a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Egypt.

"He gives twice who gives quickly"; and he withdraws half the value of his gift who hesitates and gives grudgingly. The six weeks that had elapsed at the beginning of 1922 between Allenby's recommendations to the Cabinet and their acceptance had allowed some of the effects of Zaghlul's deportation to wear off and had given the extremists time to poison the Egyptian mind against any gifts from the English. Certain events had helped them; the treaty concluded by the British Government with Ireland at the end of 1921 was interpreted to show that violence and murder were the most effective means of gaining concessions from Great Britain; and the evident weakness in Britain itself of Mr. Lloyd George's Government seemed to foreshadow its early fall. What might be hoped from a Labour Government was indicated to the Egyptian extremists when Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the prospective Prime Minister of such a Government, passed through Egypt shortly before Allenby's return with the Declaration. To some local Zaghlulists who entertained him at Port Said Mr. MacDonald declared that "the people of England would soon realize it was badly governed", and that "Egypt would then come into its own"; he also expressed a hope for Zaghlul's speedy return.

Thus the generous policy which Allenby had obtained in the Declaration was accepted somewhat grudgingly by the Egyptians as an 'instalment' of complete independence. There was plenty of material for the malcontents to use. What sort of 'independence' could Egypt enjoy, they asked, while she still lay under martial law administered by foreign troops; while the chosen leader of the



ALLENBY AT CAIRO STATION ON HIS RETURN FROM ENGLAND IN FEBRUARY 1922



Photo Weinberg, Cairo

H.M. KING FUAD OF EGYPT

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people was in exile; while highly paid foreign officials still held most of the key posts and could only be dismissed with costly compensation; and while the Sudan, an integral part of Egypt, was still under British rule?

The political history of Egypt during the three years of 1922 to 1924 is that of a triangular struggle for power. The three parties to it were the King, the body which comprised most of the educated and moderate Egyptians, and which may be termed the Liberal Party, and the popular party, which hailed Zaghlul as leader. Allenby may be said to have acted as referee, interfering as little as possible but blowing the whistle firmly when the worst and most obvious fouls occurred, and ignoring, like all good referees, the howls and criticisms of the mob at an unpopular decision.

Fuad, previously Sultan, had been proclaimed King of Egypt on March 15. This enhancement of his title seemed to arouse his ambition and to increase his love of power. As Sultan he had exercised little influence and attracted little attention; as King, intent on reviving, as far as modern conditions would allow, the autocratic rule of his ancestor, Mohammed Aly, or of his father, the Khedive Ismail, he became a serious and disturbing factor in Egyptian politics. He sought his ends by shrewd intrigue rather than by force of character, and would always give way before a stronger personality, such as Allenby; but he had considerable adroitness as a politician of the "Tammany boss" order. He was skilful to see the value of propaganda and made much use of a subsidized Press. He always contrived to work into a Ministry one or two of his own creatures, who had access to the Palace behind the Premier's back. Thus if Fuad could not get his own way he usually contrived to make the position of the Prime Minister impossible.

The moderate party, whom we may call the Liberals, comprised the majority of the ablest and most intelli-

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gent Egyptians, including many of the old Turkish ruling class. Their principal representative was Adly Pasha; he was the '*grand seigneur*' type, of good family, impressive appearance, and stately manners. He was patriotic, strictly honest, and enjoyed great prestige. But he was lacking in political courage, and would not face a difficult or unpleasant situation if he could avoid it. Allenby, after one or two experiences of his indecision, termed him "the broken reed", and put little trust in him. Adly's colleague, Sarwat Pasha, the first Prime Minister after the Declaration, had more courage than Adly and very considerable abilities and experience; if he could have commanded the prestige or following that Adly had he would have been the leader Egypt required at this juncture. Even as it was he did much towards laying the foundations of Egypt's future, in spite of the King's dislike of and intrigues against him.

Zaghlul, with his subservient party, the Wafd, undoubtedly represented the popular voice of Egypt; but he and his followers were a destructive not a constructive element. Zaghlul's character has already been sketched; himself a man of intelligence and moderation, he had been forced by circumstances to become leader of the ignorant, unruly mob, which he was not strong enough, or wise enough, to control.

In the background hovered the shadowy, enigmatical figure of the ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, nephew of King Fuad, who had been dethroned in 1914 at the beginning of the Great War and lived in exile in Europe. He had little influence on the politics of Egypt, but his intrigues, real or imaginary, had a considerable effect on the mind of King Fuad. The King, aware of his unpopularity with his people and of his unsatisfactory relations with the British Government, became obsessed with the idea that either popular outcry or the exasperation of Great Britain might demand his removal and the restoration

of Abbas. Actually, the ex-Khedive was the last person Great Britain was ever likely to restore or even to allow to return to Egypt, nor did he command any popular support in Egypt itself. But it suited certain Egyptians to keep alive King Fuad's nervousness of him, while others found some advantage, political or financial, in intriguing mildly with the exile. The ex-Khedive himself both enjoyed intrigue for its own sake, and also exploited his nuisance value in the hope of a better financial settlement of his claims on the Egyptian State.

The immediate sequence of events on Allenby's return to Egypt included: presentation of the Declaration to the Sultan; the formation of a Ministry by Sarwat Pasha; the approval of the Declaration by the British House of Commons on March 14 after a seven hours' debate which showed for the most part remarkable ignorance of the real position in Egypt; the proclamation next day of Fuad as King of Egypt; and an announcement by the British Government to all Powers of the termination of the Protectorate over Egypt. The announcement contained the following passage:

The termination of the British Protectorate over Egypt involves, however, no change in the *status quo* as regards the position of other Powers in Egypt itself. The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt, long recognized by other Governments. These special relations are defined in the Declaration recognizing Egypt as an independent sovereign state. His Majesty's Government have laid them down as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved and will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other Power. In pursuance of this principle they will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another Power, and they will consider any aggression against the territory

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of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command.

This was virtually a Monroe Doctrine for Egypt.

Allenby now departed for a six weeks' tour in the Sudan, leaving the new Ministry to establish itself and to prepare a Constitution and other important measures. On his return at the beginning of May the growing pains of the new order soon made themselves manifest. The three main troubles with which Allenby had to deal for the next year or so were these: the rising agitation over the Sudan; the crimes of a murder gang against Englishmen in Cairo; and the attempts of the King to arrogate autocratic powers to himself.

The question of the Sudan was the principal weapon of anti-British agitation during the period; it was exploited continuously and malevolently as an Egyptian grievance; it led to troubles within the Sudan itself; and it was the cause of the crime that at last ended British patience. Some examination of the history and status of the Sudan is necessary to understand the elements of a controversy which touched and interested all classes in Egypt. The fellahin were concerned only with the safety of the Nile waters, the life-blood of Egypt: so long as the flow of the river was not unfairly impeded, they cared little who controlled the Sudan. For the professional class—lawyers, civil servants, clerks—an extended Egyptian hold on the Sudan would mean more jobs. For the King and the upper class it was a matter of prestige that the Egyptian title to the Sudan and power over it should be enhanced. For the professional agitator the Sudan gave unrivalled opportunities to vilify the perfidious British. The British themselves, in addition to a naturally tenacious hold on prestige and profits, were genuinely actuated by concern for the good government of the Sudanese peoples, which they felt to be safer in their hands than in Egyptian.

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The peoples of the Upper Nile Valley have no racial affinity with the people of the Delta; their one binding cord is the course of the great river whose waters they share. The history of the Sudan's connexion with Egypt for the hundred years previous to 1922 had been as follows. Mohammed Aly, Egypt's national hero, who was an Albanian, sent an expedition to the Sudan in 1820 and brought it under his rule. Egypt held it for the next sixty years. She made little pretence of governing in the interests of the inhabitants, allowed the slave trade to flourish unchecked, and exploited the land unscrupulously. Sixty years of misrule led to the revolt of the Mahdi, the slaughter of an Egyptian army, Gordon's mission to evacuate the Sudan and his death at Khartoum. Sixteen years later an Anglo-Egyptian force under Kitchener reconquered the Sudan, which had suffered even more under the Mahdi's despotism than under Egyptian misrule. Great Britain supplied the military leadership and the greater part of the troops; Egypt paid by far the larger share of the bill (approximately a million and a half pounds out of a total cost of two millions).

The disposal of the Sudan, after French claims to a portion had been sternly refused at Fashoda,¹ raised an awkward constitutional problem. Was the Sudan simply a rebellious Egyptian province which had been re-occupied, and accordingly the property of the Khedive of Egypt, as heir to Mohammed Aly, the original conqueror, or had the Egyptian title lapsed during the sixteen years of the Mahdi's rule, and was the huge country now a prize of war to be shared between the

¹ Major Marchand, after a remarkable march across half a continent, arrived at Fashoda on the Nile, south of Khartoum, shortly after Kitchener's defeat of the Mahdi, and claimed the southern Sudan for France. Kitchener, backed by the British Government, insisted on his withdrawal. The incident almost led to war between Great Britain and France.

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successful invaders of it? What rights to it had the Turkish Sultan, the nominal overlord of Egypt?

It is not the British way to deal with a problem of this sort logically or directly. Their position in Egypt was anomalous and had never been defined; their legal status in the Sudan would be even more difficult to regularize. Lord Cromer, the British representative in Egypt and virtual ruler of the country, was called on to solve the problem. The one firm intention of the British Government (and of the British people, in so far as it was interested in the Sudan) was that the troubled country after three-quarters of a century's misrule should be given peace and good administration. The logical alternatives were open annexation by Great Britain or recognition of the country as a part of Egypt and administration by British officials behind an Egyptian façade, as in Egypt. Cromer deliberately chose an illogical compromise and called it a Condominium. In the preamble Great Britain claimed her share "by right of conquest", while in Article I the Sudan was defined as having been "temporarily lost to Egypt". The two phrases were hardly consistent with each other. The practical result of the Condominium was barely distinguishable from British annexation except that Egypt paid handsomely for her title to a share. The Sudan was ruled by a Governor-General, nominated by Great Britain but appointed by the Khedive of Egypt. Egypt supplied a part of the garrison and balanced the Budget deficit, which averaged £2,000,000 a year.

This arrangement, so advantageous to Great Britain, could only be justified by the unselfish devoted work by which the British officials brought peace and prosperity to the land. So long as Egypt itself was in leading-strings British rule in the Sudan was accepted and provoked little criticism. But with the growth of Egyptian nationalism it was only natural that so one-sided an

arrangement as the Condominium should be called in question. But it was especially when the 1922 Declaration had removed much of the previous ground for agitation that the Sudan question was used by the malcontents in Egypt to inflame feeling against Great Britain. No opportunity was lost to impute ill intention and arouse suspicion. For instance, Allenby's visit to the Sudan was interpreted by the Egyptian Press as a prelude to British annexation. In the end the weapon was used too often and brought a great crime and disaster.

Allenby's second great embarrassment was the murder campaign against Englishmen. During 1922 there were twelve attacks on Englishmen in Cairo, which resulted in four being killed and nine wounded. In addition two prominent Egyptian Liberals were murdered. As was afterwards shown, these murders were the work of a small gang inspired by a few well-educated fanatics. The actual murders were carried out by some weak-minded students of the Effendi class and a number of hired assassins from the criminal profession. The objects of the gang were presumably either to intimidate the British or to provoke them to reprisals. The victims were not usually chosen for their prominence or because of any supposed enmity to Egypt, but simply for the security with which they could be assassinated. It was easy to study the daily movements of some British official or officer, to discover some quiet spot that he passed daily at a fixed hour, to walk up behind him in the dusk, or even in daylight, and shoot him in the back. The murderers were aided by the average Englishman's dislike of carrying arms or taking precautions. They ran no risk from the victim, who was unarmed and was shot in the back; none from the police, provided they moved off before the police arrived; and none from the public, provided they chose a moment when no Englishman or

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respectable foreigner was passing. One of the British victims was shot dead in a public place outside some shops, whose owners professed to have seen or heard nothing; actual witnesses to this murder were afterwards found entirely by chance. This attitude of the Egyptian public was the principal factor which prevented the gang being brought to justice sooner; they would give no assistance to the police either by attempting arrest at the time or giving information afterwards. It was not that they approved of the murders, but they feared terrorization and reprisal, not without reason, since murderous assaults were sometimes made on those who had given evidence or helped the police.

Though the number of murders was small, they created a feeling of anger and insecurity in the British community, who chafed at the powerlessness of the authorities to stop the crimes or arrest the murderers. Some hotheads advocated reprisals and other severe measures; almost all agreed that Allenby's methods were not strong enough. Allenby kept his head and refused to be stampeded into useless violence. He may have remembered the disastrous Denshawai incident sixteen years earlier, when undue severity had left a serious stain on the British reputation in Egypt. He ordered what measures of protection he could. British soldiers patrolled the streets, the numbers of police were increased, Englishmen carried arms. All his information, however, showed that the Egyptian people at large did not approve of the murders, and that no measures of general reprisal were likely to be effective. Only the apprehension of the gang could remove the bane. Offers of rewards up to £5000 for convicting information brought no result. The Foreign Office suggested seizing some revenue-producing branch of the Egyptian Administration from which to pay compensation to victims of attacks. Allenby replied that it would make Englishmen

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no safer and would ruin any chance of good understanding with the Egyptians, while liberal compensation was already being paid to the victims. A special body which Allenby set to work under a selected British official¹ tracked down the gang in the end, as will be told later. Meanwhile the attacks were a source of constant anxiety and exasperation.

Thirdly, King Fuad. Allenby's duels with that astute and ambitious monarch over the Constitution and other matters will be recorded in the course of the narrative. The two contestants had a respect and liking for each other, and between rounds had much friendly discussion on subjects of mutual interest, one of which was the various religions of mankind. Allenby appreciated the King's intelligence; the King learned to respect Allenby's sincerity and to realize his strength. In their passages of arms the monarch showed much fencing-school skill but had usually to yield in the end to the threat of Allenby's broadsword.² In the matter of securing a liberal Constitution Allenby fought Egypt's battles as much as Great Britain's. Though the manoeuvres of the King were less dangerous than the Sudan agitation or the crimes of the murder gang, they required a constant watchfulness and gave Allenby much occupation.

The Commission which assembled to draft the Constitution under the presidency of Rushdi Pasha (the Prime Minister of the War period), began their labours in April and continued them until the late autumn. At an early stage the question of the Sudan raised an acute controversy with the British Government. The Sudan was defined in the opening clauses as an integral part of Egypt, and the King of Egypt was stated to be King of

¹ Sir Alexander Keown-Boyd, K.B.E., C.M.G., who had spent many years in the Ministry of the Interior and had been Oriental Secretary at the Residency.

² "The ingenuity of his arguments compelled my reluctant admiration," wrote Allenby after one interview.

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the Sudan. The British Government could hardly be expected to tolerate this attempt to alter the Condominium of 1899 and to prejudge the discussion of this 'reserved subject'. Allenby at once insisted that the clauses should be redrafted. A flood of indignation was poured out in speech and article by the Egyptian Nationalists, but Allenby and the British Government remained firm. King Fuad seized the opportunity to court popular favour by supporting the Nationalist view. He hoped thus to discredit the Prime Minister, whom he disliked, and to distract attention from his own manoeuvres to alter the Constitution so as to increase the royal privileges and power.

The Committee had taken the Belgian system as a model and had prepared a Constitution on liberal terms. There was to be a Parliament elected, in theory at least, on a wide popular basis, and a Senate partly elected and partly nominated. The King was to be in the position of a strictly constitutional monarch. Fuad, who had been brought up in the despotic traditions of his family and who admitted to keeping Machiavelli's *Prince* by his bedside, was not the man to accept such a position without a struggle. His idea of a Constitution proper to Egypt was that of a monarch directing subservient Ministers chosen by himself. The functions of a Parliament should be to register the decisions of the King's Ministers. It should serve as a token of democracy rather than as the voice of a people who were, he genuinely believed, too backward to be given a voice in their rule. His attitude may be illustrated by some remarks he made to a leading Egyptian when he became aware of the main provisions of the Constitution. "If you want this Bolshevik Constitution," he said, "then I claim all the powers and privileges of a Lenin." To the reply that it was not a Bolshevistic but a democratic Constitution he retorted, "Then I claim all the powers

and privileges of the President of the United States of America." The reminder that the President was elected by popular suffrage and only for a limited term was not acceptable.

At the end of November Sarwat resigned, ostensibly on the question of the Sudan clauses, actually because the King had made his position impossible by treating him with studied dislike and obstruction. This culminated in a Palace plot designed to expose Sarwat to public indignity while accompanying His Majesty to Friday prayers at the famous El Azhar mosque. Sarwat learned of the intention and realized that his position had become impossible. At the critical moment, too, the faint-hearted Adly, unwilling to share the odium of agreeing to the Sudan definition on which the British insisted and alarmed perhaps by the murder of two leading Liberals, withdrew the support of his party from Sarwat, in whose place the King nominated Tewfik Nessim.

The new Prime Minister had no great ability, but was honest and industrious. He was under the influence of the Palace and likely to prove pliable to royal wishes. First round to the King, whose confidence in his triumph was, however, disturbed by a stern warning which Allenby delivered to him on December 3, informing him of the displeasure of the British Government at his treatment of a Minister who had been appointed to implement the policy of the Declaration.

Sarwat's work has had less credit than it deserves. He had faced the difficult tasks of inaugurating a new régime with courage and determination. He had not only to settle some awkward problems with the British—the Sudan clauses, the compensation of foreign officials, an Indemnity Act to enable martial law to be abolished—in all of which he was likely to incur odium with his fellow-countrymen; but he had also to initiate a new system of

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government and to accustom to the duties of office a class almost entirely untried and untrained in the acceptance and exercise of independent responsibility. The extent of the change has not always been realized even by those who have followed the history of modern Egypt. Before the British occupation the governing class in Egypt was practically entirely Turkish in origin. During the forty years of British rule this class had lost much of its governing sense or had turned to other pursuits. The native Egyptians who were now aspiring to the direction of their country's affairs lacked for the most part the necessary moral courage and sense of responsibility. They had learned to lean on British advice in a difficulty and felt at a loss now that it was being withdrawn. As has been explained earlier, it was part of Allenby's policy to compel them to face their difficulties and dangers themselves, and he had taken some risk to do it.

The times were not easy for such an experiment. Four years of war, followed by three years of civil commotion, had overstrained the machine of government, from which the foreign advisers were now being removed with a haste dictated by nationalistic feeling rather than administrative prudence. An additional impetus to nationalism and to the desire to end British influence was given by the events in Turkey in the autumn of this year. In August and September the Greeks were completely routed by Mustapha Kemal and driven out of Anatolia. The event was hailed in Egypt as a victory for Islam over Christianity and as a British defeat. The firm stand of the British at Chanak in October did something to restore their prestige; and at the Lausanne Conference in November, called to arrange a peace treaty with Turkey, the skill of our diplomacy confirmed the resolution of the military stand. The question of Egyptian representation at this conference caused consid-

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erable diplomatic discussion and was still unsettled when Sarwat's Ministry fell.

The year had been so full of important events that Allenby was unable to go to England on leave. In the autumn his mother, whose character had done so much towards shaping his own and to whom he was so devoted, died at the age of ninety-two. To a friend Allenby wrote characteristically:

Very many thanks for your kind letter of sympathy on my mother's death. She died full of years and honour: and she kept her full mental powers and her keen interest in everything almost to the very last. Egypt kept me here this autumn; but I saw her last spring and have nothing to regret. Mabel saw her last month, and brought me her last message.

In November occurred the historic discovery by Howard Carter, financed by Lord Carnarvon, of the Tomb of Tutankhamen. Allenby was one of the privileged few who were present at the opening of the tomb and thus one of the first to see the wonderful store of treasure in it.

This eventful year of 1922 ended on a menacing note with a cruel and senseless crime. On December 27, Dr. Robson, a lecturer at the Law School and especially friendly to Egyptians, was shot and killed in broad daylight while bicycling home from his work. This murder provoked the deepest feeling of indignation in the British community, much of it directed against Allenby's supposed lack of firmness.

CHAPTER VI

1923: A YEAR OF PROGRESS

The dogs bark, but the caravan passes on.

Eastern proverb

THE year 1923, which was to be fruitful in the history of Egypt's political development, opened under unfavourable auspices. Allenby's three main difficulties were still unrelieved. The Sudan clauses had not been satisfactorily amended; the shadow of the Robson murder hung over the relations between Egyptians and British and between the British community in Cairo and the Residency; the King was unrepentant and determined to block any Constitution that did not give him a considerable measure of autocracy.

A mass meeting of the British in Cairo was held at Shepherd's Hotel on January 2 to protest against the continuance of the murder campaign and to demand strong measures of repression. Allenby had already informed the Prime Minister that martial law would not be abolished so long as such attacks continued, that an indemnity must be paid to the widow, and that police protection must be strengthened; meanwhile British cavalry would again patrol the streets.

At the beginning of February the matter of the Sudan clauses came to a head. Finding King Fuad persistent that he should be styled King of the Sudan, Allenby was compelled to seek an audience of him to insist that the point of view of the British Government must be observed. After exercising for more than twenty-

four hours every effort to evade the issue, His Majesty yielded and signed the document which Allenby had presented to him. Two days later the Prime Minister, Nessim Pasha, realizing that the King's version of the Constitution was not likely to go through unchallenged, handed in his resignation, and was roundly upbraided as a coward by his royal master.

There followed a five weeks' interregnum. At first it seemed that Adly would form a Ministry. But he made the suspension of martial law a condition of taking office, and a series of bomb outrages against British soldiers made it obvious that martial law could not be removed at once. Adly, unwilling as usual to face difficulties and unpopularity, declined his task. It was left to a comparatively unregarded man, Ibrahim Yehia Pasha, to undertake what seemed the unprofitable post of Prime Minister. He lacked the ability of Sarwat and the prestige of Adly, but he was honest and patriotic and had more than a common measure of courage and determination.

He took office in the middle of March and a month later had succeeded in getting the new Constitution promulgated in its original form. That month had seen a continuous struggle between Minister and King, a struggle in which Allenby played a considerable part. During Nessim's Ministry the King had caused the draft Constitution to be altered in a number of ways so as to enhance his power and privileges. It soon became obvious that the new Prime Minister would be powerless, unaided, to restore the original text. Allenby determined to use his influence on the side of the people. In an official report he described his action as follows:

At the time of the incident in connexion with the Sudan clauses it did not seem to me either necessary or desirable to interest myself in the other provisions of the Constitution. When, however, it became clear that, in the face of

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unanimous and clearly expressed public opinion, the King proposed to adhere to his version of the text, and that the Prime Minister's efforts were quite unavailing, I thought it judicious to use my influence with His Majesty. I accordingly advised him to allow himself to be guided by his Prime Minister. This advice I was obliged to give incessantly for a period of a month on successive articles of the Constitution.

Allenby explained his motives as twofold: that it was not in keeping with the policy of the Declaration that the King should arrogate undue powers to himself, and secondly, that a constitutional struggle between King and people must be avoided. He added:

My intervention was throughout private and unofficial, and I have been at pains to explain to the many who have since come to express their thanks that their gratitude is due not to myself but to the King and the Cabinet: still, the part I played is generally known and has, I think, gone far to promote the growing tendency amongst Egyptians to friendship towards His Majesty's Government. The King, who has little capacity for knowing when to yield, resisted Yéhia Pasha until the last moment, and then consented to the modifications in question only with bad grace.

The next step was the abolition of martial law. It was not quite so simple a matter as might appear. An Act of Indemnity was required to prevent legal proceedings which might call in question any action taken under martial law.¹ Also it was found necessary to fill in gaps in Egyptian legislation to regulate certain matters which had hitherto been dealt with under martial law, such as powers to control public meetings and to take special steps for the security of the State in an emergency. On July 5 the Act of Indemnity was passed, and simultaneously a proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief

¹ Since martial law is not recognized by civil law, such an Act is always required at the termination of a period of martial law.



PRIME MINISTERS OF EGYPT, 1920-26

TEWFIK NESSIM PASHA (May 22, 1920, to March 16, 1921; November 30, 1922, to February 5, 1923)

ADLY YEGHEN PASHA (March 17, 1921, to December 24, 1921)

ABDEL KHALEK SARWAT PASHA (March 1, 1922, to November 29, 1922)



PRIME MINISTERS OF EGYPT, 1920-26

IBRAHIM YEHA PASHA (March 15, 1923, to January 17, 1924)

AHMED ZIWAR PASHA (November 24, 1924, to June 7, 1926)

ISMAIL SIDKY PASHA (a prominent figure during the period when Ziwar was Prime Minister)

put an end to the martial law that had held force in Egypt since November 2, 1914. Though its existence for so long had been denounced as harsh and tyrannical, in actual practice its interference with the life of the ordinary citizen had been negligible. It had been put to some curious uses: one of its ordinances regulated rentals between tenant and landlord and prevented profiteering; another compelled foreigners to pay certain Egyptian taxes to which they would not otherwise, by reason of the Capitulations, have been liable. Allenby had even had to declare an Egyptian Budget passed by a proclamation under martial law, since there had been no ministry in office to do so. Of late its operation had practically been confined to enabling offences of violence against the Army to be tried by military courts. Its removal was an important step in Egypt's progress towards independence.

The next step was the Bill providing for the compensation of foreign officials, of whom half were British, who would be replaced by Egyptians. The Bill, which was naturally of great interest to the British community, provided compensation on a generous scale, at an eventual cost to the Egyptian Treasury of some £6,000,000 to £7,000,000. It may sound a large price to pay for freedom from foreign leading-strings, and was so criticized by the Egyptian Press. But the terms were by no means extortionate, and Egypt had been on the whole well and faithfully served by her foreign Advisers. That she had not been plundered is shown by the fact that though taxation was light, there was a reserve of over £18,000,000 in the Treasury at the end of the financial year 1923-24.

Allenby's immediate objectives were now secured. The Constitution had been made law in an acceptable form, martial law had been abolished, the compensation of foreign officials had been satisfactorily settled, and the murder campaign seemed in abeyance. Fourteen

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students had been arrested and tried for conspiracy to murder in June. Thirteen were found guilty, three of whom were subsequently executed.

Egypt's future seemed to lie in her own hands: when a Parliament had been elected the 'reserved subjects' could be discussed, and a final amicable settlement made in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Pending the elections, Allenby went home for a well-earned rest. He was in England from August till the end of October. He spent much of the time as usual in his favourite pursuit of fishing.

It is time to return to the Egyptian who had been and was to be Allenby's chief antagonist in the settlement between Great Britain and Egypt. Saad Zaghlul had, it will be remembered, been arrested towards the end of December 1921 for incitement to disturbance and had been interned at Aden. He was taken aboard H.M.S. *Clematis* on February 28, 1922, the day of the declaration of Egypt's independence, and left Aden for the Seychelles Islands the next day. This transfer had been decided some time before, and the date was fortuitous, but Zaghlul made it a grievance that this particular day was chosen for his deportation to an unhealthy island near the Equator. The climate in fact is not unhealthy, though it was too damp for Zaghlul, who suffered from bronchitis. He was accordingly transferred to Gibraltar in the early autumn of 1922, and remained there till the end of March 1923, when he was released. On the abolition of martial law in July there was no bar to his return to Egypt, and he landed at Alexandria on September 18 after nearly two years' exile. He received, as was natural, a tumultuous welcome from the populace. The King and many leading Egyptians, while expressing approval in public, were in private, however, probably somewhat apprehensive. At first Zaghlul was moderate in his professions

and spoke only of the union of the nation.¹ Soon, however, his attitude changed, and he became fiercely critical of all that had been done in his absence. His one idea seemed to be to wipe out all progress for which anyone else could claim credit. His vanity and his stubbornness were again in evidence. During October he became ill and spent nearly a month in retirement. Meanwhile his party had won an overwhelming success at the primary elections.

Allenby returned to Egypt early in November to find the political situation confused. Yehia Pasha, the Prime Minister, was obviously a tired man, his Ministry was ineffective, and the administration of the country was deteriorating with the removal of the foreign Advisers. The King had seized the opportunity of the Ministry's weakness to extend his influence, and was now exercising considerable power. A future conflict between him and Zaghlul seemed probable. Altogether the position at the end of 1923 gave much ground for speculation and anxiety. The murder campaign seemed, however, to have ceased.

¹ The following, taken from his first public utterance after his return, may serve as an example of his simple and effective oratory in his more reasonable moments:

"You are accustomed to obey me, but I am not a prince. I am not descended from any royal family before whom it is the custom to bend. I do not even come from a great family. I am a fellah, the son of a fellah, the issue of a very modest family, which my adversaries qualify as even humble. Blessed be this humbleness. I am not rich that your support of me can bring you financial gain. I have no prestige. Despite all that you rally round me, showing that you court neither riches nor prestige, but rather, in certain circumstances, prison."

CHAPTER VII

1924: ZAGHLUL'S YEAR

(TRIUMPH, DISASTER, ECLIPSE)

THE year 1924 in Egypt was the year of Zaghlul. Its beginning saw him supreme in Egypt save for the watchful power of Great Britain in the background. That power he believed he could neutralize by negotiation with the newly formed Labour Government in England. The passing of the year showed him in his true capacity as a demagogue with power to inflame the crowd but without courage or wisdom to control it; as a jealous ruler without capacity for statesmanship or administration; as a suspicious and narrow negotiator with no talent for compromise. His downfall, inevitable sooner or later from these defects, was hastened towards the end of the year by a crime for which his failure to control his followers was largely responsible. The year ended with his virtual elimination as the central figure he had been for so long in Egyptian politics, though his name still retained its power with the people. The first native rule attempted in Egypt for some thousands of years had been tried in the balance and found wanting.

The year opened with the Yehia Ministry still in power but completely subservient to the will of King Fuad. That astute monarch, seeing a Zaghlulist victory at the polls inevitable, now openly favoured the Wafd. He had hopes, nevertheless, of a strong opposition element belonging to the landowner class, from which nucleus would spring in time a 'King's party'. January 12 was the day fixed for the first elections to Egypt's new Parliament. On January 7 Allenby, thinking it wise to be absent

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during the elections, departed on a tour to the Sudan. Kerr,¹ the Minister, was left in charge at the Residency.

Though the result of the elections was inevitable, the completeness of the Zaghlulist victory surprised every one—King, Residency, Egyptian moderates, even Zaghlulists themselves. In a Chamber of 214 members, 190 were declared followers of Zaghlul. The Prime Minister himself was defeated, and shortly afterwards resigned. His courage and common sense had made his period of office fruitful, it had seen the Constitution and electoral law published, martial law removed, thus making the return of Zaghlul possible, and the thorny question of the compensation of foreign officials settled. His resignation upset the King's calculations. He had counted on retaining Yehia in power till the nominations for the Upper Chamber, the Senate, had been made.² Now he was compelled to ask Zaghlul to form a Government and consequently to accept his nominations for the Senate. On January 27, 1924, Zaghlul became the first Prime Minister of Egypt under the new Constitution. Almost at the same time the first Labour Government in Britain came into power under Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who became Foreign Secretary as well as Prime Minister. He was personally known to Zaghlul and had often professed sympathy with Egypt's aspirations to complete independence, as had many other members of the Labour Party. Truly Zaghlul seemed on the crest of success. He was supreme in Egyptian politics, the Liberals and other parties were powerless, the King dared not oppose him, while the Government in Great Britain was friendly and sympathetic. Even the Residency, with which he had had no official touch since November 13, 1918, when his

¹ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, K.C.M.G., British Ambassador in China, 1938-42, now British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

² The Senate was two-fifths nominated, three-fifths elected. The nominations were made by the King on the advice of his Prime Minister.

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visit to Sir Reginald Wingate had begun the struggle for Egyptian independence, now showed a desire to enter into friendly relations. Kerr, thinking it advisable to establish touch with Zaghlul before he became Prime Minister, made two secret and unofficial visits to him in the course of which he succeeded in removing much of Zaghlul's suspicion and made him realize the part Allenby had played in obtaining so liberal a Constitution for Egypt. Allenby himself, on his return from the Sudan, at once called on Zaghlul, although by custom the first call should have been paid by the Prime Minister. Zaghlul was much touched by this compliment and conceived an admiration and liking for Allenby which he retained to the end, though it was never reciprocated.

Meanwhile Zaghlul's first request to the British, for an amnesty for those still undergoing imprisonment as a result of the sentences of British military courts, had been cordially met—too cordially, in the opinion of many in Egypt. The British Government agreed to an amnesty even more generous than Zaghlul had asked or expected. Such an attitude seemed to foreshadow easy negotiations on the 'reserved subjects'; and early in March, before the opening of Parliament, Zaghlul expressed a wish to go to London at an early date to discuss a settlement of the questions outstanding between Great Britain and Egypt. The proposal did not at first commend itself to Mr. MacDonald, who would have preferred that the general lines of settlement should be negotiated in Egypt, and that Zaghlul should come to London only when agreement had been reached. Allenby urged that the negotiations should take place in London. He was convinced that it would be impossible to hold fruitful discussions in the turbulent atmosphere of Cairo, where Zaghlul would be subject to constant pressure from extremists. We should in fact, he said, soon find ourselves negotiating not only with Zaghlul but with the Egyptian populace

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and Press. Moreover, Zaghlul and his followers had set their hearts on his going to London, and it would be unwise to discourage them. Zaghlul seemed at the moment well disposed; any settlement made by him would be accepted by all Egypt, and the sooner negotiations could be begun the better. After a little further discussion Mr. MacDonald sent Zaghlul an invitation to go to London in June.

It soon became obvious, however, that Zaghlul's ideas amounted to dictation of Egypt's demands rather than negotiation, and that even if he were disposed to be reasonable the clamour of the extremists, which he did nothing to check, was forcing him into a position from which he could not recede, particularly as regards the Sudan.

March 15, 1924, which marked the opening of Egypt's first Constitutional Parliament, was a day of great public rejoicing in Cairo. The crowds kept up a constant roar of cheering; their enthusiasm reached almost a state of frenzy when the royal coach appeared, in which beside King Fuad, their monarch, sat Zaghlul, their idol. He had challenged British domination; he had led and encouraged the masses in their demand for independence; twice he had been sent into exile; and now he was Prime Minister.

It is interesting to consider the feelings of the three principal figures in this day's ceremonies—King Fuad, Zaghlul, and Allenby. The King did not relish the companionship of Zaghlul; neither did he look forward to the opening of so liberal a Parliament which, according to his beliefs, ill suited the limitations of his subjects. Zaghlul himself must have had curiously mixed feelings. His seat in the royal coach was an uneasy one, for he knew only too well the working of his monarch's mind. And he certainly must have realized how paradoxical was his own position in directing a parliament derived

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from the British Declaration of 1922, which he had flatly rejected. There had to be some way of escape from such a dilemma, and this may explain the repeated cries from the crowd of "Indivisible Nile" and "The Sudan". Few could have realized, least of all Zaghlul himself, to what they were going to lead.

Allenby in Field-Marshal's uniform presented, as usual, a striking figure. He was satisfied as he watched the scene that the British policy embodied in the 1922 Declaration was taking its required course. British promises despite all difficulties were being honestly fulfilled; a free parliamentary institution had been established through which Egypt could produce statesmen vested with unquestionable authority to bind their country in any settlement with Britain. From the Diplomatic Gallery of the House of Deputies he looked down on the unsmiling face of the would-be autocratic King and on the craggy and uncompromising features of the demagogue Zaghlul. It was clear to him that the minds of these two men were poles apart; difficulties were undoubtedly ahead, but they would be of Egyptian making. It remained to be seen how far they would affect and retard the Anglo-Egyptian settlement for which he was sincerely striving.

Even at this opening of Parliament a demonstration against British rule in the Sudan was arranged, and Egyptian rights to complete control of the Sudan continued to be the principal object of agitation in Parliament and Press, while propaganda in the Sudan itself continued unchecked and with dangerous violence. There were other disturbing symptoms. In April a corporal of the Royal Air Force was murdered by two students, the first of such attacks for nearly a year. In Parliament the position of Sir Lee Stack as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army was violently assailed, there was a refusal to vote the annual contribution made by Egypt to the Army of

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Occupation, and the law for compensation of foreign officials which had been passed by the Yehia Ministry was denounced as unacceptable.

Matters reached a crisis towards the end of June, when Lord Parmoor made a statement in the House of Lords that the British Government had no intention of abandoning its position in the Sudan. This statement led to excited demonstrations and protests in Egypt. Zaghlul declared in the Chamber that in view of the British attitude nothing was to be gained by negotiations, and that he proposed to resign. Though he tendered his resignation to the King, it was not meant seriously, and he was soon persuaded to retain office. The tension was presently eased by a conciliatory statement by Ramsay MacDonald in the House of Commons, and eventually it was arranged that a meeting should take place in London at the end of September.

On July 12, when Zaghlul was leaving Cairo for Alexandria on his way to Europe, he was shot at and wounded by a student. The incident had little political result, but postponed Zaghlul's departure till the end of July, when he went to France to take the waters.

Early in August Egyptian intrigue in the Sudan bore its poison fruit. At Khartoum an armed demonstration by the cadets of the Military School was speedily quelled without casualty; but at Atbara the Egyptian Railway Battalion broke into serious rioting, and some Sudanese troops at the order of an Egyptian officer fired on the rioters and inflicted casualties. In the Sudan itself the arrival of additional British troops and the removal of the Railway Battalion prevented any further trouble. In Egypt the incident seemed at one time likely to produce a more dangerous situation. The Press and the mob at once assumed that British troops had deliberately fired on Egyptians. The acting Prime Minister, Mohammed Said Pasha, who was fully aware of the true facts,

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did nothing either to make the facts known or to check the violent demonstrations of the mob, in spite of repeated protests from the Residency (Allenby himself was at home on leave). In London an Egyptian Note misrepresenting the facts and delivered with studied discourtesy drew a stern rebuke from the British Government. Zaghlul, in Paris, declared that negotiations with the British Government were now impossible, though he agreed to personal conversations with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald with a view to removing misunderstanding.

The conversations, which began in London on September 25, were a complete failure. Zaghlul had apparently expected private talks with the Prime Minister alone. When he found himself confronted also with a number of Foreign Office advisers, as if for formal conversations, he adopted a rigid unconciliatory attitude. The first meeting has been aptly described by Lord Lloyd as "a certain amount of ineffective recrimination upon the minor incidents of recent history", and officially by the Foreign Office as "discussions of a preliminary nature".¹ At the second meeting Zaghlul put forward a series of demands for the entire removal of British troops, British officials, and British influence from Egypt, and for the abandonment by Great Britain of any claims to defend the Suez Canal or protect minorities in Egypt. He developed this theme in greater detail at the third and last meeting. Somewhat naturally the conversations led to no result. They had shown that a Labour Government was as firm as a Conservative one on British essential interests in Egypt and the Sudan.

Zaghlul was undoubtedly disappointed and felt aggrieved with Ramsay MacDonald, who had shown a very different attitude towards Egyptian claims when he had visited Egypt as a private individual. Zaghlul had hoped for confidential talks with a sympathetic

¹ *Egypt since Cromer*, by Lord Lloyd, Vol. II, p. 92.

friend which would pave the way for British recognition of Egypt's complete independence. Instead he had found himself meeting a Foreign Secretary flanked by unyielding officials, little disposed to abandon the British position. In the circumstances no progress was possible. Zaghlul's narrow and suspicious mind had no talent for negotiation. He could state a case with vigour and fight a campaign with courage, but he expected the fruits of victory to be handed to him on a plate without discussion. His career was determined by two great blunders. The first was that of the British when they refused him permission to go to London in 1918; the second was his own when he failed to take advantage of the generous terms offered by Milner in 1920.

Towards the end of October both Zaghlul and Allenby returned to Egypt. About the same time Ramsay MacDonald's Labour Government fell and was replaced by a Conservative Government. Sir Austen Chamberlain became Foreign Secretary. Relations between Allenby and Ramsay MacDonald had opened on a note of mutual suspicion. The Prime Minister was inclined to regard the soldier as a heavy-handed reactionary, while Allenby had some reason to mistrust the previous utterances of Ramsay MacDonald on the Egyptian question. When the two men became acquainted, however, they worked on very good terms, and Allenby said afterwards that he found the Labour Government easier to serve than either of the other two Administrations under which he worked. With Austen Chamberlain it would have seemed natural that his relations should be cordial, for the two men had much in common. As will be shown, however, certain misunderstandings made them brief and unhappy.

The failure of the discussions in London had been received calmly in Egypt, and outwardly the situation was relatively quiet. To Allenby and his Advisers it was, however, obvious that a crisis of some sort could not be

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long delayed. Besides the Sudan there were several questions outstanding in which Zaghlul had challenged British interests and the policy of the 1922 Declaration. He was obviously determined to reduce the British judicial and financial Advisers to a position of impotence; he had announced his intention of cancelling the agreement for the compensation of foreign officials; and he had refused to pay certain contributions that had previously been a responsibility of the Egyptian Government.

In a dispatch to the Foreign Office Allenby shrewdly summed up Zaghlul's personal position:

It was evident that what Zaghlul Pasha could not afford to do was to lose that sort of popularity which has for years past been the breath of his life, and that now, as often before, he could hardly retain it except by extremism.

I conceive that at the end of October he was, on the one hand, rapidly losing ground through his failure to bring back from London what he had taught Egypt to want and to expect of him, and through the incompetence, injustice, and corruption of his domestic administration; and on the other, he was in danger of desertion by important adherents from the inner circle of the Wafd, and of losing with them much of the loyalty of his student army.

He was, therefore, forced to do two things; he did them, I cannot doubt, against his better judgment, and, it may be, against his will—how much or how little against his will is unlikely to be fully revealed to us. To make up for his loss in public esteem he was obliged to strengthen his tyrannical hold upon the country, and to keep the men he needed he was bound to give them office. He was in danger of losing men chiefly because he was too cautious for them: he kept them by making them more powerful; and by making them more powerful he placed the policy of caution beyond his reach.

By appointing some of his more extreme followers to important posts, with little regard to their administrative abilities, by dismissing provincial officials whom he

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judged insufficiently devoted to his régime, and by taking suppressive measures against his political opponents, Zaghlul fastened a tyrannical hold on the country; and then decided to provoke a struggle with King Fuad and to deprive the throne of any power to oppose his dictatorial behests. He did this on November 16 by a sudden resignation, by implying that it was owing to the King's intrigues, and by mobilizing his army of students and roughs to parade the streets and demonstrate for his return. His manoeuvre culminated in a two-hour audience of the King, at which he withdrew his resignation after exacting certain undertakings from him, while outside the Palace his well-drilled student 'soldiers' kept up a continual cry of "Saad or Revolution". On leaving the Palace Zaghlul openly thanked and dismissed them.

Zaghlul was now at the height of his power and may have dreamed of a dictatorship like that of Mustapha Kemal in Turkey. He felt himself strong enough to treat the head of Allenby's staff, who had been sent to discuss the question of the judicial advisership, with such rude truculence that he had to be reminded that he was speaking to the representative of the British Government. Seldom has retribution for abuse of power been swifter; within three days of his triumph at the Palace a crime caused by his own failure to control the reckless violence of his extremists was to lead to his fall from power.

On November 19, a little after 1.30 P.M., the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack, was shot at and wounded in three places while driving home from the Ministry of War. His A.D.C., Captain P. K. Campbell, of the Black Watch, and the chauffeur, an Australian ex-soldier named Marsh, were also hit by bullets. The shots were fired by several persons of the Effendi class, who then escaped in a waiting taxi-cab. A bomb was also thrown, but did not explode. The crime was committed as the car slowed down at the

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corner of a crowded street. A policeman who attempted to pursue the gunmen was struck down by a bullet.¹ The wounded chauffeur drove at once to the Residency, where the Sirdar, who was obviously seriously injured, was carried in and laid on a sofa in the drawing-room. The A.D.C. and the chauffeur, who were not so seriously wounded, remained in the hall. A luncheon-party was in progress at the time, one of the guests being Mr. Asquith. Later, at about 2.30 P.M., while Lady Stack, who had been fetched by Lady Allenby, was in the drawing-room with the Sirdar, and Allenby and some of his staff and the guests were discussing the crime in the hall, Zaghlul was suddenly announced. He had learned of the crime and had come to make inquiries. Allenby pointed sternly to the wounded A.D.C. and chauffeur and said, "This is your doing". He would have led Zaghlul to the Sirdar himself had not his staff told him that this could not be acceptable to Lady Stack. Zaghlul turned with hardly a word and hurried out.

Sir Lee Stack died just before midnight the following day in the Anglo-American Hospital. He was a man of great personal charm, who had been in Egypt and the Sudan for twenty-three years. He had served both England and Egypt well, and was much liked and respected by both English and Egyptians. The crime caused the most profound sensation in Cairo and throughout Egypt. In the British community indignation ran high, part of which was directed against Allenby, who was held by many to have pushed forbearance with Egyptian provocation beyond its limits. In Egyptian political circles there was consternation and a lively apprehension of the consequences.

November 22, the day of Sir Lee Stack's funeral, was a day of tense drama. A part of the British community

¹ For his courage he was given by the British Government £1000, which Lord Allenby handed to him in hospital.

had been outraged by the announcement that Zaghlul and the Egyptian Cabinet, whom they held largely responsible for the murder, would be present in the British church at the funeral service. There was an attempt, quite unsuccessful, to force Allenby to alter the arrangements. The Sirdar had been the head of the Egyptian Army and responsible to the Egyptian Government; and it was right and proper, Allenby held, that the members of the Government should attend his funeral.

The scene in the British church of All Saints¹ was a memorable one. King Fuad was represented by his Chamberlain. The Egyptian Ministers, led by Zaghlul, showed by their faces the strain they felt and their sense of the hostility they knew that the British portion of the congregation bore to them. The British Navy and Army and civil community crowded the small church; the whole Diplomatic Corps was present in full dress, and there were representatives of all the foreign nationalities in Egypt. Outside a long procession had been formed, including all the British troops in Cairo, and stretched already almost to the cemetery. Huge crowds lined the streets. Inside the church Allenby, in khaki uniform—a stern, impressive figure, obviously under deep but repressed emotion—stood alone before the coffin for some ten minutes while awaiting the arrival of Lady Stack and her daughter. After a short and simple service the coffin was borne to the grave by eight British warrant-officers serving with the Egyptian Army. Egyptian princes, Senators, and Deputies joined in the long procession which took an hour to pass a point; all Cairo seemed to have turned out to watch it. As Allenby stood by the grave he was obviously deeply moved and under stress of some vital decision. The behaviour of the crowd had been unexceptionable in Cairo, but in Alexandria there

¹ The present Cathedral had not then been built.

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was a demonstration and shouts of "Down with the British!" outside the church where a memorial service was being held.

The drama of the day's events was not ended by the funeral. The Egyptian Parliament was due to meet at 5 P.M., and expectation was tense as to the decisions to be taken. It was thought that the Government might resign. At the Residency Allenby was impatiently awaiting a telegram from the Foreign Office. He had determined to deliver an ultimatum that afternoon to the Egyptian Government and had cabled home its proposed terms asking for a reply by midday on the 22nd. As the afternoon wore on and no reply was received, Allenby's impatience became acute. He was determined to hand the Note to the Prime Minister before Parliament met at 5 P.M. He feared otherwise that Zaghlul might resign and that there would be no Government to receive the terms. At 4.15 P.M. he decided that he could wait no longer for Foreign Office approval. He had directed that a cavalry regiment, the 16th/5th Lancers, should stand by at Kasr-el-Nil barracks after the funeral, and he now ordered it to parade in front of the Residency to escort him to the Prime Minister's house. Allenby seldom made use of display or ceremony, and this is perhaps the only occasion of his life when he deliberately employed dramatic methods. He had still a vital decision to make. As he was leaving the Residency to enter his car one of his staff came running from the Chancery. The long-awaited cable from the Foreign Office had at last arrived and was being deciphered; from its length it was obviously not a simple acceptance of Allenby's proposed terms. On learning that it was impossible to complete the deciphering before five o'clock, Allenby decided without hesitation to proceed with the delivery of his own ultimatum. Dressed informally in a grey lounge suit with a soft felt hat, he was driven with his escort of

Lancers to the Prime Minister's office almost opposite Parliament Building, towards which the Deputies were beginning to assemble for the sitting. After receiving a salute from the cavalry and a flourish of trumpets, Allenby entered the house and walked straight to the Prime Minister's room. He read to Zaghlul in English the text of his demands, left with him a French translation, and returned to his car. He was again received with a salute before the gathering crowds and drove slowly back to the Residency with his escort, to learn from the new deciphered telegram how far his action had or had not been approved by his Government.

The terms of Allenby's ultimatum were as follows:

The Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, who was also a distinguished officer of the British Army, has been brutally murdered in Cairo. His Majesty's Government consider that this murder, which holds up Egypt as at present governed to the contempt of civilized peoples, is the natural outcome of a campaign of hostility to British rights and British subjects in Egypt and Sudan, founded upon a heedless ingratitude for benefits conferred by Great Britain, not discouraged by Your Excellency's Government, and fomented by organizations in close contact with that Government. Your Excellency was warned by His Majesty's Government little more than a month ago of the consequences of failing to stop this campaign more particularly as far as it concerned the Sudan. It has not been stopped. The Egyptian Government have now allowed the Governor-General of the Sudan to be murdered, and have proved that they are incapable or unwilling to protect foreign lives. His Majesty's Government therefore require that the Egyptian Government shall:

- (1) Present ample apology for the crime.
- (2) Prosecute inquiry into the authorship of the crime with the utmost energy and without respect of persons, and bring the criminals, whoever they are and whatever their age, to condign punishment.
- (3) Henceforth forbid and vigorously suppress all popular political demonstrations.

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- (4) Pay forthwith to His Majesty's Government a fine of £500,000.
- (5) Order within twenty-four hours the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers, and the purely Egyptian units of the Sudan Army, with such resulting changes as shall be hereafter specified.
- (6) Notify the competent Department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated at Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise.
- (7) Withdraw all opposition in the respects hereafter specified to the wishes of His Majesty's Government concerning the protection of foreign interests in Egypt.

Failing immediate compliance with these demands, His Majesty's Government will at once take appropriate action to safeguard their interests in Egypt and the Sudan.

The requirements indicated in the last demand were specified in a separate document. The Sudanese units of the Egyptian Army were to be made into a Sudan Defence Force owing allegiance to the Sudan Government alone; the conditions of retirement of foreign officials were to be revised in accordance with British ideas; the British financial and judicial Advisers were to be retained.

The cable from the Foreign Office when deciphered was found to omit the demand for an indemnity and for the revision of the terms of service of foreign officials, while the demand for "unlimited" irrigation of the Gezira was changed to "such extension of Gezira irrigation as may be considered possible without detriment to Egypt by a technical commission containing a member appointed by the Egyptian Government". Also the accusatory preamble to the demands was softened. Read in a calm, unhurried atmosphere after the event the Foreign Office document may be held to be a better-balanced presentation of the British case, less open to the

charges of vindictiveness or of seeking to profit by the occasion which were levelled by some against Allenby's ultimatum. These protested that a demand for 'blood-money' was undignified, and that neither the compensation of foreign officials nor the question of irrigation of the Sudan could properly be connected with the murder. Though the British Government upheld Allenby's ultimatum, they were disturbed by what they held to be his precipitate action, and asked for an explanation. Allenby replied that he considered the demand for a large sum of money necessary in order to bring home to the Egyptians the criminal results of their Government's policy; and that the Gezira irrigation demand was similarly intended to impress on Egypt the power we could wield if necessary by our control of the Sudan; he had never meant that an unlimited area should in fact be irrigated to the detriment of Egyptian interests, but that concessions should subsequently be made to a more friendly Egyptian Government.

The matter of the rights of foreign officials had been included as the best means of settling an outstanding difficulty and to avoid having to make such a demand on a friendly Government which would succeed Zaghlul's, whose resignation Allenby expected and desired as a result of his ultimatum. There was much to be said for Allenby's point of view, and his action had the practically unanimous support of the British and foreign communities in Egypt.

The Egyptian reply, while expressing horror at the crime, did not accept any of the demands except that for the indemnity. Allenby promptly informed the Egyptian Government that he was issuing orders forthwith for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Sudan and was giving full liberty to the Sudan Government to increase the area of the Gezira to be irrigated. As a guarantee for the fulfilment of the other conditions Allenby ordered the

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military occupation of the Customs at Alexandria, again taking action without awaiting the consent of His Majesty's Government. Zaghlul's Government now resigned, having paid the indemnity of £500,000,¹ but leaving the other demands of the ultimatum unsatisfied. Ziwar Pasha became Prime Minister. He was a man of no great ability but with considerable courage and unquenchable optimism. He was of Caucasian extraction and, although a Moslem, received his early tuition at the hands of Jesuits. He was of huge stature, and had that jovial disposition which often accompanies such physique. A special chair had to be made to accommodate him in the Prime Minister's office. As a linguist he was good; in fact, he had a natural if embarrassing habit of using English, French, Italian, Arabic, and Turkish all together in his conversations. Down his left cheek ran a perpetual tear, for he was never without a cigarette drooping perilously from the corner of his mouth, with the smoke invariably ascending into his eye.

Ziwar Pasha had held Ministerial rank several times since 1919, and in 1924, when Zaghlul came to power, he was chosen as President of Egypt's first Senate. He was a strong believer in British friendship, and by temperament and outlook he was just the man to extricate Egypt from the present difficult situation. He had the common sense to see that the only policy for Egypt was to accept the British demands without question. He knew the British well enough to realize that they would not be unreasonable once their anger had died down. He accepted the conditions of the ultimatum, and the Customs were evacuated. As Allenby had planned when

¹ The Minister of Finance had only been appointed a day or two before the murder, and it was said in Cairo that his sole administrative act was the signing of this cheque. Allenby was one of the few people who can have endorsed a cheque for £500,000. The sum was eventually used for the improvement of medical services in the Sudan.

he placed his demands at a maximum, it was now possible to make some concessions to a friendly Government. The amount of land to be irrigated in the Gezira was eventually settled by a commission on which Egypt was represented.

Such is the story of the Lee Stack murder and of the part played by Allenby in exacting satisfaction for it. From the point of view of the Egyptian Government it was, as was said of the execution of the Duc d'Enghien one hundred and twenty years earlier, "worse than a crime, it was a blunder." Zaghlul himself can be acquitted of any previous knowledge of the crime, and realized only too well the fatal consequences to him. "Pour moi, c'était un coup mortel," he said sadly shortly afterwards. But he never seems to have realized his responsibility for the murder by his failure to control the more extreme of his followers.

From the British point of view the murder resolved Anglo-Egyptian relations as they were approaching a crisis. It may even be said that the corpse of the Sirdar was the *deus ex machina* of an intolerable situation. Allenby's action has been praised for its courage and decision and has been blamed for its hastiness and unnecessary harshness. Those who were on the spot and knew the Egyptians were almost unanimous in upholding him; it was only distant criticism that condemned him. Egyptians themselves understood the strong hand and expected no less. The impression of events under which Allenby acted must be remembered; he had seen the wounded and suffering Sirdar carried into the Residency and had felt the wave of indignation that the crime aroused in the British and foreign residents in Cairo. And he felt that he had been betrayed by the Egyptians. He had been mainly instrumental in securing their independence, he had insisted against a great weight of opinion that they should be given every chance of

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ordering their own affairs, and to that end had taken risks not only with his reputation, which concerned him not at all, but with the lives and interests of his countrymen, which concerned him deeply. His championship of Egypt had been rewarded by this crime, and the reaction was strong. It was the same anger that he showed when he found an officer whom he had trusted unworthy of his trust. He never forgave Zaghlul and spoke of him afterwards as "that wicked old man".

The evacuation of the Egyptian units from the Sudan was not accomplished without serious disturbance. The Egyptian units themselves, after only a show of resistance by some of them, were withdrawn without incident, but a Sudanese battalion, corrupted by Egyptian propaganda and made of sterner stuff, broke into a mutiny which was only repressed with considerable bloodshed. That Allenby's judgment and consideration for Egypt had not been warped by the Lee Stack murder is shown by the fact that he refused to support the strongly urged recommendation of the Sudan Government that the Egyptian flag should be removed from all Army buildings in the Sudan.

The year 1924, which had been so momentous in Egyptian affairs, ended on a comparatively peaceful note. Ziwar Pasha had met all the British demands and had received some concessions. Sidky Pasha, a forcible personality, had been appointed Minister of the Interior and was engaged in removing the damage caused by Zaghlul's administration. Parliament was dissolved, and fresh elections were to be held early in 1925. Meanwhile King Fuad with his customary astuteness had seized the opportunity of Zaghlul's eclipse and Ziwar's easy-going complaisance to re-establish much of the Palace influence.

Allenby, though it was not generally known at the time, had resigned his appointment as High Commissioner and had refused, in spite of urgings from the

1924: ZAGHLUL'S YEAR

Foreign Secretary, to withdraw his resignation, though he had consented to serve on temporarily. Though the causes of his resignation belong to the end of 1924, they can best be dealt with in the account of 1925, when his resignation took effect.

CHAPTER VIII

1925: ALLENBY LEAVES EGYPT

Lord Allenby came to Egypt in the midst of a fierce storm. He leaves it in a calm which is striking in its contrast and full of good augury. British prestige in Egypt stands higher to-day than it has done since Lord Kitchener left the country in 1914.

The Times, June 20, 1925

BEFORE the causes of Allenby's resignation are discussed the political events of the first six months of 1925, up to the time when Allenby left Egypt, will be briefly described. The storm raised by the murder of Sir Lee Stack cleared the air and was followed by a period of comparative calm. The able if unscrupulous efforts of Sidky Pasha to lessen the power of Zaghlul's party led to a very close election contest for the new Parliament. The result of the final elections in March showed an apparent equality for Government and Opposition and was claimed as a victory by both sides. Parliament met at 10 A.M. on March 23. When it proceeded to business, after formal opening by the King, Zaghlul was elected President of the Chamber by 123 votes to 85, a shock for Ziwar's Ministry, who had counted on a majority for their candidate. The evening session began at 5 P.M., no Ministers being present, and proceeded normally till 7.45 P.M., when the doors opened, and the Prime Minister entered, followed by the rest of the Ministers. He read a Royal Decree dissolving Parliament, which thus lasted less than ten hours, surely the shortest-lived Parliament in history. Fresh elections were promised for the autumn after a new electoral law had been passed. Meanwhile the King's influence was supreme, and the easy-going Ziwar made little resistance

to the royal will. The old struggle between King and people entered a new phase.

Meanwhile the internal situation remained quiet. The main event of the period was the arrest, trial, and conviction of the murderers of the Sirdar. Their conviction was the result of a very fine piece of police work, carried out mainly by British police officers. The difficulty in this, as in all the other political crimes of these years in Egypt, was to obtain the necessary evidence against the criminals, who were frequently known to, or strongly suspected by, the police. The right men had sometimes been arrested but had always to be released for want of evidence. The organization responsible for the murders intimidated, if necessary, witnesses from coming forward and provided, when necessary, false evidence for the defence. Unless, therefore, the murderers could be caught red-handed the only hope was to extract a confession from one of them by guile or promise of pardon.

After much search the British heads of the police secured as their agent a former Egyptian law student who in 1915, from mistaken motives of patriotism, had been involved in an attempt on the life of Sultan Hussein. He had been sentenced to death but had received commutation to penal servitude for life, and had worked ten years in the Tura stone-quarries before being let out of prison as the result of an amnesty. When he was released and found that those who had employed him had merely used his patriotism as a tool and had no further use for him he determined on revenge; and the prospect of the ten thousand pounds' reward which had been offered for conviction of the Sirdar's murderers, together with hope of a free pardon for his original crime, brought him into the service of the police. Posing as one who thirsted for revenge on the British, he got into the confidence of the murder gang and was soon able to inform the police

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officer conducting the case of the names of the Sirdar's murderers. The next step was to obtain the necessary evidence. It was decided to try to frighten a confession out of the weakest member of the gang, a young Egyptian student. One of the other murderers was arrested, and a report that he had confessed was allowed to appear. The student and his brother, another of the gang, were persuaded by the police agent that the confession had actually been made, and on finding their house watched by the police were instigated into a terror-stricken attempt to escape into Libya by the Western Desert, taking with them the weapons which had been used in the murder. At the edge of the desert they were arrested, and the weaker of the brothers, panic-stricken, confessed. The arrests were made at the end of January, and by the end of May seven men were placed on trial for the murder. Six were sentenced to death, of whom five were executed, the student who had turned King's evidence having his sentence converted to penal servitude. The police agent received the reward of ten thousand pounds and a free pardon for the crime he had committed in 1915. Such was the final act of a drama which had considerable effect on the history of Egypt. Allenby, who had played one of the principal parts, left Egypt a week after the sentences had been pronounced.

The event which led to Allenby's resignation was the sudden decision of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, at the time of the crisis which followed the Sirdar's murder, to dispatch to Egypt, without consulting Allenby, a senior diplomatic official, who automatically became the principal representative of the Foreign Office in Egypt and Allenby's chief adviser. From the military point of view it was equivalent to the supersession without warning of a general's chief staff officer during an important operation, and it was naturally regarded by

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Allenby as implying a lack of confidence both in his staff and himself.

Though the decision was sudden, its roots had been planted a long time previously. Ever since the 1922 Declaration there had been an influential body of opinion in London, both inside the Foreign Office and outside it, which had disliked the original decision forced on the Government by Allenby and had viewed with growing disfavour the turn of events in Egypt and the way in which the policy of the Declaration was being interpreted and handled. Criticism of Allenby grew more persistent and vocal during 1924, when Zaghlul was in power, fuel being constantly added by British, and occasionally foreign, opinion in Egypt itself. The main gravamen of the charge against Allenby was that his weakness and complacency in face of Egyptian provocation were endangering British interests and even British lives. The murder of Sir Lee Stack seemed to justify the criticism; and although Allenby's firmness after the murder was approved, the terms of his ultimatum were held to be ill-advised and his action hasty. Allenby seemed to the Foreign Secretary to have taken the bit in his teeth. It was obviously impossible at this crisis to recall him, but Mr. Chamberlain decided to apply a brake. He hurriedly sent for Mr. Nevile Henderson¹ and ordered him to Cairo. Had the appointment been made after previous consultation with Allenby it is most unlikely that he would have raised any objection; as it was, the terms and manner both of the public announcement and of the official communication to Allenby were unfortunate. The public announcement was to the effect that Mr. Henderson had been appointed a "Minister Plenipotentiary" while employed at the Residency, Cairo. This is the normal title for the rank of Minister in the Diplomatic

¹ Afterwards famous as Sir Nevile Henderson, Ambassador in Berlin from 1937 to 1939.

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Service and was not meant to imply anything unusual, but coming at the time it did it was naturally interpreted in Cairo as betokening a special mission, a change of policy, and to some extent at least a supersession of Allenby's authority. In the communication of the appointment to Allenby Mr. Chamberlain made what was always a fatal mistake in dealing with Allenby—he was not entirely frank with him. His explanation of the reasons for Mr. Henderson's appointment was as follows:

I am impressed with the difficulty of putting you fully in possession of the mind and purpose of His Majesty's Government by a simple exchange of telegrams. I have therefore decided to send Mr. Nevile Henderson to Cairo. He is an official of exceptional experience, and I have explained to him verbally with a completeness which is not possible in telegraphic communication the objects at which His Majesty's Government are arriving and the difficulties which they wish to avoid. He has my fullest confidence and will, I am sure, make your task easier by the explanations which he will be able to give you. He will join your staff with the rank of Minister, and will, I hope, lighten a burden which must be excessive with your present small staff.

Allenby's first reaction was, characteristically, loyalty to his staff. He telegraphed to the Foreign Secretary that he would be glad to have Mr. Henderson's assistance during the period of stress and to learn from him the mind and purpose of His Majesty's Government, but he would be glad of an assurance that it was not intended to supersede his Counsellor, Clark Kerr, in whom, as in all his staff, he had complete confidence. The reply was to the effect that while no reflection on the Counsellor was intended Mr. Henderson would, of course, become the senior member of Allenby's staff.

Meanwhile Allenby had seen the effect in Egypt of the public announcement, and had cabled that it had been taken as amounting to his practical supersession and

had seriously weakened his position. His position would, in fact, become untenable unless the Foreign Secretary could see his way to correcting that impression by making without delay a public announcement that Mr. Henderson was coming solely for the purpose of discussing the situation and facilitating the exchange of views between the Foreign Secretary and himself and would leave for London within a week of his arrival.

Allenby's attitude was, in fact, that the Foreign Secretary's declared purpose of "putting him fully in possession of the mind and purpose of His Majesty's Government" could be as well, if not better, accomplished by a liaison visit than by a permanent appointment. If the appointment, however, was made because of dissatisfaction with himself or his staff it should be frankly stated.

Several further telegrams passed on similar lines, with the Foreign Secretary trying to convince Allenby that the appointment was a perfectly normal one and intended merely to assist him and to fill a vacancy on his staff, while Allenby insisted that the effect of the appointment in Egypt had been deplorable, and that unless Mr. Henderson's was to be merely a temporary visit he must adhere to his determination to resign. His final telegram of this series was as follows:

Either you have confidence in me or you have not. Since you have made a striking appointment to my staff in the midst of a crisis without consulting me, and published it without giving me an opportunity of expressing my opinion, I presume you have not. It is therefore my duty to resign. You must know that in a country like this the only interpretation of such an appointment is infirmity of purpose, and this at such a moment is disastrous. I seek only the public interest, but I see no way out of the difficulty unless you can arrange to announce that Mr. Henderson only comes on a specific mission and for a very brief period. As I said in my last night's telegram I shall be glad to see

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Mr. Henderson and have his help, and maintain absolute unity with you in loyal and helpful co-operation in this important public task. I do not wish to obtrude the question of my resignation at this moment, but I adhere to my previous telegram of 27 November.

Allenby's mistrust of Mr. Chamberlain's sincerity was unfortunately increased by his discovery, on the arrival of Mr. Henderson, that the Minister who was to put him so fully and completely in the mind of His Majesty's Government had in fact been hurriedly recalled from a holiday and had only had one short interview with the Foreign Secretary before his departure. He had no previous experience of Egypt.

Three weeks later, when the crisis caused by the Sirdar's murder was practically over, Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Allenby regretting the 'misunderstanding' that had arisen between them and asking him to allow his resignation to be submitted

as the natural desire of a great servant of the Crown to take the opportunity offered by the end of one chapter in our relations with Egypt and the beginning of another as the proper moment to seek relief from the strain of such long and arduous service and the natural and most honourable close of your great career in the Near East, first as soldier and then as statesman.

Allenby acknowledged the spirit in which Mr. Chamberlain's letter was written, but refused to admit that it had been a question merely of a momentary misunderstanding. As to the suggestion about the reasons to be given for his resignation, he wrote:

I have no personal feelings in the matter, but, though I thank you for suggesting the solution, I cannot ask to be retired with a view to relief from a strain which I do not feel. I must therefore beg that when the crisis is past you will submit my application to be allowed to resign my present appointment on the grounds given in my telegram of 26 November.

Allenby's annoyance was great when at the end of February a report that he had resigned appeared in a London newspaper and was telegraphed to Egypt. At the same time he was being subjected to particularly venomous attacks in certain sections of the London Press. No man ever paid less attention to personal criticism, but these attacks and the report of his resignation were having a most disturbing effect on the political situation just previous to the elections and were encouraging the Zaghlulists. Allenby therefore asked that the report of his resignation be denied and suggested that the papers concerned might be asked to desist temporarily from their attacks, which were harmful to our interests and might make just the difference between the success and defeat of the Zaghlulists. "If they like to return to the attack in a fortnight or so," he added, "these objections will no longer apply."

On May 2 Allenby wrote to the Foreign Secretary saying that he considered the time had come when his resignation might be submitted to the King and announced. It crossed a letter from Mr. Chamberlain, written two days previously, making the same suggestion. It seems to have been the one occasion in this unfortunate business when they were entirely in agreement. Before the close of the chapter there was yet another incident that added to Allenby's resentment. He had specially asked that he should be given two days' notice of the date and hour at which the announcement of his successor would be made, so that he could inform King Fuad and the Prime Minister before the news reached Egypt. He also strongly advised that the announcement should be accompanied by an assurance that the change of persons betokened no change of policy. Less than a week later he learned from a Reuters telegram that Sir George Lloyd had accepted the High Commissionership in succession to him. The announcement, though unauthorized,

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was true, and Allenby was naturally angered at the disregard of his advice and the carelessness that had allowed the news of the appointment to become public property in Egypt before he himself was informed.

Allenby left Egypt a month later, on June 14. This last month in Egypt was the occasion of a remarkable series of tributes paid to his work and his personality both in the British and Egyptian Press and by all communities in Egypt. Allenby's friends at the Foreign Office used their influence with the Press at home in Allenby's favour and did their best to see that what he had done was recognized in the articles on his departure. Allenby had paid no attention to the vicious attacks made on him in some papers a little earlier and was perhaps not unduly elated by the tributes now paid him in others. He had no very high opinion of the value of the praise or blame of journalists. But the expression of opinion in Egypt of all classes and all kinds was too spontaneous and genuine to be mistaken and caused him real pleasure, the more so as its warmth may have been a little unexpected.

Perhaps the best record of Allenby's last days in Egypt can be given in extracts from the official dispatch sent to the Foreign Office by the Minister, Mr. Nevile Henderson:

28th June, 1925

It is fitting that I should place on record some account of the remarkable tributes of esteem and affection paid to Lord and Lady Allenby during the period immediately preceding their departure from Egypt.

From the moment when the news of His Lordship's impending retirement became public he and Lady Allenby were the recipients of innumerable letters and telegrams—the sincerity and spontaneity of which were undeniable—not only from the British and foreign communities but from every section of Egyptian opinion other than Zaghlulist.





Photo Star Photos, Perth

FISHING THE STANLEY POOL, RIVER TAY






Photo Ian Smith, Edinburgh

LORD ALLENBY AT HIS INSTALLATION AS RECTOR OF EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY IN APRIL 1936

This is probably the last portrait taken of Lord Allenby, who died on May 14, 1936.

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At the same time Their Excellencies were inundated with invitations to farewell parties and receptions in their honour.

The shortage of the time at their disposal made it impossible for them to accept more than a few of these invitations. They confined themselves, as regards Egyptians, to official dinner-parties at the Palace and with the Prime Minister, to a luncheon-party with Sarwat Pasha and to an afternoon reception at the Continental Hotel organized by Mohamed Pasha Sherei, Mabrouk Pasha Fahmy, and Saleh Pasha Lamloun.

At the last three the most cordial of speeches were exchanged; and the third of these, the afternoon reception, was pronounced by competent judges one of the most remarkable events of its kind seen in Egypt within living memory. Over fifteen hundred persons attended, all but two hundred of them Egyptians; and of the latter a considerable proportion were provincial notables, who had in many cases themselves applied for invitations. Lord Allenby spoke to or shook hands with them all, and the warmth of their feelings was patent. The fact indeed that they had come long distances, in large numbers, and without fear of possible consequences was a striking proof of the change in spirit which had been so noticeable a feature of the final phase of His Lordship's work.

On the day of Lord Allenby's departure from Cairo large and manifestly friendly crowds lined the streets. The scene at the station itself was impressive. The gathering there, which it had been found necessary to limit by the issue of tickets, was the most representative of its kind which has taken place within the memory of those present; and the many Egyptians of whom Lord and Lady Allenby have by their personal charm made close personal friends were ill able to conceal their emotion.

The special train to Port Said was stopped by request at Benha and Zagazig in order that notables might deliver speeches of farewell. Finally, the British community of Port Said organized a luncheon-party for Their Excellencies prior to their embarkation.

During their last week in Egypt Lord and Lady Allenby set themselves personally to answer all the messages which

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had been addressed to them, regardless of the labour involved. The impression made by this final act of sympathy on the Egyptian mind, peculiarly susceptible as it is to such forms of courtesy, was profound. More than one Egyptian has told me with obvious sincerity that Lord Allenby's parting letter to him will remain one of his most treasured possessions; and in general one may say with certainty that there are few people of any consequence in Egypt, of whatever nationality, in whom Their Excellencies' departure has not, for one reason or another, left a sense of personal loss.

The Egyptians are a kindly people and admire generous natures; they are a polite people and appreciate good manners; they are not a forceful race, but they admire and respect strength. Though Allenby's hand had lain heavily on them at times, they recognized his innate kindness; he had been courteous, simple, and straightforward, even when stern, with the Egyptians with whom he had dealt; of his strength of character and purpose they never had any doubt, and were surprised to see them questioned by his own countrymen.

POSTSCRIPT

Such is the record of Allenby's influence on six momentous and stormy years of Egyptian history. This influence has up to now been better understood and appreciated in Egypt than in his own country, where it has been attacked or ignored. It is hoped that the story given in these chapters may cause his achievement to be better recognized. Both Great Britain and Egypt owe him a debt of gratitude. In a most difficult period in the relations between the two countries he upheld essential British interests without causing bitterness; he secured for Egypt independence from a reluctant British Government and a liberal Constitution from a reactionary monarch.

It was unfortunate that his period in Egypt should have been ended by a crime of violence and by the unhappy controversy that caused his resignation. But for this Allenby might well have crowned his work by negotiating the treaty on the reserved subjects that was not achieved until some ten years later, since there was no one in whose good faith and honesty the Egyptians had greater trust. Allenby never forgave the two persons who were primarily responsible, Zaghlul and Austen Chamberlain. This was not for any reasons of personal ambition or care for his reputation. He considered that Zaghlul had betrayed the trust he had shown in the Egyptian people, and that Austen Chamberlain had not been straightforward with him. These were the two faults which throughout his career he punished with his most severe displeasure—betrayal of a trust he placed in those with whom he dealt and lack of sincerity in speech or writing.

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Of the three great British Proconsuls who served Egypt—Cromer, Kitchener, and Allenby—it is probable that Allenby appealed most to the Egyptian, to the educated Egyptian at least. Cromer, cold and correct, was respected but certainly not loved; Kitchener was liked and admired, but it is doubtful whether he commanded the same trust as Allenby, whose honesty and straightforwardness in speech and action impressed all Egyptians with whom he came in contact. Lady Allenby's personality and charm also counted for much.

Allenby was succeeded by Lord Lloyd and a policy of the strong hand. But neither the strong hand of the administrator nor the facile pen or persuasive tongue of the diplomat could alter the fact which Allenby had recognized in Egypt, the awakened spirit of a people.

EPILOGUE

(*England and Elsewhere, 1925-1935*)

Sleepe after toyle, port after stormie seas,
Ease after warre, death after life, does greatly please.
SPENSER, *The Faerie Queene*

Birds are the most beautiful of all living things.

W. H. HUDSON

POOR Allenby! It is sad to see a big man in retirement and not knowing what to do. I wish we could all die in harness." So wrote T. E. Lawrence to a friend in 1931. His acute but restless mind completely misjudged Allenby and his affairs. Allenby in his last ten years neither courted the public eye nor did he, like "T. E. Shaw", conspicuously avoid it. His arrangement of his life showed his usual common sense. He did very much useful but unobtrusive public work; for his own enjoyment he spent his time on the things he had always loved—birds and travel and fishing. But for one enduring sorrow—the absence of his only son, the boy of such promise who had been killed in 1917—his last years would have been ideally happy.

His principal public work was done for the British National Cadet Association, of which he was President. A Cadet Force had been in existence, with official recognition and some slight financial aid, for many years, to give some training to working boys and boys of secondary schools. The units were military in form, but there was little militarism in them, and membership was entirely voluntary. They had undoubtedly done much to improve health and physique and to give some education in citizenship. But they had always been the object of dislike and suspicion to that class of Englishman who hates any form of discipline or elementary

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military training, and regards citizenship of a great nation as conferring on him the privilege of criticizing everything its Government does, but as involving him in no obligation to serve or help his country in any way. In 1930 the financial crisis gave the opponents of military service the opportunity to seek to kill the Cadet movement. They secured that all financial support—only a few thousand pounds—should be withdrawn, and also all official recognition and help. The hand of the anti-militarist can be seen in the Army Order (October 31 of 1930) cancelling all recognition and support; it enacted that should a Territorial unit be willing to allow its drill hall to be used by a Cadet unit “no instruction of a military nature may be given.” And this was less than three years before Hitler came into power and less than nine years before the greatest of all wars. It was, however, in accordance with the parsimonious edict that governed all military affairs at this time, that “no major war need be apprehended for the next ten years.” It was not until 1935 that the Cadet Force was again recognized and assisted by the Government. But even then it still suffered from strong political opposition, and for over two years of a war vital to our national existence remained at the pitifully low figure of 20,000. Then the War Office increased the grants and, enlisting the help of the Board of Education, afforded it real encouragement. As a result, numbers jumped in a few months to 200,000. That a Cadet Force was saved at all in 1930 was largely due to Allenby, who accepted the Presidency of a Cadet Association formed to carry on the movement. He used all his personality and influence to support the Association and to secure funds; and took a lively personal interest in it to the day of his death.

In 1933 Allenby became President of an institute for old soldiers known as the Veterans' Association, and by his exertions in raising funds enabled such improvement

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to be made that the name of the Club was changed to the Allenby (Services) Club. It still exists to commemorate his interest in soldiers and their welfare.

His interest in birds and animals was marked by his association with the Zoological Society; his Presidency of the Central Asian Society maintained his connexion with the part of the world in which he had so distinguished himself; his appointment as Gold Stick in Waiting, which went with his Colonelcy of the Life Guards, meant attendance at Court functions when he was in London. Except when the duties of these various institutions, which he carried out with characteristic thoroughness, claimed him, he spent his leisure in travel in the winter and in fishing in the spring and summer. Birds he had always with him.

On his return home in 1925 Allenby was offered Deal Castle as a residence. He and Lady Allenby spent a few months there, but neither cared for the seaside, and the house was too cold. They decided to make their permanent home in London and settled in 24 Wetherby Gardens, South Kensington, a conveniently sized and comfortable house. The small back garden became an aviary, in which Allenby soon had a collection of his favourites. In the winters the Allenbys invariably set out on some distant travel. In 1925-26 they visited Australia at the invitation of the Australian Government, went on to New Zealand for three weeks, and travelled home by Canada. In the winter of 1927-28 they went to South Africa, staying first with Sir Abe Bailey at Cape Town and then at Pretoria with Princess Alice and Lord Athlone, the Governor-General. Lord Athlone had been Allenby's subaltern in the early part of the South African War. The Allenbys went on to Southern Rhodesia, where unfortunately Lady Allenby had a severe attack of malaria at Victoria Falls. They returned home by Nairobi and Cairo.

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In October 1928 they went to the United States, Allenby having been invited to be present at the Convention of the American Legionaries, held that year by General Pershing in the picturesque old town of San Antonio, in Texas. They went on to Los Angeles, and spent some time in the studios of Hollywood, where they heard the first talking film—and did not appreciate it. Thence they went to San Francisco, the Grand Canyon, the Yosemite Valley, Santa Barbara, Santa Fé, Chicago, Washington, and New York.

The winter of 1929-30 was spent in India, with a week in Cairo on the return journey. Burma, Jamaica, Brazil, were among the many countries visited in other winters.

There was a curious ending to a visit to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in the winter of 1933-34. The Allenbys arrived at Batavia, in Java, from Singapore early in January 1934. A few days later word came to the Dutch Government of a plot against Allenby's life, to be attempted by some Japanese during his stay in Java. Being warned by the Governor that he would have to be closely shadowed and protected during his stay in the Dutch East Indies, Allenby realized that his holiday would be spoilt, and he abandoned it. He flew to Sumatra by plane and went thence by Dutch ship to Colombo. Whether there was any substance in the story of the plot, which seems on the face of it improbable, is unknown; presumably it was at the time thought sufficiently circumstantial to be passed on to the authorities in Java.

The most enterprising of Allenby's journeys was his last, in the winter of 1935-36, when he was well in his seventy-fifth year. He had read some time previously an article in the *Field* about an estancia in Patagonia where salmon-fishing could be obtained. He kept the article, thinking the time and opportunity might come when he could go there. In the autumn of 1935 he decided to

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attempt the adventure, though no one could give any information about Lake Traful, the reputed haunt of these salmon. A cable to the landlord of the estancia, a Major Dawson, received a satisfactory reply, and the Allenbys set out for Buenos Aires. The Ambassador to the Argentine was Sir Nevile Henderson, the innocent cause of Allenby's resignation in Egypt ten years earlier. Himself a keen fisherman, he assisted Allenby to make all the necessary arrangements for the journey to Patagonia. The visit was a great success. The Allenbys spent a month in a lovely spot with a perfect climate—day after day of brilliant sunshine but with cool evenings. The fishing was unique, landlocked salmon in shape and quality equal to those of the Tay, but hard to catch except in the early morning or late evening.

At home the Tay was Allenby's favourite fishing river, and in it he caught many salmon. For trout-fishing he had a beat on the Avon near Salisbury, rented from Colonel Bailey, of Lake. From this well-stocked stream Allenby caught many trout on the dry-fly, though his methods were once described by the water-bailiff as "a trifle military".

Shortly after his return home from Patagonia Allenby was elected Rector of Edinburgh University. He delivered his inaugural address on April 28. For some reason there is a tradition of rowdiness at this ceremony, and Allenby did not escape the usual accompaniment of hootings, cat-calls, and the like, which punctuated his address. He took it all with great good humour. His address on this occasion is printed at the conclusion of the present volume.

It was Allenby's last public function. A few days after his return to London he went out for a walk in apparently the best of health and spirits. He had arranged to go fishing on the following day. In the course of his walk he bought an addition to his aviary. When

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he returned to the house he talked for some time to Lady Allenby, and then went upstairs to his study. A few minutes later his butler, Pooley, entered the study and found Allenby lying dead across his desk. A blood-vessel in his brain had burst, and he had died instantly without pain or struggle. Death had given a quick and merciful end to one who had never feared him.

Allenby's death took place when conversations in Cairo between British and Egyptian delegations for the conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty of friendship and Alliance were nearing an satisfactory conclusion—the fitting sequel to his work in Egypt. The leaders of all three principal parties—the Wafd, the Liberals, and the Shaab—sent heartfelt messages of condolence. There is no doubt that his death was genuinely mourned by all shades of Egyptian opinion, and that memory of his work for Egypt still lives there.

His remains were cremated and his ashes buried in Westminster Abbey on May 19, near the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior.

REQUIEM

A scholar, a statesman, and a soldier.

SHAKESPEARE, *Measure for Measure*

IN spite of some foibles and faults, he was, beyond doubt, a very great man. His greatness was the result of a few striking qualities—a perfect simplicity of character without a particle of vanity or conceit, but with a thorough and strenuous self-reliance, a severe truthfulness, never misled by fancy or exaggeration, and an ever-abiding sense of duty and obligation.

SO wrote Greville of the Duke of Wellington on his death. The portrait will serve for Allenby without the change of a word. His foibles and faults were different from those of Wellington; he had less self-control, but he had less ambition and an even higher sense of obligation and duty. He had more natural tolerance and kindness than the great Duke, but resembled him in the directness and incisiveness and sometimes in the apparent inconsiderateness of his language.

Allenby was perhaps more akin in character to another great Englishman, his contemporary, Lord Grey of Fallodon, a simple, direct, loyal servant of his country, free from all personal vanity and jealousy. His biographer wrote of Grey that "his heart was not in the streets or in the council-chambers but in the woods and beside the streams". So was Allenby's. Like Grey, he was wholly country-bred, a type becoming all too rare in these days of crowded cities, spreading suburbs, and week-end countrymen; like Grey, he loved birds and enjoyed fishing.

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Allenby's qualities as a soldier have been described and summed up elsewhere. His claim to statesmanship is set out in the chapters of this volume which tell of his work in Egypt. It remains only to say something of a quality less known, his scholarship and taste for knowledge. It was a catholic taste and embraced the classics, much poetry and literature, natural history, horticulture, more than a little science, geography, and general history. When he acquired knowledge he acquired it attentively and exactly, and since he had a tenacious memory, he could always produce his knowledge accurately, thereby often confounding those with wider but less well-digested information. This memory extended to poetry, of which he could repeat much by heart. Allenby never ceased learning, just as he never ceased travelling. He had none of the vanity that leads a man to conceal or avoid what he does not know. When he came on some subject that interested him or concerned him he at once sought for knowledge, preferably by questioning some one who was informed. He had no very deep knowledge of any one subject. There were many who knew more of the ways of birds and beasts—his favourite subject; many who were wider read in his favourite authors; many who travelled more. But few can have got more pleasure out of both books and personal observation than did Allenby, or have made a wiser choice of interests.

He could on occasion talk well to a sympathetic listener, as he would listen well to some one who knew what he was talking about; but he had on the whole no great power of giving out what he knew. He was an indifferent lecturer, unless carefully prepared and rehearsed, and his impromptu speeches sometimes approached disaster. Nor did he write with freedom or ease; his letters dealt severely and baldly with the matter in hand, or were simple chronicles of events, unless some

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bird or beast or flower had attracted his attention; his official reports were clear and direct, but lacked any literary grace. That he had a feeling for words and the power to express himself when he took trouble may be illustrated by some extracts from his speeches and writings. Moreover, these extracts throw light on his character and attitude to life. The first is from a speech on gardens:

There is a mystery in the beauty of a blossom. It conveys a suggestion of self-conscious life; a suggestion which stimulates the imagination of even the dullest and the dumbest among us. We seem to detect in certain flowering plants a consciousness resembling intelligence. The delight exhibited by a plant in the enjoyment of good soil and genial environment, its happiness in sunlight and fresh air, are so obvious that one can with difficulty believe the feeling to be subconscious. The ingenuity with which the orchid ensures fertilization in the interest of its race, the cunning of the Sundew, of Venus' fly trap, and others in snaring insects for food, the shrinking from rough contact of the sensitive plants, entitle them to be considered as on a par with, at least, some of the lower forms of animal life. Flowers know slumber and waking, they know health and sickness, they riot in wilderness, yet live contentedly in confinement, they endure discipline, they profit by education. The gorgeous denizens of the wilderness and the hedgerows have, in many cases, been brought by the brain and hand of the gardener to a perfection of colour and form unattainable apart from his tutorial skill.

The second is from an address at the opening of the "Men of the Trees" exhibition:

Man's ingratitude to trees has been bad. Sinai was not always a desert; but the tamarisks which once abounded and supplied manna to wanderers in the wilderness are there no more. The forests of Palestine have disappeared; Carmel and Lebanon are bare; no longer is balm found in Gilead; and there a rider, however reckless, may urge his mount without danger of suffering the fate of Absalom.

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The next is taken from a magazine article:

The peoples of the earth were broken, physically and morally, on a larger scale than hitherto experienced, yet in no different fashion than a thousand times. What we have witnessed is the customary process of evolution in man's affairs, and always, when like shocks occur, those affected believe that civilization is crashing in ruin. But civilization survives, and the social system endures. Human nature is, in our days, not unlike what it has ever been; that is, on the whole, well-disposed and kindly. The Great War has taught the bitter lesson that even for the victors gain is outweighed by loss; and looking back through the pages of history, we note that the winnings of one war as often as not disappear in the next. Where are now the fruits of Napoleon's dazzling triumphs, or the gains of Bismarck's victorious combinations? For Freedom no ransom is too high.

There is something prophetic in this passage from an address to the British Legion in 1932:

It is good that we should meet each other often, recalling ancient memories and renewing old acquaintance. It is good for us and good for our children and all the younger generation. Over eighteen years have passed since you answered your country's call. It is difficult to realize that babies then in arms are now of man's estate—that those men and women who are just beginning to play an active part in the service of our country knew nothing about the war of their own experience. Those girls and boys have got to learn from you, lest the lessons you learnt with such suffering be wasted. True, they can read history, and should do so. But written history is no efficient substitute for the spoken word. On you who made history lies the duty of telling these young people how the war was fought and why, show those children what sacrifices were made, that the land of their fathers—this green pleasant land—might be saved, and Great Britain and the Empire secured to them against the direst efforts of their enemies.

Unless the rising generation learn now—and learn from you who know—they may have to pay again with pain and

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bitter tears the debt which you have already discharged.

Let us be true to the principles which unite and guide the British Legion. Show kindness in others' trouble, courage in our own. Hold together. Trust in God; and keep your powder dry.

While as a sample of his after-dinner speaking here is one from a banquet of the Merchant Taylors Company:

Man is the only animal which eats when not hungry or drinks when not thirsty. This is a definition of man, given with intent to blame. But to-night, even if not hungry, whether thirsty or otherwise, I think no one could have resisted the temptation offered by the Worshipful Company our Hosts. Nor can blame or shame attach to any of us who have enjoyed to the full these rare meats and these generous wines. Food is the first need of mankind, to maintain internal warmth: while clothes are a useful adjunct to help in maintaining exterior warmth. Clothes are of negligible importance in hot regions, gaining in value as colder climates are reached. In Equatorial Africa food only is wanted; clothing—except for a coating of wood ash to discourage mosquitoes—is not used. In the Arctic Circle Nature has provided seals, bears, reindeer, etc., which afford both food and raiment. In temperate regions, where we live, Nature has evolved the Merchant Taylors. To their industry and ability we owe it that the materials wherewith we clothe ourselves in winter and veil ourselves in summer are of satisfactory quality. It is because of the standard established by the Guild of Merchant Taylors that we guests are able to appear to-night decently garbed in stout broadcloth, and not in sackcloth or ragged rabbit-skins. For all these benefits, for the bounteous feast of which we have joyously partaken, and for the very garb we wear, we are indebted to our Hosts. Of my own feelings it is easy to speak; but not so easy to tell those of others. Here, with us, are great legal luminaries and diplomatists. The thoughts of a Judge are never known until he speaks. The thoughts of a Diplomatist may not be known even when he has spoken. But all are human beings like the rest of us, capable of gratitude; and in the name of each and of all I express our sense of gratitude for the hospitality we

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have enjoyed and for the kind way in which the toast of the Guests has been honoured.

Allenby had always a great sense of humour and was capable of schoolboy fun, even in his later years. His wit was not quick but was always tolerant and kindly.

Generosity, fair-mindedness, and loyalty were Allenby's most abiding qualities, and they were shown in his treatment of his friends and his foes, in his defence and support of all those who served him, in his attitude towards the Boers in the South African War, towards the Turks and even the Germans in the Great War, towards the Egyptians in the difficult years in Egypt.

Allenby was not outwardly a religious man; he seldom went to church and was broad-minded in matters of belief or observance. But few men knew their Bible better or read it more regularly. That he believed in life after death is shown by the two following extracts, from speeches made at the opening of a Cenotaph at Belfast in 1929, and of the Y.M.C.A. at Jerusalem in 1933.

At Belfast:

They have passed on, from Darkness through fire, into Light. Our Memorial to them is this Cenotaph, this Empty Tomb. It holds no mortal remains. Their graves are not here; their souls are in God's keeping; but we may believe that they are in spiritual touch with us to-day. And the Empty Tomb, round which we are standing, may symbolize a Tomb which heart-broken mourners found vacant nearly two thousand years ago. In despair they went to the Tomb; they came away with a sure and certain hope. For on that morning was given to them—and through them to all the World—the Revelation that Death's dread portal is, in truth, but the gate to Eternal Life.

At Jerusalem:

Believing in life beyond the tomb, we cannot but feel that in this Land of ancient strife, myriad spirits are about and around us; souls of friends and of enemies, now united,

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in mutual comprehension and full wisdom; free from the toils of the flesh, willing and able to help us mortals on the upward path.

Courage and truth—these are the foundations of any greatness, a man's or a nation's. They were Allenby's outstanding qualities. He was English to the core; born and brought up in the English countryside; made vigorous and hardy by country air and wholesome food; steeped from boyhood in the countryman's lore and in observation of the ways of birds and beasts; educated in the best English traditions of duty, justice, and fair play; gifted with a clear if not brilliant mind, which was developed on the sound if easy-going methods of English schools. A character with such origins will achieve greatness if circumstances and opportunity are favourable. They favoured Allenby, and his achievement was high.

So long as England can continue to breed leaders in Allenby's mould her greatness and prosperity will remain. There were dangers ahead before the disaster of the present war shook us from complacency and ignoble ease. Country life had given place to town life; courage and toughness seemed rated at lower value than of old; cleverness was being reckoned of more account than character; leadership was gained by caution rather than by daring; pleasure and personal advantage were being set before duty. The dangers and hardships of to-day are helping to bring back the old standards of courage, self-sacrifice, and hard work; they have proved that the town-bred man can show the bravery and toughness of the English race as well as his country forbears. These qualities will be very necessary in the great task before us of rebuilding a shaken world.

It may help in that task to read the story of one whose courage never failed him; who had the strength never to look back at a decision once taken, either for pride or for regret; who loved the English countryside

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and the English way of life and was prepared for any sacrifice to uphold it; who saw much of other lands and other peoples and was tolerant of other ways of life provided they were based on justice and fair dealing and not on self-interest; who knew much war but always spoke for peace; who was true to his own self and was never false to any man.

He was a great Englishman; may his example live and inspire us all in the testing years that lie ahead.

RECTORIAL ADDRESS TO EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY

By Lord Allenby

MORE than half a century ago I entered the Army, with little ambition, vague as to the future, accepting events as they came along.

I had no expectation or idea of attaining the rank of Field-Marshal; I never thought that your University might raise me to the dignity of a Doctor of Laws; that I should have the honour of receiving the Livingstone Gold Medal of the Royal Scottish Geographical Society; or—highest distinction of all—that I might be chosen by you as Rector of the University of Edinburgh.

All these things have come to pass.

Knowing that pride is a sin to be reprehended, while gratitude is commendable, I will not proclaim my pride; but I do express my gratitude to all those who have helped me on my way through life, especially to you who elected me for the exalted and honourable position in which I now stand.

As a mere soldier, I am diffident in addressing you, my fellow-members, who are superior to me in every branch of knowledge except, perhaps, the barren business of war—and, even in that, I am now no longer up-to-date.

I am fully conscious of my limitations; but the situation must be accepted, the duty has to be faced; nothing was ever won by shirking an issue or shrinking from an obligation.

Though I have not had the good fortune to enjoy a University education, I have been privileged to know men and women of intelligence and learning in all walks of life; and it has been my constant endeavour to profit by the association. In that effort I hope I have been successful. Moreover, I have always tried to keep my mind from stagnation; and in this I have been gratuitously aided by the system of continual inspection and frequent examination, by papers and word of mouth, which prevails in the Army and which no soldier—however unaspiring—is able to elude.

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We soldiers are sometimes looked down on as below the average educational standard; especially so, perhaps, cavalrymen—of whom I am one. However, I assure you that your armed forces take their profession seriously; are as earnest, industrious, and competent as any equal number of civilians. We are interested in and we study each our own technical branch, while appreciating whole-heartedly and with admiration the zeal and efficiency of our brothers-in-arms belonging to the other units in the Service—here at home and throughout the Empire overseas—all bound with spontaneous loyalty to one another, under and in humble duty to the King-Emperor.

But not only in the regular forces of the Crown is that sense of loyalty found. Linked thereby, united as one, the sons and daughters of the Empire, when the supreme test of the Great War came, were equal to every trial: joined the fighting services, bore uncomplainingly the brunt, and emerged victorious.

Since victory came many years have rolled by. What has victory given us? How do we stand?

Some of our statesmen and leaders, enthusiastic and optimistic, as well they might be, acclaimed the termination of hostilities as the glorious and welcome conclusion of a war which was to end all wars. The golden age had arrived, to stay with us eternally.

We have waited long. The golden promise has not yet materialized. Still, do not let us accept the belief that all our efforts were futile, that our sacrifices were offered in vain.

Truly, the fruit for which we hungered is not yet ripe for the gathering, but we were, perhaps, hasty and premature in expectation of reward; our disappointment may thus result from impatience, natural as that might be after relaxation from the long and almost intolerable strain.

During those terrible years humanity was shocked and shaken to a degree without precedent; mentally and morally we are still unbalanced. Furthermore, the loss of our best and bravest has stripped from the world the flower and pride of its youth.

Those who to-day should have been in the prime of manhood, able and eager to join with brain, heart, and hand in the colossal task of reconstruction, are gone before their

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work as citizens could even begin.

But though we deplore their loss we must not let ourselves be mastered by despair. The work has to be carried on; and it is for the young generation—with broad outlook and liberal education—to undertake the rebuilding of a broken world.

Here, in this venerable centre of universal knowledge, is offered the opportunity of acquiring that breadth of outlook, and of assimilating the wisdom of ages past and present; of laying the foundation of a liberal education.

Foundation, I say, meaningly, because education is never complete. Self-education should continue while life lasts.

It is on all of you who belong to the young and rising generation that the future of our civilization depends. You have got to fit yourselves now for the enterprise awaiting you. The responsibilities to be incurred will be heavy, but you dare not attempt to escape from them; they must be courageously undertaken and carried through. The labour, though severe, is honourable in the highest degree; yet remember that you cannot expect recognition by personal honours bestowed; you will have to set about the work in a spirit of altruism, and the reward for your altruism will be the inwardly sure knowledge that so far as in you lies you have done your duty and have deserved success, even if success has not crowned your efforts.

In the protracted course of international strife many deplorable acts were committed, even by civilized nations and Christian peoples, their sanguinary and fratricidal disputes involving in the quarrel communities of other faiths and of culture less advanced.

The prestige of the elder nations has been weakened thereby, as the more backward races see their would-be mentors fallen from the exalted moral standard which the mentors themselves erected.

It will require much time to undo the harm thus brought about, to recover the ground lost; but faith and firm resolve can remedy the evil, and it is worth doing.

It must be recognized that human nature remains as it has ever been: kindly, on the whole, and well-disposed; faithful in friendship; manifesting admirable qualities of self-abnegation and of superb courage in support of high ideals or defence of kith and kin. Such qualities may—it is true—become distorted in great crises, as when existence is at stake, and may

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become exaggerated and changed, till marked by ferocity and even cruelty in extreme trial; but, war at an end, old hatreds weaken and gradually disappear, though persisting longer between communities than between individuals.

The pity of it is that progress towards reconciliation is hampered and retarded by the fact that after a lengthy period of general insanity, such as was experienced in the years 1914-18 and which has not even now been completely cured, each nation has difficulty in recognizing recovery of reason by other nations; hence arise mutual suspicion and distrust. Thus fear is bred, and fear is an evil counsellor; it produces nothing better than a narrow nationalism—nationalism disguised as, and miscalled, patriotism, but which is at bottom only selfish jealousy.

Nationalism is commonly held up to admiration as a high virtue, while internationalism—which is, in other words, generous sympathy with our fellow-men—is branded as a crime, a surrender, a betrayal of our own peculiar interests and rights.

Until this view—this regrettable attitude—is altered we cannot hope for any enduring amelioration in international relations.

It is often said that war is in accordance with the law of nature, that man has always fought and always will fight, that human nature cannot be changed. As I have already suggested, human nature is not a bad nature; it need not be changed, but it can be trained and guided—by education and example—to its betterment.

From earliest days, in the evolution and rise of *homo sapiens*, competition has been bitter. From the beginning he found it cruelly hard to live; the strong arm was law, and only the fittest won through to survival. Man fought man, then family fought family; families combined for defence or aggression; tribes resulted from the association of the families, and held their own for a while against tribes similarly formed, till, eventually, tribes joined forces and nations came into being.

Nations now maintain internal peace and good order by means of their own organized police forces, who restrain personal and party brawling. But as yet there are no inter-

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national police, and nations continue to make war on each other freely.

To an unprejudiced and dispassionate observer there can be, however, no obvious reason why the rational procedure which has resulted in the establishment of a happy social state by the fusion in amity of once hostile tribes should not be extended to the creation of a wide comity of nations, nations independent yet interdependent—a world federation or fellowship.

And, in the end, war is not a satisfactory method of settling disputes. Ordeal by battle brings lasting benefit to neither combatant.

What have availed the victories of Napoleon Bonaparte? Where are the permanent advantages resulting from the political and military combinations, the strategical triumphs of Moltke and Bismarck?

Wars have been usually waged—in olden days—for the spoils of victory: increase of territory, acquisition of wealth, even glory to the victor. That lust for expansion is not yet quite dead, but the glory of conquest is departing; its gains are Dead Sea fruit, its legacy, bitter memories alone.

We earth-dwellers are prisoners on the planet; there is no way out. So, as we cannot escape from the proximity of our neighbours, it is surely better to live with them as friends than as enemies.

I am told on good authority that our globe can support human life for another two thousand million years or more.

If the men of science are correct in their estimate the earth is still young, barely middle-aged, and mankind is in a very early stage of babyhood. What sort of creatures our remote descendants may be in the world's old age, or under what conditions they will exist, we cannot even guess.

The old order changeth, the dragons of the prime have had their day, and a thousand million years hence evolution may have brought into being a type differing as widely from ourselves as the deinotherium from the dormouse.

But our interests lie in the problems of to-day, political, social, economic, all of immediate urgency; the near not the distant future is our instant concern, and we should concentrate on that.

There is danger in delay, for it seems likely that unless an

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effort in the right direction—a successful effort—is made soon the present social system will crumble in ruin, and many now alive may witness the hideous wreck. Then will loom the dreadful menace of the dark ages, returning, darker, black, universal in scope, long-lasting.

At the present moment, many years after the close of the war which was to bring enduring peace to all, we find the cleverest brains everywhere busily experimenting with new inventions for facilitating slaughter, building more horrible engines of destruction, brewing more atrocious poisons, designing more monstrous methods of murdering their fellow men and women.

If war comes on us the peaceful inhabitants of our so-called civilized communities—our women and children not excepted—will be as open to attack as the soldier in the field, for the convention that non-combatants are respected no longer obtains.

Recent progress in science has now given to the machine the mastery over man its maker. Until lately politicians and statesmen—who are the authors and the initiators of war—could feel safe in their own homes surrounded by their families. That happy security will be theirs no longer.

The knowledge of this may perhaps bring to the statesman a warning sense of his responsibility. The choice lies with him. Will the hardness of his heart prevail; must the narrowness of his outlook persist until he is schooled by poison gas and bomb; or will he call to mind the pact renouncing war as a solvent of differences, the pact signed by sixty nations, but now forgotten or disregarded? Is it too much to believe that the human intellect is equal to the problem of designing a world state wherein neighbours can live without molestation, in collective security? It does not matter what the state is called; give it any name you please—League of Nations, Federated Nations, United States of the World. Why should there not be a world police just as each nation has a national police force?

Many former obstacles have been cleared away. Science has overthrown barriers and given egress in all directions. Man is now able to navigate the atmosphere, plumb the deep seas, travel in three dimensions of space, move anywhere at a speed unimaginable to our fathers. Willingly or unwillingly,

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he has become a world citizen, and the duties of that citizenship cannot be evaded; duties calling for the whole-hearted co-operation of every man and woman alive, joined in mind and purpose to promote the good and the advancement of all.

And machinery is ready to hand. The League of Nations is alive and active, while courts exist for determining and adjusting all international differences, judicial and financial.

No nation at heart wants war, but in the course of history it has happened and is happening that ambitious leaders, inspired by a narrow nationalism, may exercise a compelling influence on impressionable and inexperienced youth to urge them on a path of promised glory. This, especially in countries which have suffered recent territorial loss or whose overcrowded population is looking for outlet, exerts a magnetic lure on immature minds.

Dictators are, however, but ephemeral phenomena; they do not represent the democracy, the sovereignty of the people, whose common sense is in the end the sole arbiter.

Misunderstandings and petty quarrels between individuals often occur in even the happiest families, but they are composed amicably, without resort to knife or pistol. So should it be in the case of bickering between nations.

But the world is in peril because of the lack of faith. Governments, distrusting treaty-makers, no longer hold treaties in respect, regarding them as merely temporary make-shifts. Lasting agreement, permanent mutual understanding, have to be founded on truth and honesty. A pledged word ought to be as binding on the State as on the individual. In ordinary private life a partner to a contract is bound by law; the State should be bound by honour.

A distinguished scholar and profound thinker, the President of Columbia University, in words spoken not long ago, has emphasized the fact that the fundamental evil in our day is the world-wide lack of confidence.

He points out, too, that the nations of the world are now precisely where the thirteen American states were after they had gained independence and before they had organized a federal form of government.

In his opinion world organization, world consultation and co-operation, are essential to world prosperity and international peace—as essential for the nations of the world

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to-day as for the thirteen independent, competitive, and self-centred states of America in the eighteenth century.

I believe he is right. To my mind his are wise words. When mankind has matured in wisdom it will be generally accepted that international interests are inseparably interwoven.

When that is universally appreciated such epithets as Militarist and Pacifist will disappear, obsolete, forgotten, and none of us will be afraid to stand forth and say, with Abou Ben Adhem, "Write me as one that loves his fellow-men."

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